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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse whether gender diversity on the decision-making 
bodies of Spanish listed companies may influence the decisions made by these bodies. 
To achieve this general goal, we propose four specific objectives.  
 
The first aim is to analyse whether gender diversity on Audit Committees 
(hereinafter AC’s) impacts on the financial reporting quality, measured in terms of the 
type of opinion issued by external auditors in their audit reports. We analyse unqualified 
and qualified audit opinions. Moreover, the qualifications are divided into two groups: 
(1) errors, non-compliance and the omission of information and (2) uncertainties. 
Gender diversity is defined as the presence of women on AC’s; the percentage of 
women making up AC’s; the number of executive, institutional and independent women 
on AC’s; and the number of AC’s chaired by women. After controlling for other audit 
report qualifications-related factors, the results do not show a negative association 
between gender diversity on AC’s and the probability of receiving qualifications with 
errors, non-compliance and the omission of information, but we do find a significant 
and positive relationship between the number of AC’s chaired by women and the 
likelihood of disclosing qualifications with uncertainties, suggesting that having 
chairwomen on AC’s would enhance the financial reporting quality. 
 
The second aim of this thesis is to analyse whether a gender wage gap exists among 
boards of directors (hereinafter BD’s) of companies listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange from 2004 to 2011. We hypothesize that the percentage of female directors on 
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BD’s, the presence of female directors on Nomination and Compensation Committees, 
the presence of well-qualified independent female directors on BD’s, the sector and the 
geographical region have an effect on the gender wage gap. The results show that the 
percentage of female directors on BD’s and the geographical region have no effect on 
the gender wage gap. On the other hand, the findings report that the presence of women 
on the Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender gap in pay and it 
is reduced when the BD includes independent female directors who have gained a 
degree and when the company operates in the finance and real estate services sector. In 
addition, the results demonstrate that the seniority of the female director decreases the 
gender gap in pay, while there is a rise when the companies are bigger and the size of 
the BD and the return on assets increase. Thus, these conclusions should encourage 
regulatory bodies to adopt forceful rules in order to mitigate the gender gap in pay.  
 
The third objective is to examine whether gender diversity on BD’s influences the 
voluntary formation of their board sub-committees. Concretely, we hypothesize that the 
number of women on BD’s, the percentage of independent, executive and institutional 
female directors on BD’s, the percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s 
and the remuneration of female directors on BD’s have an effect on the voluntary 
creation of board sub-committees. The results show that the number of women on BD’s 
only encourages the voluntary creation of an Executive Commission, while the 
percentage of independent women on BD’s increases the voluntary creation of all or 
some of their board sub-committees and the Committee for Supervision and Control. 
The percentage of female executive directors on BD’s reduces the likelihood of creating 
an Executive Committee. Furthermore, the percentage of institutional female directors 
on BD’s reduces the formation of all or some of their board sub-committees. Female 
directors on BD’s, who hold shares, exert a positive influence on the voluntary 
formation of an Executive Committee. Finally, the findings reveal that the 
compensation of female directors on BD’s does not contribute to the voluntary creation 
of all or some of the board sub-committees or to the formation of an Executive 
Committee and a Committee for Supervision and Control.  
 
Finally, the fourth objective of this thesis is to study the impact of gender diversity 
on BD’s on the dividend policy. We hypothesize that the percentage of female directors, 
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the percentage of independent, institutional and executive female directors and the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s have an impact on the dividend 
payment. Our results show that the percentage of female directors and the percentage of 
shares held by female directors on BD’s are positively associated with the dividend 
payout, while the percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s has a negative 
impact on the dividend payment. The percentage of independent and executive female 
directors has no effect on the dividend payout. 
 
The economic effects of the gender diversity in companies have experienced 
increased interest in the financial and accounting disciplines in recent years, being 
largely the contributions relating to the relation between gender diversity and some 
aspects of the companies (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Kulich et al., 
2010; Van Pelt, 2013). The introduction of gender diversity to AC’s and BD’s has an 
important role in the decision-making bodies of Spanish firms. Our evidence supports 
Act 3/2007 of 22 March, about equality of gender on Spanish decision-making bodies, 
which requires Spanish listed firms to achieve a gender quota of 40% on BD’s from 
2007 to 2015, since AC’s chaired by women increase the likelihood of disclosing 
qualifications with uncertainties, gender diversity on BD’s has an impact on the gender 
gap in pay, board diversity increases the board sub-committees and women’s presence 
on BD’s has an impact on the dividend policy. In sum, women have had to overcome 
external and internal barriers to obtain top positions in firms and exert a great impact on 
corporate governance. Nevertheless, the results show that there is a limited presence of 
female directors in high positions in companies; consequently, the progress made is still 
too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target of achieving a gender quota of 40% on 
corporate boards. For this reason, it is recommendable that stronger government 
sanctions combined with more effective equality plans within companies are required 
for the quota to be met and it is also necessary to continue to conduct research about 
gender diversity in decision-making bodies, considering that gender diversity affects the 
functioning and efficiency of AC’s and BD’s. 
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RESUMEN 
 
 
 
 
 
La idea de esta tesis es analizar si la diversidad de género en los órganos de decisión 
de las empresas cotizadas españolas puede influir en la toma de decisiones de estos 
órganos. Para alcanzar este objetivo general, proponemos cuatro objetivos específicos. 
 
El primer objetivo es analizar si la diversidad de género en los Comités de Auditoría 
(de aquí en adelante, AC’s) tiene un impacto en la calidad de la información financiera, 
medida como el tipo de opinión que emiten los auditores externos en los informes de 
auditoría. Analizamos los informes de auditoría con y sin salvedades. Además, las 
salvedades están divididas en dos grupos: (1) errores, incumplimiento y omisión de 
información y (2) incertidumbres. La diversidad de género se define como la presencia 
de mujeres en los AC’s; el porcentaje de mujeres en los AC’s; el número de mujeres 
ejecutivas, institucionales e independientes del AC y el número de AC’s presididos por 
mujeres. Después de controlar otros factores del informe de auditoría relacionados con 
las salvedades, los resultados no muestran una asociación negativa entre la diversidad 
en los AC’s y la probabilidad de recibir salvedades por errores, incumplimientos y 
omisión de información, pero encontramos una relación positiva entre el número de 
AC’s presididos por mujeres y la probabilidad de publicar salvedades por 
incertidumbres, esto sugiere que tener mujeres presidentas en los AC’s mejoraría la 
calidad de la información financiera. 
 
La segunda idea de esta tesis es analizar si existe una brecha salarial por razón de 
género en los Consejos de Administración (en adelante, BD) de las empresas cotizadas 
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de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid desde 2004 a 2011. Nuestra hipótesis es que el 
porcentaje de mujeres en el BD, la presencia de mujeres en el Comité de 
Nombramientos y Retribuciones, el nivel de formación de las mujeres independientes 
del BD, el sector y la localización geográfica tienen un efecto en la brecha salarial por 
razón de género. Los resultados muestran que el porcentaje de mujeres en el BD y la 
zona geográfica no tienen efecto en la brecha salarial por razón de género. Por otra 
parte, los resultados indican que la presencia de mujeres en el Comité de 
Nombramientos y Retribución incrementa la brecha salarial por razón de género y esta 
se reduce cuando en el BD hay mujeres independientes que han adquirido un grado y 
cuando las empresas operan en el sector financiero e inmobiliario. Además, los 
resultados también demuestran que la antigüedad de las consejeras disminuye la brecha 
salarial por razón de género, mientras que hay un incremento cuando las empresas son 
más grandes y el tamaño del BD y los rendimientos de los activos aumentan. Por lo 
tanto, estas conclusiones deberían incentivar a los organismos reguladores a adoptar 
normativas más contundentes para mitigar la brecha salarial por razón de género. 
 
El tercer objetivo es examinar si la diversidad de género en los BD’s influye en la 
formación voluntaria de Comisiones Delegadas del consejo. Concretamente, nosotros 
suponemos que el número de mujeres del BD, el porcentaje de mujeres independientes, 
ejecutivas e institucionales de los BD’s, el porcentaje de acciones en manos de las 
mujeres del BD y la remuneración de las mujeres del BD tienen efecto sobre la creación 
voluntaria de Comités Delgados. Los resultados muestran que el número de mujeres en 
los BD’s solo fomenta la creación voluntaria de una Comisión Ejecutiva, mientras que 
el porcentaje de mujeres independientes del BD incrementa la creación voluntaria de 
todas o algunas de las Comisiones Delegadas del consejo y los Comités de Supervisión 
y control. El porcentaje de mujeres ejecutivas del BD reduce la probabilidad de crear 
una Comisión Ejecutiva. Además, el porcentaje de mujeres institucionales del BD 
reduce la formación de todas o algunas de las Comisiones Delegadas del consejo. El 
porcentaje de acciones en manos de las mujeres del BD ejercen una influencia positiva 
en la formación voluntaria de una Comisión Ejecutiva. Para finalizar, los resultados 
revelan que la retribución de las mujeres del BD no contribuye a la creación voluntaria 
de todas o algunas de las Comisiones Delegadas del consejo, ni a la formación de una 
Comisión Ejecutiva ni a la creación de una Comisión de Supervisión y Control.  
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Finalmente, el cuarto objetivo de esta tesis es estudiar el impacto de la diversidad de 
género en los BD’s y la política de dividendos. Nosotros suponemos que el porcentaje 
de consejeras, el porcentaje de mujeres independientes, institucionales y ejecutivas del 
BD, y el porcentaje de acciones de las mujeres del BD tienen un impacto en el pago de 
dividendos. Nuestros resultados muestran que el porcentaje de mujeres y el porcentaje 
de acciones en manos de las mujeres del BD esta positivamente asociado con el pago de 
dividendos, mientras que el porcentaje de mujeres institucionales del BD tiene un 
impacto negativo en el pago de dividendos. El porcentaje de mujeres independientes y 
ejecutivas del BD no tiene un efecto en el pago de dividendos. 
 
El efecto económico de la diversidad de género en las empresas ha incrementado el 
interés de la disciplina financiera y contable en los últimos años, siendo extensas las 
contribuciones obtenidas sobre la relación entre la diversidad de género y algunos 
aspectos de las empresas (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Kulich et al., 
2010; Van Pelt, 2013). La introducción de la diversidad de género en los AC’s y BD’s 
tiene un papel importante en las órganos de decisión de las empresas españolas. Nuestra 
evidencia apoya la Ley 3/2007 de 22 Marzo, sobre la igualdad de género en los órganos 
de decisión españoles, que exige a las empresas cotizadas españolas alcanzar una cuota 
de mujeres del 40% en los BD’s desde 2007 hasta 2015, ya que los AC’s presididos por 
mujeres incrementan la probabilidad de divulgar salvedades con incertidumbres, la 
diversidad de género en el BD tiene un impacto en la brecha salarial por razón de 
género, la diversidad del consejo incrementa la creación de Comités Delegados y la 
presencia de mujeres en los BD’s tiene un impacto en la política de dividendos. En 
resumen, las mujeres han tenido que superar barreras internas y externas para conseguir 
altos cargos en las empresas y proporcionar un gran impacto en el gobierno corporativo. 
Sin embargo, los resultados muestran que hay una limitada presencia de mujeres en los 
altos cargos de las compañías, y en consecuencia, los avances son todavía demasiado 
lentos para alcanzar una cuota de mujeres del 40% en los BD’s. Por esta razón, se 
recomiendan fuertes sanciones gubernamentales combinados con más planes de 
igualdad efectivos dentro de las empresas necesarios para conseguir la cuota establecida 
y también es necesario continuar investigando acerca de la diversidad de género en los 
órganos de decisión, considerando que la diversidad de género afecta al funcionamiento 
y la eficiencia de los AC’s y BD’s. 
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INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
 
 
 
 
La investigación sobre la repercusión de la mujer en los órganos de decisión y 
control de las empresas ha incrementado el interés público y académico en los últimos 
años (Krishnan y Pearsons, 2008; Ye et al. 2010). La representación femenina en la alta 
dirección y en los puestos de responsabilidad de las empresas es todavía pequeña en la 
mayoría de los países, aunque este porcentaje ha aumentado en Estados Unidos y varios 
países europeos (Catalyst, 2004). 
 
En España han sido diversos los autores que confirman el ligero incremento de 
mujeres en el mercado laboral en los últimos años (Mateos et al., 2006; Del Brío y Del 
Brío, 2009, entre otros). Dos razones fundamentales podrían explicar la evolución de la 
diversidad de género en el ámbito nacional. La primera de ellas se refiere a los cambios 
políticos que ha sufrido España, tras el paso por una dictadura, que han llevado a la 
mujer a acceder a puestos de trabajo hasta ahora reservados para los hombres. Los 
cambios políticos han desatado un cambio cultural en la sociedad, provocando el 
reconocimiento de las mujeres en el ámbito personal y laboral. Ambos cambios han 
favorecido el incremento generalizado de la educación de las mujeres, impulsándolas en 
el contexto socio-laboral, y llevándolas a una independencia económica, que había sido 
obviada durante siglos a la población femenina. Algunos gobiernos, como los de 
Noruega y España, han regulado la composición de género en los BD’s de las empresas 
cotizadas implantando un sistema de cuotas. El nombramiento de mujeres en los BD’s 
de las empresas ha incrementado la delegación de funciones de responsabilidad y 
reconocimiento a las mujeres. La segunda razón se refiere a los cambios en materia 
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legislativa, más concretamente en derechos y leyes que han supuesto la igualdad entre 
hombres y mujeres. Los cambios políticos sufridos en España tras el fin de la dictadura 
en 1975 hasta la actualidad han llevado a la publicación de un conjunto de Códigos de 
Buen Gobierno Corporativo y leyes que recomendaban la igualdad de género en el 
ámbito laboral. 
 
Estos cambios políticos, culturales, y legislativos han ido acompañados por cambios 
económicos. Los fraudes financieros ocurridos en las últimas décadas tanto a nivel 
nacional como internacional junto con la crisis económico-financiera mundial han 
llevado a las organizaciones a perder la transparencia en la gestión empresarial, la 
calidad de la información financiera y la credibilidad de los inversores.  
 
La evidencia previa demuestra que la presencia de la mujeres en los BD’s influye en 
los resultados empresariales (Adler, 2001; Krishnan y Park, 2005), en la política de 
dividendos (Van Pelt, 2013 and Wellalage et al., 2012) y en la calidad de la información 
financiera o en el fomento de buenas prácticas corporativas (Burgess y Tharenou, 2002; 
Rogelberg y Rumery, 1996), entre otras cuestiones.  
 
La pérdida de la calidad de la información financiera y la credibilidad de los 
inversores han sido dos de los principales factores que han llevado a las empresas a 
demandar mecanismos de control internos y externos. El Código Unificado de Buen 
Gobierno Corporativo (CUBG, 2006), conocido como Código Conthe, recomendaba la 
constitución voluntaria de AC’s entre otras comisiones. Una de las principales 
funciones de los AC’s es revisar los estados financieros antes de remitirlos al BD. En 
2002, se publicó la Ley de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero, obligando a las 
empresas cotizadas a constituir un AC. Trabajos previos (DeZoort y Salterio, 2001; 
Goodwin-Stewart y Kent, 2006) han evidenciado que la existencia de los AC’s 
favorecía la obtención de informes de auditoría favorables, implicando la publicación de 
información financiera de calidad. Respecto a la diversidad de género en los AC’s, la 
evidencia previa revela que la presencia de mujeres en los AC’s redujo la probabilidad 
de recibir informes de auditoría con salvedades (Ittonen et al., 2010) y aumentó la 
calidad de la información financiera (Qi y Tian, 2012). 
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Por otra parte, la retribución de los hombres ha sido durante décadas superior a la 
percibida por las mujeres, originando una brecha salarial por razón de género. Estudios 
previos han documentado la existencia de diferencias salariales por razón de género 
tanto a nivel nacional (Hernández, 1995; Palacio y Simón, 2002) como internacional 
(Chu Ng, 2004; Cho, 2007). La paulatina incorporación de mujeres a los puestos de 
responsabilidad de las empresas les ha permitido realizar trabajos que habían sido 
reservados para los hombres durante décadas. Diversas han sido las teorías que han 
intentado explicar la brecha salarial por razón de género, entre las cuales destacan la 
teoría del capital humano (Varela et al., 2010) y la segregación ocupacional (De la Rica, 
2007).  
 
Entre las recomendaciones principales de los Códigos de Buen Gobierno españoles 
se anunciaba la constitución voluntaria de Comisiones Delegadas del BD. Las 
Comisiones Delegadas han sido modificadas a lo largo de las publicaciones de los 
Códigos de Buen Gobierno, siendo ahora las recomendadas por el CUBG (2006) el 
Comité Ejecutivo, el Comité de Nombramientos y Retribuciones y la Comisión de 
Estrategia e Inversiones, además del AC obligatorio por ley. Además, la creación 
voluntaria de Comisiones Delegadas varía en función del país y del Código de Buen 
Gobierno emitido en cada momento. Muchos estudios han analizado la creación 
voluntaria de Comités de Nombramiento (Carson, 2002), del Comité de Retribución 
(Liao y Hsu, 2013) y de los AC’s (Collier y Zaman, 2005; Pucheta-Martínez y De 
Fuentes, 2007). Estudios previos evidencian la relación existente entre la presencia de 
mujeres en los BD’s y la supervisión y control de las actividades del BD (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). Otros trabajos empíricos han examinado la relación existente entre la 
presencia de mujeres en el BD y la creación voluntaria de Comités de Nombramiento 
(Ruigrok et al. 2006), de Comités de Retribución (Carter et al. 2007) y de Comités de 
Auditoría (Kesner, 1988).  
 
La política de dividendos de las empresas ha reducido los problemas de agencia que 
surgen entre propietarios y gerentes mediante la reducción del flujo de caja libre 
disponible de los gerentes (Grossman y Hart, 1980). Este argumento es apoyado por 
autores previos (Easterbrook, 1984; Díez and Esteban, 2001; Angelo et al., 2004), 
quienes han evidenciado que el pago de dividendos reduce los costes de agencia. La 
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política de dividendos es considerada como la política económica y financiera más 
importante para los gestores e inversores, ya que afecta al valor y la capacidad 
financiera y económica de la empresa. La evidencia previa ha documentado la relación 
existente entre la política de dividendos y los consejeros independientes (Sharma, 2011; 
O’Connor, 2013), los consejeros institucionales (Khan, 2006; Al-Kuwari, 2012), los 
consejeros ejecutivos (Maury and Pajuste, 2002; Mansourinia et al., 2013 y la 
diversidad de género en los BD’s (Knyazeva et al., 2009; Wellalage et al., 2012). 
Respecto a esta última línea de investigación, los resultados han revelado que la 
diversidad de género en los BD’s incrementa el pago de dividendos a los accionistas 
(Byoun et al., 2013; Van Pelt, 2013).  
 
Así pues, el principal objetivo de esta tesis es analizar el efecto que la reciente 
incorporación de las mujeres en los órganos de decisión y control de las empresas 
cotizadas españolas tiene en las decisiones que se toman en los mismos. Concretamente, 
estudiamos si la diversidad de género en los AC’s influye en la calidad de la 
información financiera que publican las empresas, en la brecha salarial que surge entre 
directivos y directivas de los BD’s, en la creación de comisiones delegadas del BD y en 
la política de pago de dividendos. En este sentido, y como veremos a lo largo de la 
investigación, se ha intentado explicar cómo repercute la diversidad de género en los 
puestos de responsabilidad en las decisiones empresariales, desde que las empresas 
cotizadas españolas están obligadas a elaborar y publicar el Informe Anual de Gobierno 
Corporativo, es decir, desde el año 2004. 
 
La muestra utilizada en esta tesis está compuesta por las empresas que cotizan la 
bolsa de Madrid desde 2004 hasta 2012. La metodología empleada para contrastar 
empíricamente las hipótesis planteadas que nos permitirán alcanzar los objetivos 
propuestos es una regresión logística para el primer y el tercer capítulo, y una regresión 
lineal para el segundo y cuarto. 
 
La tesis está estructurada en cuatro capítulos que argumentan los objetivos 
planteados previamente.  
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En el primer capítulo tratamos de alcanzar el primero de los objetivos planteados, es 
decir, estudiar cómo la diversidad de género en los AC’s afecta a la calidad de la 
información financiera. Para ello revisamos trabajos empíricos previos que analizan la 
presencia de las mujeres en los AC’s y la calidad de la información financiera (Ittonen 
et al. 2010; Qi y Tian, 2012). Para medir la calidad de la información financiera 
publicada por las empresas utilizamos la opinión emitida por los auditores externos en 
los informes de auditoría, distinguiendo entre informes de auditoría que contienen 
salvedades por errores e incumplimiento de principios y normas contables generalmente 
aceptados, inclusive la omisión de información, y por otra parte, aquellos que contienen 
salvedades por incertidumbres. Varios trabajos previos han tenido como principal 
objetivo analizar la calidad de la información financiera y la demanda de AC’s en las 
organizaciones (Abbott et al, 2003; Turley y Zaman, 2004; Goodwin-Stewart y Kent, 
2006). La mayoría de la evidencia empírica se publicó a finales del siglo XX y 
principios del siglo XXI en países anglosajones, ya que son los países pioneros en 
Códigos de Buen Gobierno Corporativo. 
 
La idea principal del segundo capítulo es analizar si existen diferencias salariales 
entre directivos y directivas de los BD’s de las empresas cotizadas españolas, y si 
existen, averiguar qué factores podrían explicarlas. Para ello, presentamos las teorías 
que explican la existencia de la brecha salarial por razón de género y realizamos una 
revisión de la normativa más relevante en cuanto a la equidad de género en el ámbito 
nacional. Los estudios previos sobre diferencias salariales por razón de género se 
realizaron mayoritariamente en países de habla inglesa, países de Europa del este y 
algunos países asiáticos. Sin embargo, la escasa literatura española puede deberse a que 
los informes anuales que presentaban las empresas no incluían las remuneraciones de 
los consejeros hasta 2003, cuando se publicó la Ley de Transparencia de las Sociedades 
Cotizadas (Ley 26/2003), que junto a la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(CNMV), obligaron a las empresas a publicar el salario de los consejeros. Este capítulo 
adquiere especial relevancia en el ámbito empresarial, ya que gran parte de la literatura 
previa centra su análisis en las Encuestas Europeas de Estructura Salarial (EEES), 
mientras que este trabajo utiliza los datos proporcionados por los Informes de Gobierno 
Corporativo publicado por las empresas, y también porque hay escasos trabajos que 
traten de estudiar la brecha salarial por razón de género en el ámbito del BD.  
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En el tercer capítulo de la tesis analizamos si la diversidad de género en el BD 
contribuye a la creación voluntaria de Comisiones Delegadas del mismo. Para ello, se 
realiza una revisión de las recomendaciones efectuadas en los Códigos de Buen 
Gobierno españoles sobre la constitución voluntaria de comisiones delegadas del BD. 
Además, realizamos una exhaustiva revisión de trabajos previos que estudian si los 
BD’s de las organizaciones crean voluntariamente comisiones delegadas. Por otra parte, 
también revisamos los escasos trabajos empíricos previos centrados en la relación que 
se pone de manifiesto entre la presencia de mujeres en el BD y la creación voluntaria de 
comisiones delegadas del mismo. La investigación empírica previa basada en la 
constitución de Comisiones Delegadas ha tenido lugar básicamente en países 
anglosajones, y la mayoría de ellos no han tenido en cuenta el impacto de la diversidad 
de género en la creación voluntaria de Comités Delegadas.  
 
El propósito del cuarto y último capítulo de la tesis doctoral es realizar un análisis de 
la asociación existente entre la presencia de mujeres en el BD y la política de pago de 
dividendos establecida por las empresas. Para ello, hemos llevado a cabo una revisión 
de aquellos trabajos empíricos que documentaban el efecto de la política de dividendos 
en las organizaciones, concretamente en la reducción de los problemas de agencia, y 
aquellos que estudian la relación entre la diversidad de género en el BD y la política de 
pago de dividendos. Apoyándonos en la evidencia previa hemos planteado un conjunto 
de hipótesis para alcanzar el objetivo propuesto. Los estudios previos basados en la 
repercusión de la política de dividendos en las organizaciones han sido realizados 
mayoritariamente en países no europeos. Sin embargo, hay que destacar que han sido 
pocos los estudios que han examinado la relación existente entre la política de 
dividendos y la diversidad de género en los BD’s.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
GENDER DIVERSITY IN AUDIT COMMITTEES 
AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent corporate governance literature has acknowledged that gender diversity may 
affect the functioning and efficiency of corporate boards and committees (see e.g., 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Huse and Solberg, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Huse et al., 
2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010 and Rose, 2007). This can explain why one of the most 
relevant issues currently facing the shareholders and managers of modern firms, mass 
media, politicians and legislators, among others, is gender diversity within the corporate 
governance system. Given the emphasis on gender diversity as a part of good corporate 
governance, the relationship between gender diversity and financial reporting quality 
deserves both theoretical and empirical examination.  
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the growing literature on the role of women 
in corporate governance and, more concretely, on the effectiveness of AC in terms of 
the enhancement of financial information quality. Spanish firms have voluntarily 
improved their committees (García, 2010), among them the AC. According to Leuz et 
al. (2003), earnings management is more intense in countries like Spain with weak legal 
protection for investors, where insiders and even large shareholders enjoy large private 
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control benefits. As a result, financial reporting quality could be severely damaged by 
accounting manipulation practices, especially in countries such as Spain where the 
litigation risk is low. In this sense, Sierra et al. (2012) have shown that AC’s reduce 
earnings management in Spanish firms, which enhances financial reporting quality. 
Consistent with this idea is the necessity to encourage the creation of active AC’s. Thus, 
we analyse whether gender diversity in AC’s influences the quality of the financial 
information reported by companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, measured in 
terms of the type of opinion issued by external auditors in their audit reports.  
 
An AC may influence the issued audit report in two ways. Firstly, the existence of an 
AC may reduce the likelihood of receiving qualifications for errors or non-compliance, 
since it can put pressure on management to accept the auditor’s proposed adjustments 
(see Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes, 2007; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). 
Thus, the AC could have an effective role in reducing the probability of a qualified audit 
report or at least the frequency of qualifications. Moreover, McMullen (1996) observed 
that AC’s ask questions of both auditors and management as part of their oversight 
function and may thereby reduce the risk of material errors in financial statements by 
providing an information flow between the BD’s, external auditors, internal auditors 
and company management. Secondly, the AC may affect the issuance of qualifications 
concerning uncertainties. The auditor may acquiesce to management demands for an 
unqualified opinion, in which case they would include an uncertainty (Carcello and 
Neal, 2000). In this regard, the effectiveness of the AC would lead to greater disclosure.  
 
The wake of financial scandals in the last decade has drawn sharp criticism of the 
quality of financial information and the credibility of the financial system in general, 
among others. Examples of these scandals include Ahold in 2003 in the Netherlands; 
Enron in 2001 in the US and Afinsa-Fórum Filatélico in 2006 in Spain. Meanwhile, a 
series of regulations and corporate governance recommendations have been issued at 
both the national and the international level in an effort to mitigate the problem. Among 
these regulations, the publication of Codes of Corporate Good Governance (CGGs) can 
be highlighted. Numerous countries, including Spain, have shown an interest in CGGs 
(an extensive analysis of the most important CGGs can be found in Ferruz et al., 2010). 
AC’s play an important role as a mechanism of corporate governance (Turley and 
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Zaman, 2004). One of the main functions of AC’s is to review the financial statements 
before they are sent to the BD (CUBG, 2006). In addition, the AC should supervise the 
internal audit function of the firm and have important functions in terms of risk 
management (CUBG, 2006). In Spain, the Financial System Reform Act of 2002 (Law 
44/2002, of 22 November) required that listed firms create AC’s. 
 
The findings from our study contribute to the extant literature in several ways. 
Firstly, our research shows that AC’s chaired by women are positively associated with 
the disclosure of qualifications with uncertainties, suggesting an enhancement of the 
quality of financial information. The evidence we provide is important as it reinforces 
the belief that some aspects of gender diversity in a corporate governance system is 
likely to be useful for creating value to stakeholders such as financial information users 
or shareholders, by improving the reliability of financial reporting. These results suggest 
that women in AC’s have an impact on the quality of information when they are in a 
position to exert significant influence. Secondly, the findings of this paper suggest that 
the historical background of Spain could, to some extent, have influenced these results. 
Spain is a society that is different from other societies since it was branded by the 
experience of the Franco dictatorship, which lasted from 1939 until 1975. The Franco 
regime’s ideology was fiercely traditionalist, where women had no access to senior 
positions in the hierarchy, and were engaging in manual work and domestic family life. 
With the end of the dictatorship and the advent of democracy, this traditional, male-
dominated society gave way to a more liberated order that has allowed women to climb 
to the highest positions of professional life. Although the legal, political, social and 
cultural changes in Spain in recent years have gradually increased gender diversity in 
senior management positions (CUBG, 2006; Effective Equality Act, Basic Law 3/2007, 
of 22 March), it seems that too short a time has passed to reach a definitive conclusion. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and gender 
diversity.  
 
Additionally, this study is especially relevant to a country like Spain, as the empirical 
evidence that is currently available focuses largely on the Anglo-Saxon world, where 
the situation is relatively different from Spain. The business context in which Spanish-
listed firms operate is characterised by less developed capital markets (as is the case in 
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most continental European countries), significant ownership concentration, lower levels 
of protection for minority investors, stronger presence of majority shareholders who are 
ideally placed to guide managers’ work and a system in which firms are obliged to raise 
funds in the form of bank borrowings. Thus, these institutional, legal and corporate 
governance features that make Spain so different from the situation in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (including the US), which embody the contexts in which discussions on 
gender diversity in AC’s exist, may affect the AC’s efficiency and its impact on audit 
reports. Therefore, this investigation may provide new insights into the association 
between gender diversity in corporate governance systems, and AC’s in particular, and 
auditor reporting behaviour in the Spanish setting, which highlights the importance of 
studying this relationship.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: this introduction is followed by a review of 
the existing literature and development of the hypotheses we wish to test. The third 
section describes the methodology and samples used in the study and the fourth section 
shows the results obtained. In the final section, we discuss our conclusions and explain 
the limitations inherent to this study, while at the same time pointing to possible future 
lines of research.  
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
1.2.1. Literature Review 
 
Like previous research (Carter et al., 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008), this study draws on 
agency theory to examine the link between gender diversity on AC’s and the quality of 
financial information. The separation of management from ownership in the modern 
corporation provides an ideal context for the operation of agency theory. This theory 
describes the relationship between a principal (e.g. shareholder and other stakeholders 
such as users of financial information or blockholders) and the agent of the principal 
(e.g. directors and managers), often considering the costs of resolving conflicts and 
aligning interests across groups. Problems arise because of the separation of ownership 
from management and the resulting inability of the owners to observe the actions of 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Owners have incentives to demand control 
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devices to reduce the agency costs associated with information asymmetry (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Demands for monitoring may result in 
external audits (Chow, 1982; Anderson et al., 1993), the formation of AC’s (Pincus et 
al., 1989; Menon and Williams, 1994) and the publication of the risk-related 
information of the firms as a communication strategy to reduce agency costs and to 
enhance corporate reputation (Oliveira et al., 2013), among other solutions. The use of 
AC’s can be considered an important part of the decision control system for internal 
monitoring by a BD (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). A common assumption in 
agency theory is that outside directors would act independently from their inside 
director counterparts and would act as good monitors for shareholders’ interests.  
 
AC’s and the quality of financial information have been the subject of numerous 
studies. The wave of financial scandals that have occurred in recent years has led to the 
mandatory requirement for AC’s in listed companies. The presence of AC’s in listed 
companies is key to the eradication of bad accounting practice. Numerous empirical 
studies, including Beasley et al. (2000), Carcello and Neal (2000), Deli and Gillan 
(2000), DeZoort and Salterio (2001), Abbott et al. (2003), Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006), Turley and Zaman (2007) and Baxter and Cotter (2009), have shown that the 
existence of an AC favours the preparation of financial reports containing less 
accounting errors and, therefore, enhances the quality and credibility of the financial 
information presented.  
 
On the one hand, the composition of the AC’s is an important factor to assure the 
integrity and credibility of financial statements. Thus, the members of AC’s should also 
be drawn from outside the management of the firm, as interests may exist that could 
favour the needs of internal members (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Ruiz-Barbadillo and 
Biedma, 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2007). On the other hand, the appropriate academic 
qualifications and professional experience of the members of AC’s are a key component 
to improving the quality of financial information (DeZoort, 1998; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Al-Mudhaki and Joshi, 2004; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Chan and Li, 2008). A 
further key aspect is the activity of the AC. Frequent meetings between AC members 
imply greater control over management, which would improve the likelihood that 
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accounting irregularities would be detected (Beasley, 1996; Abbott et al., 2000; Al-
Mudhaki and Joshi, 2004; Turley and Zaman, 2004). A meta-analysis of AC’s has been 
performed by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) and Hassink and Bollen (2009).  
 
One other aspect of corporate governance characteristics that has received growing 
attention is the issue of gender diversity in top management (Carrasco and Laffarga, 
2007). Research suggests that women play a significant role in enhancing board 
effectiveness. Previous findings have shown the positive impact of women’s presence in 
company boards on improving the quality of financial information or fostering good 
corporate practice (Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002).  
 
1.2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Women’s Presence in Audit Committees 
 
Given the importance that women have attained in our culture and society in recent 
decades, we need to know whether the presence of women on AC’s might improve the 
quality of financial information, measured in terms of the type of opinion that firms 
receive in their audit reports. According to Ittonen et al. (2010), the presence of women 
on boards reduced the likelihood that the financial information presented by companies 
had errors. Furthermore, Huse and Solberg (2006) reported that their presence improved 
the efficacy and functioning of the BD. 
 
Authors like Ruegger and King (1992) and Khazanchi (1995) have suggested that 
women are more ethically-minded than men and are better able to identify unethical 
conduct. Johnson and Powell (1994), Powell and Ansic (1997), Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998), Byrnes et al. (1999) and Watson and Robinson (2003) found that 
female directors are more risk-averse in decision making and more conservative than 
men. The conservatism and risk-aversion of females may also have implications for the 
integrity of the financial reporting process. Fondas and Sassalos (2000) indicated that 
women tend to have higher expectations regarding their responsibilities as directors, 
which may induce them to expend more effort on their tasks. Similarly, Huse and 
Solberg (2006) showed that women in corporate boards are better prepared for board 
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meetings than men; thus, female representation may improve board behaviour and 
effectiveness.  
 
Based on the recent corporate governance literature (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Huse et al., 2009), we presume that female representation may improve the monitoring 
activities of the AC and enhance financial reporting quality as a result. Consequently, 
gender diversity may improve the efficiency of corporate boards and committees simply 
because female representatives, in general, are presumably highly competent and 
hardworking (Ittonen et al., 2010). In this sense, Qi and Tian (2012) reported that 
female directors in AC’s reduce earnings management, which would suggest an increase 
in financial reporting quality. Heminway (2007) argued that women are more 
trustworthy than men, and would therefore be less likely to manipulate corporate 
financial and other disclosures. Nielsen and Huse (2010) illustrated that women’s 
presence on a BD reduces the conflicts between the members of the board, thus 
promoting best practices in the company, and Schwartz-Ziv (2011) showed that 
women’s presence on a board increased the supervision of the financial information of 
the company.  
 
In sum, previous literature seems to support the notion that women’s presence 
positively impacts on corporate governance bodies. Therefore, we predict that the 
presence of women in AC’s may have a positive effect on the quality of financial 
information, because women are now fully integrated into the world of business in a 
wide range of roles (as politicians, shareholders, community leaders, important 
consumers and business professionals), and if the AC is made up of people of different 
genders with different skills, experience and capabilities, it would contain a greater 
variety of outlooks, opinions and values.  
 
Hence, women would be keen to ensure that firms produce error-free financial 
statements and to comply with accounting standards, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that the audit reports received would be unqualified. Meanwhile, if the financial 
statements are subject to uncertainties, women would also ensure that managers do not 
seek to pressure auditors into issuing a clean opinion instead of a qualified opinion 
(McMullen, 1996; Carcello and Neal, 2000). Previous research associates have qualified 
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audit reports with stock prices declines (Jones, 1996), difficulty in raising debt capital 
(Firth, 1980) and a perception by management that a qualified audit report may 
precipitate the company’s failure (i.e. the self-fulfilling-prophecy effect) (Mutchler, 
1984). According to this finding, management may resist a qualified audit report 
(Mutchler, 1984). The hypothesis we wish to test is, then, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of women in AC’s will increase the quality of 
financial information, reducing the receipt of qualified audit reports with errors, non-
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles or the omission of 
information, and increasing the disclosure of qualified audit reports with uncertainties 
compared to the absence of women in AC’s. 
 
Percentage of Women in Audit Committees 
 
Based on our judgment, the members of AC’s should provide specialist knowledge 
and enhance control over accounting processes and financial statements, and the 
committee members should seek to prevent the presentation of fraudulent financial 
information. Gul et al. (2008) found that, as the number of women increased in BD’s, 
the quality of the financial information improved because the supervision of the 
financial statements were enhanced. Schwartz-Ziv (2011) and Abbott et al. (2012) 
reported that a greater number of women on the board increased the supervision of 
financial information and the behaviour of the board members. Other studies have also 
shown that women are more sensitive to corporate social responsibility issues than men 
(e.g. Kedia and Kuntz, 1981; Wang and Coffey, 1992; Williams, 2003; Webb, 2004).  
 
This evidence supports the view that a greater percentage of women in AC’s can 
improve the quality of financial information. Thus, we predict that the likelihood that a 
company will receive audit reports containing qualifications relating to errors, non-
compliance or the omission of information will decrease as the percentage of women on 
the AC increases, and the probability that companies will disclose more audit reports 
containing uncertainties qualifications will increase because women are better able to 
identify unethical conduct than men, as mentioned above. Hence, we will also test the 
following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Firms whose AC’s include a greater percentage of women will 
exhibit a higher quality of financial information, reducing the receipt of qualified audit 
reports with errors, non-compliance with generally accepted accounting principles or 
the omission of information, and increasing the disclosure of qualified audit reports 
with uncertainties compared to firms whose AC’s have fewer female members.  
 
Number of Executive Women in Audit Committees 
 
Similar to the Spanish Corporate Governance Reports such as the Olivencia Report 
(1998), Aldama Report (2003), CUBG (2006) and the Cadbury Report (1992) 
recommends that AC’s should be made up exclusively of outside directors to maintain 
independence from the management. Outside directors increase internal controls and 
good corporate governance. Nevertheless, most Spanish companies do not follow this 
recommendation and their AC’s are made up by executive directors (Sierra et al., 2012).  
 
Previous research has shown that executive directors in AC’s would control the 
decision-making process of the company’s top management, resulting in less objective 
decisions. In this sense, Gilson (1990), Kaplan et al. (1990), Shivdasami (1993) and 
Yermack (1996), among others, reported that executive directors provide only a 
restricted amount of information to non-executive directors in order to prevent 
stakeholders from getting all the information. The dominance of executive directors 
results in weak control mechanisms within the management structure. A firm’s 
executives may have incentives to manipulate earnings in order to maximise its value 
and/or their own wealth at the expense of shareholders (see e.g. Holthausen, 1990; 
Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Beneish, 2001). Accordingly, it is extensively 
recognised that the quality of financial reporting may depend on managerial motives 
and characteristics, and moreover, that the opportunism of the firm’s executives tends to 
reduce earnings quality. Likewise, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) argued that managers 
have incentives to manage earnings for their job security. Carcello and Neal (2003) 
reported that when an affiliated director is able to dominate the AC, management can 
often pressure the auditor into issuing an unqualified report despite ongoing issues and 
may even go so far as to dismiss its auditor for refusing to change an opinion with 
qualifications. 
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However, as mentioned in the first hypothesis, it has long been acknowledged in 
cognitive psychology and management literature that significant gender differences 
exist, for example in conservatism, risk averseness and ethical behaviour (see e.g. 
Powell and Ansic, 1997; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Byrnes et al., 1999; Schubert, 
2006), which may influence the quality of financial reporting. Consistent with this 
literature, Bernardi and Arnold (1997) and Qi and Tian (2012) have noted that female 
executive directors in AC’s may be more conservative than male executive directors in 
AC’s, and therefore, may also have a higher sense of ethical concern than male-
dominated AC’s.  
 
Peni and Vahamaa (2010) provided evidence that female CFOs (Chief Financial 
Officers) (executive) engage in less earnings management than male CFOs. These 
results are consistent with the findings reported by Geiger and North (2006), Jiang et al. 
(2008) and Matsunaga and Yeung (2008), among others, suggesting that female 
executives provide better financial reporting quality.  
 
Thus, we presume that executive women and executive men may act and behave 
somewhat differently, and that the gender-based differences in cognitive functioning, 
decision making and conservatism may have important implications for the quality of 
financial reporting. Therefore, we predict that as the number of executive women in the 
AC’s increase, the probability of receiving errors, non-compliance or the omission of 
information qualifications will be reduced and the likelihood of disclosing more audit 
reports with uncertainties will increase. Hence, we will test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms whose AC’s include a greater number of executive women 
members will have higher quality of financial information, reducing the receipt of 
qualified audit reports with errors, non-compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles or the omission of information, and increasing the disclosure of qualified 
audit reports with uncertainties compared to firms whose AC’s have a smaller number 
of executive female members. 
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Number of Institutional Women in Audit Committees 
 
According to CUBG (2006), non-executive members within Spanish AC’s can be 
classified as institutional directors and independent directors. Institutional directors sit 
on the AC by their condition of shareholder or for being a large shareholder (CUBG, 
2006) and can sit personally on the AC by means of a representative.  
 
Given institutional shareholder incentives to supervise managerial actions, a positive 
influence of institutional directors on the quality of information would be expected. We 
believe that because earnings information is important for business valuation purposes, 
institutional directors would demand high quality information and exert more influence 
than other committee members. This is because institutional owners, as a group, 
command large amounts of capital that are professionally managed and employed in the 
equity markets. Using this capital, institutional owners can exert influence by buying 
and selling large blocks of a firm's securities, and by holding voting rights that can be 
directly employed to influence the decisions of management (Kane and Velury, 2004).  
 
Chung et al. (2002), Rajgopal et al. (2002) and Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) 
suggested that institutional directors serve as monitors, mitigating earnings management 
behaviour. Along the same line, some authors have found that the higher the proportion 
of non-executive board members, the lower the probability of accounting fraud 
(Beasley, 1996; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005). Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) 
also noted that higher ownership by institutions that are likely to monitor managers is 
associated with more conservative financial reporting, and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) 
supported the hypothesis that the presence of institutional investors provides incentives 
for analysts to publish unbiased or less biased research. Klein (2002) also found a 
significantly negative association between abnormal accruals and the percentage of 
outside directors on the AC. Similarly, García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2007) 
showed that the main role in constraining earnings management in Spain is played by 
institutional directors. Hsu and Wu (2010) found that the greater the number of 
institutional directors on the board and AC, the lower the probability of corporate 
failure.  
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According to previous research, when AC’s are made up of a high number of 
institutional directors, they are more likely to be more effective at protecting the 
credibility of the firm’s financial reporting since they are also external directors and 
independent of management (Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes, 2007). In this case, it 
would also be more difficult for management not to accept the adjustments proposed by 
auditors (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Song and Windram, 2004). Furthermore, 
institutional directors, given that they are independent of management, are more likely 
to mitigate any management pressure on auditors to issue a clean opinion when 
uncertainties are warranted (McMullen, 1996).  
 
On the whole, prior evidence supports the view that institutional women in AC’s 
may have an effect on financial reporting quality. Thus, we hypothesise that a higher 
number of institutional female directors in the AC will increase the likelihood that the 
quality of financial statements would be better controlled, while the likelihood of 
receiving qualified audit report with errors, non-compliance or the omission of 
information would decreases, and the probability of disclosing a qualified audit report 
with uncertainties would increase. Hence, we will test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Firms whose AC’s include a greater number of institutional 
female members will have a higher quality of financial information, reducing the receipt 
of qualified audit reports with errors, non-compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles or the omission of information, and increasing the disclosure of 
qualified audit reports with uncertainties compared to firms whose AC’s have a smaller 
number of institutional female members. 
 
Number of Independent Women in Audit Committees 
 
The presence of independent members in AC’s is a key factor to ensuring that the 
AC will perform its control functions clearly and precisely. A number of studies, 
including the ones by Abbott et al. (2000), Carcello and Neal (2000), Deli and Gillan 
(2000), Felo et al. (2003), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Pucheta-Martínez and De 
Fuentes (2007) and Bédard and Gendron (2010), have shown that a higher number of 
independent members in AC’s enhances the quality of the information that firms 
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disclose, as the AC’s independent members would take steps to ensure that the firm 
prepares its financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. Meanwhile, Ruiz-Barbadillo and Biedma (2003) found that larger firms 
incorporated independent members into their AC’s, given their control needs. Song and 
Windram (2004) concluded that independent members in AC’s contributed to better 
quality in a firm’s financial reports. Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) reported that AC’s 
with independent members were positively associated with higher audit fees, as the 
firms sought enhanced reliability and credibility in their published financial 
information. Carcello and Neal (2003) showed that firms were more likely to receive 
unqualified audit reports where the AC’s members were independent and closely 
supervised the managers’ work in preparing the financial statements.  
 
Overall, previous research supports the idea that the number of independent women 
in AC’s may have an impact on the quality of financial information, therefore, we 
predict that the more independent female members there are in the AC, the lower the 
likelihood that the audit reports received would contain qualifications relating to errors, 
non-compliance or the omission of information, and the greater the likelihood that the 
firm would disclose uncertainties through the audit report. Hence, we may formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Firms whose AC’s include a greater number of independent 
female members will have a higher quality in their financial information, reducing the 
receipt of qualified audit reports with errors, non-compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles or the omission of information, and increasing the disclosure of 
qualified audit reports with uncertainties compared to firms whose AC’s have a smaller 
number of independent female members. 
 
Audit Committees Chaired by Women 
 
For many years, women have had a negligible presence in corporate decision making 
bodies. However, the political, social and cultural changes that have taken place in 
recent years have increased gender diversity in positions of responsibility. Over the last 
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decade, women have acquired a relevant role in the workplace, as better education has 
increasingly allowed them to opt for the top jobs in organisations.  
 
According to Krishnan and Parsons (2008), earnings quality is positively associated 
with gender diversity in senior management positions. Schwartz-Ziv (2011) showed that 
boards of directors chaired by women exercised greater supervision of financial 
information than boards that were chaired by men. Ye et al. (2010) reported that boards 
chaired by women do not exhibit earnings quality.  
 
In general terms, previous research supports the notion that AC’s chaired by women 
may improve the quality of financial information. Thus, this evidence leads us to predict 
that if a woman chairs the AC, she would exercise greater control over management and 
would be quicker to detect opportunistic behaviours than if the AC was chaired by a 
man (Ruegger and King, 1992; Khazanchi, 1995). Therefore, an AC chaired by a 
woman would reduce the likelihood of receiving audit reports that contain qualifications 
in relation to errors, non-compliance or the omission of information, and it would 
increase the likelihood that the firm would disclose uncertainties in audit reports. 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Firms in which the AC is chaired by a woman will have a higher 
quality of financial information, reducing the receipt of qualified audit reports with 
errors, non-compliance with generally accepted accounting principles or the omission 
of information, and increasing the disclosure of qualified audit reports with 
uncertainties compared to firms whose AC is chaired by a man. 
 
1.3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
1.3.1. Methodology 
 
We shall use the following logistic regression model to empirically test the 
hypotheses proposed:  
 
 39 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
IAit= β0 + β1MCAit + β2%MCAit + β3NMECA+ β4NMDCAit + β5NMICAit +β6MPRESit 
+ β7NRCAit + β8AC’SIZEit+ β9OPINAUDit + β10LOSSit + β11LEVit + β12TAMEMPRit + 
β13BIGFOURit + β14INSOWNit +  β15OWNCONit +  β16FIRMAGEit +∑j αj FIRMj + μit 
 
where the dependent variable IA1 takes a value of 1 if the audit report contains 
qualifications, and 0 if otherwise. Some other papers have used audit opinion as a proxy 
for financial reporting quality (Bartov et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Chen et al., 
2001; Butler et al., 2004; Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2005; Pucheta-Martínez 
and de Fuentes, 2007; Farihna and Viana, 2009). We also split the dependent variable 
into two to create Model 1 and Model 2. In Model 1, the dependent variable IA takes a 
value of 1 if the audit report contains qualifications related to errors and non-
compliance with generally accepted accounting principles, including omission of 
information, and 0 if otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent variable IA takes a value of 
1 if the audit report contains uncertainties, and 0 if otherwise.  
 
Table 1 presents the independent and control variables included in the models, and 
their expected signs. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Variables Description 
 
Variable Description Model 1 * 
Expected Sign 
Model 2 ** 
Expected Sign 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
MCA Dummy value (1=presence of women in the AC; 0= 
otherwise) 
- + 
%MCA Total number of women in the AC/Total number of 
members in the AC 
- + 
NMECA Total number of executive women in the AC - + 
NMDCA Total number of institutional  women in the AC - + 
NMICA Total number of  independent women in the AC - + 
MPRES Dummy value (1= AC has a chairwoman; 0= 
otherwise) 
- + 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
NRCA Number of AC meetings per year - - 
ACSIZE  Total number of members in the AC +/- +/- 
OPINAUD Dummy value (1=if the firm received the same 
qualification in the prior and the current year; 0= 
otherwise) 
+ + 
LOSS Dummy value (1=if the company reported a loss in 
the prior year; 0= otherwise) 
+ + 
LEV Total debt/ Total assets + + 
TAMEMPR Log of total assets (in thousands of Euros) +/- +/- 
BIGFOUR Dummy value (1=Big Four; 0= otherwise) + + 
INSOWN Proportion of shares held by the management - - 
OWNCON Percentage of shares held by large shareholder - - 
FIRMAGE Log of the difference between setting-up company 
and observation year  
+/- +/- 
* Model 1: The dependent variable refers to qualifications for errors, non-compliance and omission of 
information.  
** Model 2: The dependent variable refers to qualifications for uncertainties. 
 
 
1.3.1.1. Independent Variables  
 
Presence of Women in Audit Committees 
This variable, denoted by “MCA”, is calculated as a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if women are present in the AC, and 0 if otherwise. MCA is expected to have 
a negative sign in Model 1 (i.e. the presence of women in AC’s will reduce the 
likelihood that the firms will receive audit reports containing qualifications in relation to 
errors, non-compliance and omission of information) and a positive sign in Model 2, 
since the presence of women in the AC will increase the likelihood that a firm will 
disclose uncertainties through the audit report. 
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Percentage of Women in Audit Committees 
This variable, denoted by “%MCA”, is calculated as the ratio of the total number of 
women members in the AC to the total number of members in the AC. As for the 
variable presence of women in AC’s, the expected sign for the %MCA variable is 
negative in Model 1 and positive in Model 2. 
 
Number of Executive Women in Audit Committees  
This variable is denoted by “NMECA” and is calculated as the total number of 
executive women in the AC. Also, the variable is expected to have a negative sign in 
Model 1 and a positive sign in Model 2.  
 
Number of Institutional Women in Audit Committees  
This variable is denoted by “NMDCA” and is calculated as the total number of 
institutional women in the AC. Also, the variable is expected to have a negative sign in 
Model 1 and a positive sign in Model 2.  
 
Number of Independent Women in Audit Committees  
This variable is denoted by “NMICA” and is calculated as the total number of 
independent women in the AC. Also, the variable is expected to have a negative sign in 
Model 1 and a positive sign in Model 2.  
 
Audit Committee Chairwomen 
This variable is denoted as “MPRES”. It takes a value of 1 if the AC is chaired by a 
woman, and 0 if otherwise. Thus, as in previous variables, we expect a negative sign in 
Model 1 and a positive sign in Model 2. 
 
1.3.1.2. Control Variables 
 
We include certain control variables that could have an influence on the qualification 
of audit reports, in order to test the models.  
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Number of Audit Committee Meetings 
Studies such as Abbott et al. (2000) have reported that the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified audit opinion is reduced when the AC holds at least two meetings per year, 
and similarly for the likelihood of fraudulent or misleading financial information being 
published. Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) examined AC efficiency and changes of 
auditor, and found that suspicious switches were more common in firms where the AC 
met only occasionally compared to those where the AC met more frequently. 
Meanwhile, Al-Mudhaki and Joshi (2004) recommended that AC’s should meet at least 
three times per year, as frequent meetings enhance internal control and assessments of 
the firm’s activities. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found that the number of AC 
meetings was positively associated with the payment of higher fees to audit firms, as 
companies demanded higher quality work from their auditors. Other studies (Xie et al., 
2003; Song and Windram, 2004; Lin et al., 2006) showed a positive relationship 
between the AC’s meeting frequency and financial reporting quality. De Andrés et al. 
(2012) analysed a sample of Spanish listed companies from 1998 to 2007, and reported 
that the number of meetings by the AC was directly associated with improvements in 
financial reporting quality. It is expected that AC’s that hold a larger number of 
meetings during the year would examine financial and management issues in more 
detail, enabling them to detect potential problems in the financial statements and to 
anticipate qualifications. As a result, the members of the AC would ensure the 
publication of quality financial information and, therefore, reduce the likelihood that the 
audit reports received will be qualified. 
 
We denote the variable referring to the number of AC meetings by “NRCA”, which 
is calculated by counting the total number of meetings held by the AC during the year. 
We predict that this variable will take a negative sign, as the likelihood of qualifications 
in audit reports would be lower with a greater number of AC meetings held during the 
year.  
 
Audit Committee Size 
Most Corporate Governance reports (Cadbury Report, 1992; Smith Report, 2003; 
CUBG, 2006) recommend a minimum of three members in the AC. Similarly, Carcello 
and Neal (2000) and Buchalter and Yokomoto (2003) indicated that an AC should have 
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between three and five members, although it would depend on the company size and 
type of business.  
 
Previous research (e.g. Felo et al., 2003) has reported that AC size has an effect on 
financial reporting quality. To this effect, Lin et al. (2006) and Sierra et al. (2012) 
showed that the number of members in an AC was negatively related to earnings 
management and Yang and Krishnan (2005) regarding quarterly abnormal accruals. 
Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2007) documented a positive relationship between 
the size of an AC and the quality of financial reporting, which is consistent with the 
findings of Felo et al. (2003). Contrary to these results, Rahman and Ali (2006) reported 
that AC size positively impacts on earnings management. They concluded that large 
AC’s are ineffective. Xie et al. (2003), Abbott et al. (2004), Bédard et al. (2004) and 
Davidson et al. (2005) reported insignificant associations between AC size and 
restatements or earnings management.  
 
This variable is referred to as ACSIZE and is calculated as the total number of 
members in the AC. According to previous evidence, the direction of the influence of 
AC size on financial reporting quality and the receipt of a qualified audit report is not 
clear; therefore, we do not have an expected sign associated with it.  
 
Prior Year’s Audit Opinion  
A further variable requiring analysis is the prior year’s audit report, as it could 
influence the opinion issued in the current year if the circumstances have not changed. 
If a company receives a different qualification in the current year compared to the prior 
year, it is classified as an initial qualification, but if the same qualification is received in 
two or more consecutive years, it could be defined as recurring. For example, if the 
audit opinion contained an uncertainty in the prior year, it would be likely to have an 
uncertainty again in the current year, which would be a recurring qualification. 
 
García and Sánchez (1999) concluded that a clean audit report was an effective 
mechanism to underscore the quality of the financial information published. Meanwhile, 
Carcello and Neal (2003) showed that firms presenting qualified audit opinions in their 
financial reports were more likely to encounter financial and management problems, 
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with the result that the auditors would be less optimistic in their decisions. Pucheta-
Martinez and De Fuentes (2007) found that companies that received a recurring 
qualification in the previous year were more likely to receive the same qualification in 
the current year. The variable is denoted as “OPINAUD” and is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the qualification contained in the current years’ audit report is the 
same as in the previous year, and 0 if otherwise. We expect this variable to be positively 
associated with qualified audit reports.  
 
Losses Reported by Firms  
A further control variable consists of the losses reported by firms. We expect that a 
firm that reported a loss in the prior year would again incur a loss in the current year. 
Hayn (1995) confirmed that smaller firms are more likely to incur losses than medium-
sized and large companies. According to Klein (1998), a firm that reports a loss in the 
current year, or reports continuous losses, should be reviewed against a range of 
indicators to improve control. Klein (2002) showed that the accuracy of the published 
financial statements declined in firms that had AC’s containing independent members 
and had reported recurring losses. Meanwhile, Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2007) 
observed a positive association between the publication of losses in one or both of the 
two prior years and the issuance of audit reports containing qualifications for errors, 
non-compliance, omission of information and uncertainties. 
 
We denote this dummy variable as “LOSS”. It takes a value of 1 if the company 
reported a loss in the prior year, and 0 if otherwise. We expect the behaviour of this 
variable to be positive, as a firm that incurred a loss in the prior year would likely 
receive a qualified audit opinion.  
 
Leverage 
Leverage is the control variable used to control the agency costs of debt. According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency costs inherent to leverage are directly 
associated with the level of indebtedness maintained by a firm. Bradbury (1990), 
Adams (1997) and Deli and Gillan (2000) showed that the greater a firm’s leverage, the 
higher their level of risk assumed, which would require increased supervision of the 
financial statements. Meanwhile, Mateos et al. (2006) concluded that firms with higher 
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levels of leverage assume more risks than those with lower levels, which may, therefore, 
be considered as more risk averse.  
 
The level of leverage or indebtedness is denoted as “LEV”. This variable is 
calculated as the ratio of the firm’s total debt to its total assets. Its expected sign is 
positive, as firms are more likely to receive qualified opinions with a higher level of 
leverage.  
 
Company Size  
Fama and Jensen (1983) found a positive relationship between the size of firms and 
the quality of the financial information published. Menon and Willams (1994), Klein 
(1998), Beasley and Salterio (2001) and Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2007), among others, 
reported that larger firms were more likely to have AC’s with independent members in 
order to ensure that their financial information is error-free. Beasley et al. (2000) 
showed that small US firms were more likely to prepare financial information 
containing errors given looser internal controls, resulting in more qualified audit reports. 
Meanwhile, Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2007) reported that large firms were 
more likely to receive a qualified audit report when they deserved one, given that audit 
firms tend to be more independent when the firm audited is large. This variable is 
denoted as “TAMEMPR” and is calculated as the logarithm of the company’s total 
assets. The expected sign is difficult to determine a priori, because a large size can have 
both a positive and a negative influence on the audit report received by the firm. Hence, 
we may expect both a positive and a negative sign for this variable.  
 
Audit Firm 
The choice of auditor is a key decision for the credibility and reliability of published 
financial information. Various studies, including DeAngelo (1981), have reported that 
the big auditing firms offer higher quality services and perform their functions better 
than smaller auditors. Meanwhile, Lennox (1999) found that the big audit firms provide 
higher quality services and enhance the credibility of corporate financial reporting. 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) showed that using one of the audit majors reduced the risk of 
qualified audit reports. DeFond and Jiambalvo, (1991) and Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2007) 
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also found that using one of the audit majors ensured the quality of a firm’s financial 
reporting.  
 
This variable, denoted as “BIGFOUR”, is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
company is audited by one of the Big Four audit firms, and 0 if otherwise. The expected 
sign of the variable is positive, as these auditors are highly competent and express 
pertinent opinions on the financial information examined in their audit reports (Lennox, 
1999). Consequently, the auditor would issue a qualified opinion if the company 
deserves it and would not yield to pressure from management. This is because any 
failure of auditor independence would have a greater public impact for a large audited 
company.  
 
Management Ownership  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as Jensen (1993) have used an agency 
framework to argue that higher inside ownership can reduce agency costs by aligning 
the interests of a firm’s management with its shareholders, which would reduce the need 
to monitor the BD and provide better incentives for quality reporting. This is consistent 
with the convergence-of-interest theory, which implies that increased managerial 
ownership can reduce the mangers’ exploitation of accounting numbers as the interest of 
inside and external shareholders are realigned, thus resulting in less conflict among the 
shareholders. In this sense, the Mustapha and Ahmad’s paper (2011) supports the 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis since the results suggest that managerial ownership 
has a significantly negative relationship with monitoring costs as predicted by agency 
theory. Shwu-Jen et al. (2003) noted that managerial ownership acts as a constraining 
factor that limits the management’s manipulation of accounting numbers. Furthermore, 
Warfield et al. (1995) and Shwu-Jen et al. (2003) described an inverse relationship 
between inside ownership and earnings management, suggesting an increase in financial 
reporting quality. Accordingly, management would take more care in preparing 
financial statements in order to avoid a qualified audit report, which could affect the 
share price and, consequently, the managers’ own wealth. In Spain, Sánchez-Ballesta 
and García-Meca (2005) demonstrated that higher insider ownership leads to higher 
quality financial reporting and, therefore, less likelihood of receiving qualified audit 
reports.  
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Thus, we include management ownership as a control variable for the agency cost. 
This variable is denoted as INSOWN and calculated as the proportion of shares held by 
the management of the firm. We expect a negative relationship between the percentage 
of stock owned by management and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report. 
 
Ownership Concentration 
High ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999; Demirg¨u¸c-Kunt and Levine, 
2001; Díaz and García Olalla, 2003) is one of the main differences between the Anglo-
Saxon and Spanish financial markets. Large shareholders frequently enjoy the 
possibility of appointing the CEO and top executives in the management team, so that 
they can more effectively monitor management. Therefore, a realignment of interests 
between managers and large shareholders may be expected. As a result, the presence of 
a large shareholder may decrease the likelihood of receiving qualified audit reports 
because the CEO would be more likely to act in the interests of the firm and prepare 
financial statements that are less likely to attract audit qualifications (Gul et al., 2001; 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca, 2005). Thus, we expect a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit 
report. This variable is denoted as OWNCON and calculated as the percentage of shares 
held by large shareholder.  
 
Firm’s Age  
The final control variable used is the age of the firm. The rationale for selecting this 
variable lies in the possibility that old firms might have improved their financial 
reporting practices over time, and consequently, may have better financial reporting 
quality. In this sense, Lang (1991) reported that uncertainty in the capital markets about 
firms’ earnings decreases with their age. Pittman and Fortin (2004) showed that the 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders also decreases with firm age. 
Owusu-Ansah (2005) revealed that company age is the most critical factor for 
explaining the extent of mandatory disclosures practices of the firms. On the other hand, 
Tasios and Bekiaris (2012) reported that Greek auditors found factors like company age 
to be less important quality factors of financial reporting, while Chalaki et al. (2012) did 
not find evidence to support a significant relationship between firm age and financial 
reporting quality.  
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This variable is denoted as FIRMAGE and calculated as the log of the difference 
between setting-up the company and observation year. According to prior evidence, the 
direction of the influence of firm age on financial reporting quality and the receipt of a 
qualified audit report is not clear, and therefore, we do not have an expected sign for it.  
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
The firm fixed effect control variable, denoted by “FIRM”, is intended to capture 
unobservable and fixed characteristics of firms that may potentially be correlated to the 
dependent variable. Specifically, we include industry indicator variables, and year 
indicator variables to control for industry and yearly differences.  
 
1.3.2. Sample 
 
The sample used for the study consisted of 175 companies listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange. The information was obtained from the Public Registers of the National 
Securities Market Commission (CNMV in its Spanish acronym), from the SABI 
database and from corporate websites. The sample has a time horizon of eight years 
from 2004 to 2011, inclusive. Table 2 contains a description of the sample.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
Sample Description 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 
Initial sample of companies 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 1400 
Companies excluded (72) (66) (61) (50) (54) (53) (53) (55) (464) 
Industrial companies 58 52 47 36 40 39 39 41 352 
Financial companies 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 112 
Final sample of companies 103 109 114 125 121 122 122 120 936 
 
 
As can be observed in Table 2, the sample consists of 175 firms for each year of the 
initial sample. We excluded financial companies both because they are under special 
scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of their BD’s, and because of 
their special accounting practices. Also, some industrial companies were excluded each 
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year because we lacked data on some of the variables needed to verify the model or 
because audit reports contained both qualifications for errors, non-compliance and 
omissions (Model 1) and for uncertainties (Model 2). The final sample comprised 936 
observations per year.  
 
Table 3 shows the percentage of unqualified and qualified audit reports received by 
the firms in the period of 2004-2011. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
Analysis of the Type of Audit Reports Received by the Sample Firms 
 
Year Number of firms Unqualified audit reports Qualified audit reports 
2004 103 90 87.38% 13 12.62% 
2005 109 94 86.24% 15 13.76% 
2006 114 101 88.60% 13 11.40% 
2007 125 107 85.60% 18 14.40% 
2008 121 100 82.64% 21 17.36% 
2009 122 100 81.97% 22 18.03% 
2010 122 120 98.36% 2 1.64% 
2011 120 116 96.67% 4 3.33% 
Total 936 828 88.46% 108 11.54% 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, 87.38% of the analysed firms received a clean audit opinion in 
2004, while 12.62% were qualified. In short, the table suggests that the number of 
qualified audit reports issued increased considerably until 2009.  
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TABLE 4 
 
Analysis of the Type of Qualification Contained in the Audit Report 
 
Year 
Number of qualified audit 
reports 
Errors, non-compliance and omission of 
information Uncertainties  
2004 13 5 8 
2005 15 7 8 
2006 13 4 9 
2007 18 7 11 
2008 21 2 19 
2009 22 2 20 
2010 2 1 1 
2011 4 4 0 
TOTAL 108 32 76 
 
 
Table 4 shows the qualified audit reports for each year, indicating the types of 
qualifications we were interested in for the purposes of the study. In Model 1, where the 
dependent variable refers to qualifications for errors, non-compliance or the omission of 
information, we made 860 observations per year, compared to 904 observations per year 
in Model 2, where the dependent variable refers to uncertainties.  
 
1.4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
1.4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Tables 5 and 6 present the descriptive statistics for the dummy and continuous 
variables in the final sample of companies for Models 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Dummies and Continuous Variables in the Sample of Companies that 
Received Qualifications for Error, Non-Compliance and Omission of Information. Model 1 (N=860) 
 
A) CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Variables N Mean Standard deviation Percentile 25 Median Percentile 75 
%MCA 860 7.441 13.893 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMECA 860 0.004 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMDCA 860 0.108 0.325 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMICA 860 0.153 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MPRES 860 0.061 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NRCA 860 5.607 2.653 4.000 5.000 7.000 
ACSIZE 860 3.581 0.953 3.000 3.000 4.000 
LEV 860 52.029 90.207 26.238 50.504 68.222 
TAMEMPR 860 13.039 1.873 11.741 12.881 14.338 
INSOWN 860 10.392 26.624 0.001 0.173 11.639 
OWNCON 860 24.773 22.243 8.880 18.045 35.016 
FIRMAGE 860 3.588 1.030 3.000 4.000 4.000 
B) DUMMIES VARIABLES  
    % (1) 
IA   3.72%    
MCA   24.00%    
OPINAUD   1.20%    
LOSS   19.00%    
BIGFOUR    87.00%    
Mean, standard deviation and quartiles of the main variables. %MCA: Total number of women in the 
AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in the AC; 
NMDCA: Total number of institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women 
in the AC; MPRES: dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC 
meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; LEV: Total debt divided by total 
assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the 
management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the 
difference between setting-up company and observation year.IA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
audit report contains qualifications with errors, non-compliance and omission of information; MCA: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the company reported a loss in the prior year; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is 
audited by one of the big 4 audit firms. 
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Table 5 shows the statistics for the sample used to test Model 1, where the dependent 
variable refers to qualifications for errors, non-compliance or omission of information. 
As can be observed in Table 5, the percentage of women in AC’s that involved women 
represented 7.44% of total members, while the number of executive, institutional and 
independent women in AC’s, on average, was 0.004, 0.108 and 0.153, respectively. In 
addition, 6.10% of AC chairpersons were women. Further findings were that an average 
of 5.60 meetings were held per year; the AC size was, on average, 3.58 members; 
company leverage was 52.02% and firm size was 13.03 (natural log of total assets). 
Finally, the percentage of shares held by the management and by large shareholders was 
10.39% and 24.77%, respectively, while the firm age, on average, was 3.58 (log of the 
difference between setting-up company and observation year). On the other hand, 
3.72% of the companies in the sample used for Model 1 received a qualification for 
error, non-compliance or omission of information, with women being present in only 
24% of AC’s. We also noted that 87% of the companies in the sample were audited by 
one of the Big Four audit firms. Meanwhile, 1.20% of the sample firms received the 
same type of qualification in the current as in the prior year, and 19% reported losses.  
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TABLE 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Dummies and Continuous Variables in the Sample of Companies that 
Received Qualifications for Uncertainties. Model 2 (N=904) 
 
A) CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Variables N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Percentile 
25 
Median Percentile 
75 
%MCA 904 7.533 14.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMECA 904 0.003 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMDCA 904 0.107 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NMICA 904 0.154 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MPRES 904 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NRCA 904 5.582 2.646 4.000 5.000 7.000 
ACSIZE 904 3.569 0.946 3.000 3.000 4.000 
LEV 904 52.986 88.181 26.800 51.457 69.344 
TAMEMPR 904 13.046 1.868 11.742 12.854 14.375 
INSOWN 904 10.736 26.572 0.002 0.194 12.160 
OWNCON 904 24.779 22.184 8.894 18.045 35.016 
FIRMAGE 904 3.593 1.017 3.000 4.000 4.000 
B) DUMMIES VARIABLES  
    % (1) 
IA   8.40%    
MCA   24.00%    
OPINAUD   5.00%    
LOSS   21.00%    
BIGFOUR    86.00%    
Mean, standard deviation and quartiles of the main variables. %MCA: Total number of women in the 
AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in the AC; 
NMDCA: Total number of institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women 
in the AC; MPRES: dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC 
meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; LEV: Total debt divided by total 
assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the 
management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the 
difference between setting-up company and observation year.IA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
audit report contains qualifications with errors, non-compliance and omission of information; MCA: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the company reported a loss in the prior year; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is 
audited by one of the big 4 audit firms. 
 
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for Model 2, in which the dependent 
variable refers to qualifications for uncertainties. The audit report variable reflects 
uncertainties in the opinions issued on 8.40% of the sample firms. Meanwhile, 5% of 
the sample firms received the same type of qualification in the current as in the prior 
year, and 21% reported losses. The data for continuous variables did not vary 
significantly from Table 5.  
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1.4.2. Univariate Analysis 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the mean difference of the independent and control variables 
between firms with qualified and unqualified audit reports, as well as the results of the 
parametric t test for the continuous variables and Pearson’s Chi-squared tests for the 
dummies to identify the presence of differences in means between the two groups of 
companies. 
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TABLE 7 
 
Mean Difference for Independent and Control Variables Between Companies With Unqualified 
and Qualified Audit Reports for the Sample of Qualifications for Errors, Non Compliance and 
Omission of Information. Model 1 (N=860) 
 
Variable Unqualified audit reports 
(N=828) Mean 
Qualified audit reports 
(N=32) 
Mean 
Mean  
difference 
Univariate test 
(Sig.)   
MCA 0.250 0.130 0.120 -1.722† 
    (0.097) 
%MCA 7.538 4.167 3.371 -1.434 
    (0.164) 
NMECA 0.004 0.000 0.004 -1.734† 
    (0.083) 
NMDCA 0.109 0.083 0.026 -0.428 
 
    
 
(0.672) 
NMICA 0.158 0.000 0.158 -11.228*** 
    (0.000) 
MPRES 0.062 0.042 0.020 -0.470 
    (0.642) 
NRCA 5.655 4.000 1.655 -2.860** 
    (0.009) 
ACSIZE 3.597 3.042 0.555 -4.214*** 
    (0.000) 
OPINAUD 0.000 0.311 -0.311 4.387*** 
    (0.000) 
LOSS 0.185 0.208 -0.023 0.273 
    (0.788) 
LEV 51.844 58.302 -6.458 0.580 
    (0.566) 
TAMEMPR 13.077 11.726 1.351 -3.944*** 
    (0.001 
BIGFOUR 0.873 0.708 0.165 -1.724† 
    (0.098) 
INSOWN 10.324 12.69 -2.366 0.520 
    (0.608) 
OWNCON 25.02 16.399 8.621 -2.741** 
    (0.011) 
FIRMAGE 3.586 3.667 -0.081 0.507 
    (0.616) 
Means Comparison Test. The dependent variable is IA, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit report 
contains qualifications with errors, non-compliance and omission of information; MCA: dummy variable 
equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; %MCA: Total number of women in the AC/Total number of 
members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in the AC; NMDCA: Total number of 
institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women in the AC; MPRES: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC meetings per year; 
ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company reported a loss in the prior year; LEV: Total debt divided by total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural 
logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the 
big 4 audit firms; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the management; OWNCON: Percentage of 
shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the difference between setting-up company and 
observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
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As shown in Table 7, the differences in the mean for the variables denoting the 
presence of women in AC’s (MCA) and the number of executive (NMECA) and 
independent (NMICA) women in AC’s between firms with unqualified and qualified 
audit reports were positive and statistically significant at 0.1 or 10%, which indicates 
that the firms receiving unqualified audit reports are more likely to have female AC 
members and a higher number of executive and independent female members in AC’s 
than those receiving qualifications for errors, non-compliance or the omission of 
information. These results are not consistent with the first, third and fifth hypotheses. 
The differences between unqualified and qualified audit opinions for the variables 
referring to the number of meetings held by the AC (NRCA), AC size, company size 
(TAMEMPR), the fact that the financial statements were audited by one of the Big Four 
audit firms (BIGFOUR) and the proportion of shares held by large shareholders 
(OWNCON) were positive and statistically significant at 0.1%, 1% and 10%. These 
findings suggest that large companies with a high proportion of shares held by large 
shareholders, that are audited by one of the Big Four firms and with big AC’s that meet 
more often are more likely to receive unqualified than qualified audit reports. The 
difference in the means for the OPINAUD variable was negative and statistically 
significant at 0.1%. This result implies that firms receiving a qualification for errors, 
non-compliance or the omission of information in the prior year are more likely to 
receive qualifications in the current year than if the prior year’s opinion had been 
unqualified. The rest of the variables were not statistically significant.  
 
Table 8 shows the difference in means for the variables in Model 2, where the 
dependent variable refers to qualifications for uncertainties. The difference between 
unqualified and qualified audit reports for the variable number of executive women in 
AC’s was positive and statistically significant. Hence, we can accept the third 
hypothesis. This result suggests that the presence of executive women in AC’s increases 
the likelihood of disclosing qualified audit reports with uncertainties, which implies best 
financial reporting quality. This finding is consistent with earlier studies that reported 
the positive effect of executive women directors on financial reporting quality (Geiger 
and North, 2006; Jiang et al., 2008; Matsunaga and Yeung, 2008; Peni and Vahamaa, 
2010). One possible explanation for these dissimilar results would be that, given the 
small number of women occupying the executive positions in AC’s, it is likely that they 
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are dominated by executive men or have aligned with them. The empowerment of 
women at the executive level in Spain is a relatively new phenomenon and might have a 
limited role to play. Bernardi and Arnold (1997) and Qi and Tian (2012) showed that 
executive men in AC’s are less conservative and have a lower ethical level than 
executive women, suggesting that male executives provide a worse financial reporting 
quality.  
 
The differences in the means for the variables referring to the number of meetings 
held by the AC (NRCA), AC size (ACSIZE), firm size (TAMEMPR) and examination 
of the financial statements by one of the Big Four audit firms (BIGFOUR) were positive 
and statistically significant. Finally, the OPINAUD, LOSS, LEV and INSOWN 
variables displayed negative differences in means that were statistically significant. The 
remaining variables were not statistically significant.  
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TABLE 8 
 
Mean Difference for Independent and Control Variables Between Companies With Unqualified 
and Qualified Audit Reports for the Sample of Qualifications for Uncertainties. Model 2 (N=904) 
 
Variable 
Unqualified audit reports 
(N=828) 
Mean 
Qualified audit reports 
(N=76) 
Mean 
Mean 
difference 
Univariate test 
(Sig.) 
MCA 0.246 0.222 0.024 -0.438 
        (0.662) 
%MCA 7.529 7.593 -0.064 0.030 
        (0.976) 
NMECA 0.004 0.000 0.004 -1.734† 
        (0.083) 
NMDCA 0.108 0.095 0.013 -0.337 
        (0.737) 
NMICA 0.158 0.111 0.047 -1.100 
        (0.275) 
MPRES 0.062 0.095 -0.033 0.881 
        (0.382) 
NRCA 5.656 4.619 1.037 -3.016** 
        (0.004) 
ACSIZE 3.596 3.222 0.374 -3.826*** 
        (0.000) 
OPINAUD 0.000 0.537 -0.053 9.643*** 
        (0.000) 
LOSS 0.186 0.524 -0.338 5.207*** 
        (0.000) 
LEV 51.823 67.976 -16.153 3.231*** 
        (0.001) 
TAMEMPR 13.077 12.645 0.432 -1.759† 
(0.083) 
BIGFOUR 0.872 0.746 0.126 -2.228* 
        (0.029) 
INSOWN 10.340 15.839 -5.499 1.751† 
        (0.084) 
OWNCON 25.045 21.342 3.703 -1.448 
(0.152) 
FIRMAGE 3.586 3.683 0.097 0.992 
        (0.324) 
Means Comparison Test. The dependent variable is IA, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit report 
contains qualifications with uncertainties; MCA: dummy variable equal to 1 if women are present in the 
AC; %MCA: Total number of women in the AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total 
number of executive women in the AC; NMDCA: Total number of institutional women in the AC; 
NMICA: Total number of independent women in the AC; MPRES: dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC 
has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the 
AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received the same qualification in the prior and 
the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss in the prior year; LEV: 
Total debt divided by total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms; INSOWN: Proportion of 
shares held by the management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: 
Log of the difference between setting-up company and observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
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1.4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
The multivariate analysis looked at the results of the multicollinearity test and 
logistic regression. To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Spearman correlation 
coefficients for all of the variables included in the model. Table 9 presents the 
correlation matrix for the sample of companies receiving qualifications for errors, non-
compliance or the omission of information. These results show that the correlation 
between some pairs of variables formed by the characteristics of the AC was significant, 
which is consistent with existing studies of AC’s (see Menon and Williams, 1994; 
Turpin and DeZoort, 1998; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; 
Willekens et al., 2004; Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2007). The correlation 
between most of the remaining pairs was not significant and was low, generally being 
below 0.3. None of the correlation coefficients were high enough (>0.80) to cause 
multicollinearity problems (see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001), except for the pair 
MCA-%MCA, which was correlated by construction2 (see Carcello and Neal, 2000; 
Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001; Lord and DeZoort, 2001; Pucheta-Martínez and De 
Fuentes, 2007). Our conclusions are similar for the results presented in Table 10, which 
shows the Spearman correlation coefficients for the sample of firms receiving 
qualifications for uncertainties. According to these results, we can conclude that the 
models are free from multicollinearity problems. 
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TABLE 9 
 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for the Sample of Companies with Qualifications for Errors, Non-Compliance and Omission of Information. Model 1 (N = 
860) 
 
  MCA %MCA NMECA NMICA NMDCA MPRES NRCA ACSIZE OPINAUD LOSS LEV TAMEMPR BIGFOUR INSOWN OWNCON 
%MCA 0.976***               
NMECA 0.106** 0.115***              
NMICA 0.712*** 0.687*** -0.024             
NMDCA 0.570*** 0.610*** -0.020 -0.024            
MPRES 0.450*** 0.451*** -0.015 0.561*** 0.094**           
NRCA 0.128*** 0.130*** -0.013 0.136*** 0.055 0.110***          
ACSIZE 0.180*** 0.131*** -0.043 0.225*** 0.042 0.095** 0.202***         
OPINAUD -0.026 -0.023 -0.008 -0.051 -0.011 0.049 -0.100** -0.068        
LOSS -0.019 -0.015 -0.029 -0.025 -0.010 0.007 -0.041 -0.099** 0.039       
LEV -0.040 -0.053 -0.074 -0.108** 0.080 -0.095 0.049 0.150*** 0.006 0.084      
TAMEMPR 0.041 0.025 -0.046 0.103** -0.002 0.037 0.452*** 0.357*** -0.107** -0.133*** 0.382***     
BIGFOUR 0.056 0.049 0.023 0.067† 0.016 -0.004 0.280*** 0.183*** -0.037 -0.051 0.071* 0.334***    
INSOWN -0.030 -0.019 0.029 -0.070* -0.002 -0.063† -0.068* -0.041 -0.034 0.017 0.076* -0.138*** -0.129***   
OWNCON -0.057 -0.050 -0.035 -0.008 -0.029 -0.096** -0.046 0.067† -0.057† -0.060† 0.053 0.174*** 0.036 -0.227***  
FIRMAGE -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.024 -0.146*** -0.040 -0.144*** -0.051 0.098** 0.060† -0.005 0.184*** 0.080* -0.018 -0.053 0.170*** 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. IA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit report contains qualifications with errors, non-compliance and omission of information; 
MCA: dummy variable equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; %MCA: Total number of women in the AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total 
number of executive women in the AC; NMDCA: Total number of institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women in the AC; MPRES: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss in the 
prior year; LEV: Total debt divided by total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by 
one of the big 4 audit firms; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of 
the difference between setting-up company and observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
 61 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
TABLE 10 
 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for the Sample of Companies with Qualifications for Uncertainties. Model 2 (N= 904) 
 
  MCA %MCA NMECA NMICA NMDCA MPRES NRCA ACSIZE OPINAUD LOSS LEV TAMEMPR BIGFOUR INSOWN OWNCON 
%MCA 0.973***               
NMECA 0.103** 0.112***              
NMICA 0.713*** 0.685*** -0.024             
NMDCA 0.569*** 0.609*** -0.020 -0.030            
MPRES 0.460*** 0.467*** -0.015 0.551*** 0.126***           
NRCA 0.121*** 0.118*** -0.011 0.138*** 0.040 0.089**          
ACSIZE 0.175*** 0.122*** -0.042 0.213*** 0.038 0.076* 0.186***         
OPINAUD -0.013 -0.005 -0.013 -0.029 0.014 0.075 -0.119*** -0.067*        
LOSS -0.026 -0.026 -0.030 -0.018 -0.037 0.003 -0.047 -0.116*** 0.151***       
LEV -0.042 -0.056 -0.073 -0.112*** 0.075* -0.088** 0.036 0.112*** 0.086* 0.141***      
TAMEMPR 0.022 0.006 -0.045 0.079* -0.013 0.015 0.440*** 0.326*** -0.109*** -0.121*** 0.366***     
BIGFOUR 0.034 0.022 0.023 0.058† -0.017 -0.031 0.295*** 0.189*** -0.100* -0.071* 0.033 0.331***    
INSOWN -0.025 -0.016 0.028 -0.058† -0.009 -0.075* -0.087** -0.050 0.025 0.040 0.084* -0.140*** -0.112***   
OWNCON -0.054 -0.050 -0.034 -0.005 -0.028 -0.103** -0.034 0.052 -0.013 -0.071* 0.047 0.178*** 0.034 -0.202***  
FIRMAGE -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.024 -0.151*** -0.025 -0.126*** -0.063† 0.083* 0.054 -0.012 0.171*** 0.077* -0.038 -0.068* 0.159*** 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. IA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit report contains qualifications with uncertainties; MCA: dummy variable equal to 1 if 
women are present in the AC; %MCA: Total number of women in the AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in the 
AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women in the AC; NMDCA: Total number of nominee women in the AC; MPRES: dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC 
has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss in the prior year; LEV: Total debt 
divided by total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms; 
INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the difference between 
setting-up company and observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
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Table 11 presents the results for the logistic regressions in Model 1 and two variants, 
Model 1.1 and Model 1.2, in which the dependent variable represents qualifications for 
errors, non-compliance or omission of information. Model 1 contains six independent 
variables, while the only independent variable in Model 1.1 is the presence of women in 
the AC (MCA), and excludes the variables that refer to the AC’s characteristics 
(%MCA, NMECA, NMDCA, NMICA and MPRES). These are, in turn, the five 
independent variables included in Model 1.2, which excludes the presence of women in 
the AC (MCA). The goodness of fit was 55.10% for Model 1, 53.20% for Model 1.1 
and 55% for Model 1.2. The Chi-squared test shows that the three models were 
statistically significant at 0.1%.  
 
In Model 1, all independent variables were not statistically significant. Consequently, 
none of the six proposed hypotheses can be accepted. This leads to the conclusion that 
none of the six independent variables analysed jointly is associated with the likelihood 
of reducing the receipt of audit qualifications related to errors, non-compliance or the 
omission of information. With regard to the control variables, all were statistically 
insignificant.  
 
In Model 1.1, which includes the presence of women in the AC as the only 
independent variable, and Model 1.2, where the only independent variables are those 
referring to the characteristics of the AC (%MCA, NMECA, NMDCA, NMICA and 
MPRES), neither the independent variables nor the control variables were statistically 
significant. Thus, these results suggest that gender diversity on AC’s is not related to the 
likelihood of reducing the receipt of qualifications with errors, non-compliance or the 
omission of information. This conclusion is consistent with the findings from Sun et al. 
(2011), who showed no association between gender diversity on AC’s and earnings 
management, suggesting that there is no relationship between gender diversity on AC’s 
and financial reporting quality. Moreover, Khan (2010) did not find a significant 
relationship between gender diversity on boards and Corporate Social Responsibility 
reporting. However, the lack of significance may simply be related to the extremely low 
number of qualifications with errors, non-compliance or the omission of information in 
our sample. 
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TABLE 11 
 
Results of the Logistic Regression for the Model in Which the Dependent Variable Refers to 
Qualifications for Errors, Non-Compliance and Omission of Information (N=860) 
 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
Model 1 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 
  Parameters 
estimated 
Wald 
test 
Parameters 
estimated 
Wald 
test 
Parameters 
estimated 
Wald 
test 
(Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MCA - -1.749 0.164 -0.570 0.435 - - (0.685) (0.510)   
%MCA - 0.046 0.150 - - 0.008 0.017 (0.698) (0.897) 
NMECA - -16.946 0.000 - - -17.160 0.000 (0.999) (0.999) 
NMDCA - 0.497 0.058 - - 0.303 0.025 (0.810) (0.873) 
NMICA - -16.024 0.000 - - -16.213 0.000 (0.995) (0.995) 
MPRES - -16.944 0.000 - - -17.007 0.000 (0.995) (0.995) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
NRCA - -0.091 0.423 -0.090 0.435 -0.087 0.391 (0.516) (0.509) (0.532) 
ACSIZE +/- -0.416 0.867 -0.458 1.066 -0.388 0.824 (0.352) (0.302) (0.364) 
OPINAUD + 36.991 0.000 35.585 0.000 36.886 0.000 (0.992) (0.992) (0.992) 
LOSS + -0.739 0.725 -0.694 0.638 -0.721 0.693 (0.394) (0.424) (0.405) 
LEV + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 (0.955) (0.950) (0.948) 
TAMEMPR +/- -0.220 1.142 -0.234 1.384 -0.219 1.146 (0.285) (0.239) (0.284) 
BIGFOUR + -0.581 0.469 -0.655 0.631 -0.602 0.508 (0.493) (0.427) (0.476) 
INSOWN - 0.006 0.956 0.007 1.324 0.006 0.993 (0.328) (0.250) (0.319) 
OWNCON - -0.014 0.701 -0.011 0.480 -0.013 0.685 (0.402) (0.489) (0.408) 
FIRMAGE +/- -0.183 0.363 -0.186 0.363 -0.191 0.396 (0.547) (0.547) (0.529) 
FIRM  
  
Included Included Included 
  χ2=112.916 (0.000) χ2=108.764 (0.000) χ2=112.763 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2= 55.10% Pseudo R2= 53.20% Pseudo R2= 55.00% 
Classification=98.40% Classification=98.40% Classification=98.40% 
Estimated coefficients through the ordinary least square method. The dependent variable is IA, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the audit report contains qualifications with errors, non-compliance and omission of 
information; MCA: dummy variable equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; %MCA: Total number of 
women in the AC/Total number of members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in 
the AC; NMDCA: Total number of institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of 
independent women in the AC; MPRES: dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: 
Number of AC meetings per year; ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: 
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dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss in the prior year; LEV: Total debt divided by 
total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the 
management; OWNCON: Percentage of shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the 
difference between setting-up company and observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
 
 
Table 12 shows the results obtained for Model 2, where the dependent variable refers 
to qualifications for uncertainties, and its two variants, Model 2.1 and Model 2.2. The 
independent variables included in these three models are the same as the ones in Model 
1, Model 1.1 and Model 1.2. As can be observed, the goodness of fit of Models 2, 2.1 
and 2.2 was 67%, 65% and 66.50%, respectively, while the level of correct 
classification ranged from 97.10% to 97.30%. Meanwhile, the Chi-squared test shows 
that the models were statistically significant at 0.1%.  
 
As can be observed in Table 12, the independent variable AC’s chaired by a woman 
(MPRES) was statistically significant at 5% in Model 2 and at 1% in Model 2.2. In both 
models, the variables presented the expected sign. Consequently, we can accept only 
hypothesis 6 as the results did not support the remaining hypotheses. This evidence 
suggests that there is a positive association between firms whose AC’s are chaired by a 
woman and the probability of disclosing audit reports containing qualifications for 
uncertainties. Thus, AC’s chaired by women provide better financial reporting quality. 
Similar results have been reported by Schwartz-Ziv (2011), who found that boards of 
directors chaired by women exercised higher supervision of financial information. 
 
Of the control variables, ACSIZE, OPINAUD, LOSS, TAMEMPR and OWNCON 
were statistically significant at 0.1%, 1% and 5% in the three models. All variables 
presented the expected signs. Thus, these results demonstrate that the likelihood of 
disclosing qualifications with uncertainties is negatively associated with companies that 
have large AC’s and ownership concentration, and positively related to firms that are 
large, received the same qualification in the prior year as the current year and reported 
losses in the prior year.  
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TABLE 12 
 
Results of the Logistic Regression for the Model in Which the Dependent Variable Refers to 
Qualifications for Uncertainties. Model 2(N=904) 
 
Variables 
Expected 
sign 
Model 2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 
  Parameters 
estimated 
Wald test Parameters 
estimated 
Wald test Parameters 
estimated 
Wald test 
(Sig.) (Sig.) (Sig.) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
MCA + 
2.254 2.035 0.399 0.526 - - 
(0.154) (0.468)   
%MCA + 
-0.020 0.198 - - 0.025 0.433 
(0.657) (0.510) 
NMECA + 
-19.602 0.000 - - -18.857 0.000 
(0.999) (0.999) 
NMDCA + 
-1.252 0.784 - - -0.739 0.258 
(0.376) (0.611) 
NMICA + 
0.413 0.107 - - 1.122 0.898 
(0.744) (0.343) 
MPRES + 
2.931 5.237* - - 3.122 6.442** 
(0.022) (0.011) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
NRCA - 
-0.088 0.771 -0.097 0.959 -0.083 0.699 
(0.380) (0.327) (0.403) 
ACSIZE +/- 
-0.633 5.039* -0.504 3.675† -0.536 3.825* 
(0.025) (0,055) 0,050 
OPINAUD + 
6.845 56.583*** 6.308 56.225*** 6.835 55.947*** 
0.000 0.000 (0.000) 
LOSS + 
1.905 15.778*** 1.917 16.887*** 1.914 15.926*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV + 
0.002 2.396 0.002 2.132 0.002 2.425 
(0.122) (0.144) (0.119) 
TAMEMPR +/- 
0.307 4.032* 0.304 3.982* 0.318 4.285* 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.038) 
BIGFOUR + 
0.012 0.000 0.168 0.065 -0.006 0.000 
(0.986) (0.799) (0.992) 
INSOWN - 
0.002 0.059 0.002 0.176 0.001 0.027 
(0.808) (0.674) (0.869) 
OWNCON - 
-0.030 5.038* -0.020 2.723** -0.030 5.310* 
(0.025) (0.099) (0.021) 
FIRMAGE +/- 
0.173 0.426 0.096 0.153 0.119 0.210 
(0.514) (0.696) (0.647) 
FIRM  
  
Included Included Included 
  χ2= 70.230 (0.000) χ2=261.157 (0.000) χ2=268.044 (0.000) 
Pseudo R2= 67.00% Pseudo R2= 65.00% Pseudo R2= 66.50% 
Classification=97.30% Classification=97.10% Classification=97.00% 
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Estimated coefficients through the ordinary least square method. The dependent variable is IA, a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the audit report contains qualifications with uncertainties; MCA: dummy variable 
equal to 1 if women are present in the AC; %MCA: Total number of women in the AC/Total number of 
members in the AC; NMECA: Total number of executive women in the AC; NMDCA: Total number of 
institutional women in the AC; NMICA: Total number of independent women in the AC; MPRES: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the AC has a chairwoman; NRCA: Number of AC meetings per year; 
ACSIZE: Total number of members in the AC; OPINAUD: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
received the same qualification in the prior and the current year; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company reported a loss in the prior year; LEV: Total debt divided by total assets; TAMEMPR: Natural 
logarithm of total assets; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the 
big 4 audit firms; INSOWN: Proportion of shares held by the management; OWNCON: Percentage of 
shares held by large shareholder; FIRMAGE: Log of the difference between setting-up company and 
observation year. Significant at † p <  0 .10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0 .001. 
 
 
1.5. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Given the importance placed on gender diversity as a part of good corporate 
governance, this study provides an empirical analysis of the influence of female 
members of AC’s on the financial information reported by the firms listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange. In order to measure the quality of the financial information 
published, we considered the type of audit reports that firms received, distinguishing 
between opinions containing qualifications for errors, non-compliance or the omission 
of information and those containing uncertainties. 
 
We hypothesised that there is a negative relation between gender diversity in AC’s 
and the likelihood of receiving a qualification with errors, non-compliance or the 
omission of information, and a positive association between gender diversity in AC’s 
and the probability of disclosing qualifications with uncertainties. On the one hand, the 
results show no association between gender diversity in AC’s (the presence of women 
in the AC; the percentage of women making up AC’s; the number of executive, 
institutional and independent women in AC’s and AC’s chaired by women) and the 
likelihood of reducing the receipt of audit reports with qualifications with errors, non-
compliance or the omission of information. On the other hand, the results report a 
positive relationship between AC’s chaired by women and the likelihood of disclosing 
qualifications with uncertainties, suggesting an enhancement to financial reporting 
quality. The remaining variables of gender diversity in AC’s (the presence of women in 
the AC; the percentage of women making up AC’s and the number of executive, 
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institutional and independent women in AC’s) were not associated with the disclosure 
of qualifications with uncertainties. 
 
In sum, our conclusions support the view that women in AC’s have an impact on the 
quality of information when they are in a position to exert significant influence, since 
the results show that AC’s chaired by a woman are positively associated with the 
quality of financial information, increasing the disclosure of qualifications with 
uncertainties. The explanations for these results may include the following: firstly, the 
low number of qualifications with errors, non-compliance and the omission of 
information can justify the lack of significant results for these types of qualifications. 
Secondly, the vestiges of the Franco dictatorship, a traditionally male-dominated 
society, can also support these findings. Spanish society needs to remove any remainder 
of this era over time. To this effect, the presence of women in corporate governance 
bodies is a new phenomenon and might have a role in restricting their influence. It is 
possible that female AC members are more ethical than male AC members but are 
unable to influence the remainder of the AC. Therefore, their role in relation to financial 
reporting issues would either be limited or unattended to in most cases. Thirdly, it is 
possible that women are not uniform in their ability to influence other AC members. 
Individual differences in this ability may mask a gender difference in financial reporting 
quality beliefs and lead to the null results. Unfortunately, we cannot control for this 
effect in the study. Finally, the culture of corporate governance may not be fully 
developed yet in Spain, in particular with respect to AC’s, as these mechanisms of 
corporate governance are imported from Anglo-Saxon countries.  
 
Thus, these findings provide evidence for the necessity to continue researching on 
issues about women in corporate governance, especially in the international context, as 
comparison of our results with other legal, cultural, professional and regulatory 
environments would enrich the debate about gender diversity in corporate governance 
and could help correct inappropriate conduct and encourage the adoption of tougher 
measures.  
 
Let us now mention key limitations to this study. In the first place, the number of 
qualifications with errors, non-compliance or the omission of information in our sample 
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was extremely low. With this caveat in mind, much caution should be exercised when 
interpreting the results. Finally, it is possible that there are unknown factors that could 
impact our dependent variable. While we have controlled for as many factors as 
possible based on theory and prior research, empirical and theoretical limitations 
prevent us from knowing whether all of the important influences have been controlled 
for and addressed. 
 
This empirical study could give rise to future lines of research. It would be valuable 
to examine the criteria that firms employ to select candidates for membership to AC’s, 
and the functions of the committee members. Additionally, it would be interesting to 
analyse the role that women can play in corporate governance in a post-crisis era since 
women’s contribution to the corporate governance system may have been mitigated by 
the crisis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE GENDER GAP IN PAY IN COMPANY 
BOARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Men’s compensation has remained higher than women’s for decades, resulting in a 
gender salary gap in which female pay has consistently been lower than that of their 
male counterparts. Gosling and Lemieux (2001) observed the ongoing existence of this 
gender pay gap in the labour markets of the most advanced industrialised countries. 
Meanwhile, Chu Ng (2004) and Cho (2007) showed that Chinese and Korean women 
also earned less than men. Jolliffe (2002) obtained similar results for Bulgaria. 
Chevalier (2007) found that women in the United Kingdom earned 20% less than men, 
despite the country’s long-standing anti-discrimination policies. Kulich et al. (2010) 
also examined the gender pay gap in senior posts at UK firms, finding that the salaries 
earned by male executives were higher than those of women at the same level of 
financial performance. 
 
Previous studies focusing on analysing gender gap in pay (Blau and Kahn, 1992; 
Kunze, 2005; Miyoshi, 2008; Vitaliano, 2009) show that it is caused by occupational 
segregation (Bayard et al., 1999; De la Rica, 2007; Palacio and Simón, 2006) and other 
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factors which can be explained by human capital theory (Amarante and Espino, 2002; 
García et al., 2001, Rubery et al., 2005; Varela et al., 2010).  
 
In this light, there is a clear need for further research into the factors underlying the 
gender gap in pay, an issue that has aroused considerable interest both in Spain 
(Hernández, 1995; Palacio and Simón, 2002; Simón, 2009) and internationally 
(Miyoshi, 2008; Olsen et al., 2009; Papapetrou, 2008; Vitaliano, 2009; Wood et al., 
1993).  
 
The aim of this study is to analyse whether there are differences in the pay earned by 
male and female directors serving on the boards of firms listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange, in the period 2004-2011, and if so, to examine the explanatory factors behind 
the gender gap in pay.  
 
This study is particularly relevant in the Spanish context, as most analyses of the 
gender gap in pay refer to the English-speaking nations, or to Eastern European and 
some Asian countries. The contribution made by this study lies in its analysis of the 
gender gap in pay among the directors of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, 
since most existing studies (De la Rica, 2007; Del Rio et al, 2011; Simón, 2006) use 
data from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) and since most of the 
previous empirical literature on the gender wage gap is based on the labour market in 
general, but very little empirical evidence for the groups of boards of directors in listed 
private companies exists. The results reported are therefore particularly important, as 
they confirm that there is a gender gap in pay at the top of the corporate hierarchy in 
Spain, due basically to the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation 
Committee.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. This introduction is followed by a 
description of the institutional background in Spain. The third section describes the 
theoretical background and previous literature. The fourth section develops the 
hypotheses predicted. The fifth section describes the methodology and sample used in 
the study and the sixth section shows the results obtained. In the seventh and final 
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section we discuss our conclusions and explain the limitations inherent in this study, at 
the same time pointing to possible future lines of research. 
 
2.2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
In Spain, between the 1970s and the 1990s many changes in legislation governing 
the treatment of men and women were introduced. There has been a general belief that 
one of the fundamental characteristics of the Spanish labour market was, and maybe is, 
the persistent and strong wage discrimination due to gender for similar jobs: men are 
clearly paid more than women. The equality principle was highlighted in Article 14 of 
the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which clearly prohibited discrimination on grounds of 
gender. The Workers’ Statute Act of 1980 (amended several times since then) 
established in Article 28 a wage equality for work of equal value. Moreover, the 3rd 
Plan for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (1997–2000) recognised the 
persistence of unjustifiable wage inequalities for women already working. To palliate 
this unequal situation, a number of actions were taken under the Plan to provide women 
with real access to employment with full social and economic rights by encouraging 
structural changes and transformations that favoured this purpose. In total and to date, 
there are four Plans for Equal Opportunities, the Activity Plans for Employment (with a 
special emphasis on gender equality) of 1998 and the EU Strategy Plan for Gender 
Equality of June 7, 2000. The Act 3/2007 of 22 March, “The Equality Law”, for 
effective equality between women and men (LOIMH), implemented in 2007, in Article 
5 also highlights that wage equality has to prevail between men and women. This 
regulation has had a positive impact mainly on discrimination in the public sector where 
today, one can hardly find a pay-gap anymore in Spain (Aláez et al., 2011; Ullibarri, 
2003).  
 
Academic research into the pay earned by company directors in Spain was no easy 
task until only a few years ago, because the majority of listed firms did not publish 
information about board compensation. However, the Spanish Listed Companies 
Transparency Act (Law 26/2003), enacted in 2003 with the full backing of the National 
Securities Market Commission (CNMV), made it mandatory for listed firms to disclose 
details of directors’ pay in their Annual Reports. As a consequence, data on the pay 
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earned by Spanish directors has become available since this legislation entered the 
statute book. In 2011, the Sustainable Economy Act 2/2011 was passed to strengthen 
the application of EU Directive CRD3 for the financial sector and provide similar 
regulations for all listed companies. Under part of the Act, listed companies have to 
submit director and senior executive remuneration policy to a non-binding vote at the 
general meeting of shareholders.  
 
The Spanish Corporate Governance System has been subject to significant reforms 
since the first publication in 1998 of what is known as the Olivencia Report, whose 
recommendations focused on the performance of firms and the publication of public 
information. It was followed in 2002 by the Law on Measures to Reform the Financial 
System (LMRFS), and in 2003 by the Law on Transparency of Listed Firms (LTLF). In 
2003, the Aldama Report was also published and replaced the Olivencia Report and 
finally, in 2006 the Unified Code of Corporate Governance (CUBG) report or Conthe 
Code, was published, which unifies the Olivencia and Aldama Codes. The purpose of 
the CUBG (2006) was to improve business management and return transparency to the 
Spanish system.  
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that the continuous political and socio-economic 
changes in Spain in recent years have increased gender diversity in BD. This raise was 
enhanced by the publication of the Conthe Code (CUBG, 2006), whose 
recommendations are intended to support female presence in decision-making bodies 
and eliminate possible discrimination. According to Gonzáléz Menéndez and Martínez 
González (2012), after this recommendation and the debate of the Draft Equality Law, 
most of the improvements in women’s representation on boards occurred between 2005 
and 2006. In addition, Act 3/2007 of 22 March, “The Equality Law”, in Article 75 
frames the regulation of the appointment of women and men in BDs in an equitable 
form for a period of 8 years since the law came into force. Spanish law followed the 
pattern of Norway, the first country in the world to establish a gender quota of 40% in 
boards, and this law also forced companies to reach a gender quota of 40% by 2015. De 
Anca (2008) argues that this percentage is not a high target, given the high level of 
rotation among board members in Spanish listing firms. However, the progress made is 
still too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target, and for this reason, González-
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Menéndez and Martínez-González (2012) recommend that stronger government 
sanctions, combined with more effective equality plans within companies, are required 
for the quota to be met.  
 
In this sense, González-Menéndez and Martínez-González (2012) analysed the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey and reported that the presence of women directors on the 
listed firms' corporate boards rose from 5’6% in 2004 to 10’40% in 2010. In the same 
vein, De Anca (2008) examined 127 listed companies in 2006, including the Ibex 35 
firms, and documented that only 5’1% of the members of the Ibex 35 BD’s were 
women directors, while the non-Ibex 35 companies had 6’7%  women in BD's. The 
United Nations Report (2010) documented that the proportion of women increased from 
6 per cent in 2007 to only 10 per cent on Spanish boards in 2009. 
 
2.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
 
The salary structure of developed countries shows a gap in pay as a consequence of a 
higher influence in supply and the demand. For decades the remunerations received by 
males have been, and are, greater than those of females, giving rise to a gender gap in 
pay. De Pablos (2001) documented that the salary received by women was smaller than 
men’s and in 40% of the cases, the women’s compensation was below the minimum 
salary. Amarante and Espino (2001, 2002) observed that the Uruguayan job market 
exhibited an important gender gap in pay. The two most relevant economic approaches 
that explain male-female wage differences in the companies are the human capital 
theory (Terjesen et al., 2009) and occupational segregation.  
 
In this sense, previous studies that have analysed gender gap in pay in developed 
countries (Blau and Kahn, 1992) have reported that most of the gender gap in pay is 
explained by human capital theory (Amarante and Espino, 2002; García et al., 2001; 
Varela et al., 2010) and occupational segregation theory (Bayard et al., 1999; De la 
Rica, 2007; Palacio and Simón, 2006). 
 
Human capital theory posits that individuals invest in themselves, building up their 
own stock of knowledge, experience and skills over the years (Becker, 1964). Human 
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capital can be acquired either by years of educational attainment, or in the labour 
market, measured in terms of years of experience or seniority in a given job. For this 
reason, individuals can increase their productivity by learning work skills while they are 
on the job. However, women tend to invest less in human capital than men, mainly 
because they take on a greater share of domestic responsibilities and are less committed 
to their careers (Lips, 2003; Wood et al., 1993). Burke (2000) argues that board 
selectors held the assumption that women lack adequate human capital for board 
positions. This argument is empirically supported by Westphal and Milton (2000) and 
Singh et al. (2008), who reported that women directors are less likely to have top 
manager or focal director experience than men directors. In the same vein, Catalyst 
(1993) showed that CEOs were reluctant to appoint women as directors of BD’s 
because they believe that females are unqualified. Carli (1990) and Heilman and Haynes 
(2005) documented that in a male dominated context, female with work experience can 
neutralize negative opinions about women’s performance, but they are presumed to be 
less competent than men. Thus, women begin their careers with less human capital than 
men and reap less compensation than men (Tharenou et al., 1994). 
 
Hillman et al. (2002) showed that groups such as women can compensate for the 
effects of discrimination and subjective bias in selection procedures if they gain post-
graduate qualifications. However, Hernández (1995) demonstrated that graduate men 
earned much more than women with the same university training. Similar evidence was 
reported by Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004). García et al. (2001) showed that the 
gender gap in pay in Spain is higher for more trained women. Palacio and Simón (2002) 
and Ullibarri (2003) provide similar evidence. According to CES (Consejo Económico 
and Social, 2011), the gender gap in pay was exhibited at all training levels and it was 
greater when women were more trained. Contrary to this evidence, Gardín and Del Río 
(2009), Gonzalo and Pons (2005) and Ullibarri (2003) reported that between graduate 
men and women, there was not a gender gap in pay, but it was exhibited among women 
with elementary education.  
 
Singh et al. (2008) showed that women had minor board experience but not less 
business experience than men. Studies such as De la Rica and Ugidos (1995) and 
Hernández (1995) demonstrated that women obtained a higher salary as they gained 
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more experience in the company, and therefore, the gender gap in pay was reduced. In 
addition, Hernández (1995) demonstrated that when a woman’s work contract lasted at 
least two years, their salary was increased, while that of men did not. Aláez and 
Ullibarri (1999) analysed whether all Spanish regions exhibited a gender gap in pay and 
reported that women’s experience was less than men’s experience in all regions. 
Moreover, the authors demonstrated that the difference in experience between males 
and females was caused because women retired from active working life in order to take 
care their children, which is one of the most important factors explaining the gender gap 
in pay. Simón et al. (2005) documented that the average salary earned by women was 
similar to men’s salary when both had less experience in their jobs. According to Ortega 
(2007), experience was a key factor in establishing the pay of males and females.  
 
Regarding women’s seniority, it is expected that as women have more seniority, the 
gender gap exhibited in pay is smaller. The reason for the low seniority of women is the 
tardy incorporation of women into the labour market and their commitment to family 
life. In this sense, De la Rica and Ugidos (1995) showed that men with more seniority 
earned much more than women. The authors also reported that when women had the 
same education and seniority as men, the reduction of the gender gap in pay is 50%. 
According to CES (2011), the gender gap in pay between males and females was higher 
as the seniority between them increased.  
 
The occupational segregation approach excludes women from certain kinds of work, 
so that they tend to be concentrated in low-paid occupations (Dolado et al., 2004; 
Leaker, 2008; Olsen et al., 2009). Segregation can arise as the result of employer 
discrimination in hiring and promotion, or from human capital differences in education 
levels. In addition, occupational segregation can be divided between horizontal and 
vertical: the first analyses how men and women are distributed according to their 
occupation, and the second examines the distribution of male and female according to 
the hierarchical level within the organisation. The existence of a gender gap in pay in 
some occupations may be due to women being discouraged from entering high-wage 
occupations by discriminatory barriers. Jurajda (2003) demonstrated that the 
segregation of women in low-paying occupations was one third of the total wage gap. 
 78 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
Simón (2006) reported that occupational segregation was a key factor in the gender gap 
in pay. 
 
Authors such as Groshen (1991), Johnson and Solon (1986) and MacPherson and 
Hirsch (1995), among others, documented that men had higher wages than women, 
since women were employed in jobs where average remuneration was lower. Palacio 
and Simón (2002) concluded that the gender gap in pay in most of the cases is due to 
the way men and women are distributed within the labour market, since women are 
concentrated in jobs with low salaries. In the same vein, previous studies (Bayard et al., 
1999; De la Rica, 2003) showed that women earned less than men because females were 
concentrated in low-paid occupations. Bell (2005) demonstrated that executive women 
with the same education and occupation earned less than executive men. Simón et al. 
(2005) concluded that the segregation of women increased in low-paid occupations and 
in those jobs where there were a high number of women. Ortega (2007) reported that the 
higher the occupational segregation, the higher the gender gap in pay. Thus, in those 
jobs with a high concentration of men, the gender gap in pay exhibited will be higher. 
Aláez and Ullibarri (1999) showed that women earned 19% less than men when both 
occupied the same job and had the same education.  
 
Bell (2005), Bird et al. (2007) and Castaño et al. (2008) demonstrated that of men 
and women directors, females earned less than males. Tenjo et al. (2005) analysed the 
gender gap in pay in six Latin American countries and reported that the gender gap in 
pay per hour was reduced in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Uruguay, but 
in Costa Rica it considerably increased. In addition, they demonstrated that in 
Argentina, Colombia and Honduras, the average wage per hour of women was higher 
than of men, except for housekeepers. Palacio and Simón (2006) showed that in the 
period 1995-2002, men earned higher salaries than women in the same hierarchical 
level and occupation, while Bird et al. (2007) documented that female accountants 
earned $24 per hour less than male accountants. In the same sense, Castaño et al. (2008) 
revealed that executive women received 42% less of the wage than men. Porto et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that women directors earned 16’5% less than male directors, and 
the gender gap in pay was lower when the hierarchical level was lower. 
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2.4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Board membership: percentage of female directors on the board and presence 
of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee 
 
Although women were scarcely represented on company boards until comparatively 
recently, their numbers have risen over the last decade or so as they have become 
progressively better qualified. Mateos et al. (2007) found that only 6.61% of directors in 
the 1.085 largest Spanish firms were women. Meanwhile, statistics published by the 
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2012) show that women made up 10’3% of 
directors in IBEX 35 companies, which is still low but nonetheless a considerable 
improvement – in 2005 less than 2% were women.  
 
The percentage of female directors on BD may be an important factor for the 
supervision and control of the board’s activities (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Schwartz-
Ziv, 2011). In this sense, research has found that women on boards have an important 
influence on firm performance (Adler, 2001; Adam and Ferreira, 2003; Campbell and 
Mínguez, 2008; Carter et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2004; Farrel and Hersh, 2005; Shrader et 
al., 2007; Krishnan and Park, 2005), financial reporting quality or fostering good 
corporate practice (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996) and 
dividend policy (Van Pelt, 2013; Wellalage et al., 2012), among others. Given the 
importance of women on boards in allocating capital to corporations, as well as their 
role in firm governance, an understanding of how their presence in boards affects the 
gender pay gap is undoubtedly needed. 
 
Most studies that focus on wage disparity between male and female report that men 
earn significantly more than women, although some researchers argue that men and 
women receive similar compensation at management levels (Bowlin and Renne, 2008). 
Blau and Khan (2001) demonstrated that the implementation of a gender quota in BDs 
could develop egalitarian wage structures, and reduce the gender gap in pay. Bilimoria 
(2006) found a positive association between female corporate board members and 
women among the top corporate earners, exhibiting a smaller gender gap in pay. 
Terjesen and Singh (2008) show that boards with a higher representation of women are 
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more likely to have women in senior management and smaller gender pay gaps. Smith 
et al. (2011) revealed that for the small and select group of CEOs the gender 
compensation gap decreased slightly. Jacobs (1992) demonstrated a narrowing of the 
gender pay gap among directors that is correlated with a substantial rise in the number 
of female directors. In the same vein, Cohen and Huffman (2007) demonstrated that as 
the representation of female directors increased, the gender wage gap narrowed. 
According to Jordan et al. (2007), for women who have reached a seat on the board, no 
gender pay gap exists, as females are paid virtually the same as their male counterparts.  
 
Fondas and Sassalos (2000) indicated that women tend to have higher expectations 
regarding their responsibilities as directors, which may induce them to expend more 
effort on their tasks. Similarly, Huse and Solberg (2006) showed that women on 
corporate boards are better prepared for board meetings than men; thus, female 
representation may improve board behaviour and effectiveness. According to Ittonen et 
al. (2010), gender diversity may improve the efficiency of corporate boards simply 
because female directors, in general, are presumably highly competent and 
hardworking. In this sense, Ye et al. (2010) provide evidence that companies with a 
higher proportion of women directors perform better than those without gender 
diversity, and Nielsen and Huse (2010) illustrated that women’s presence on a BD 
reduces conflicts between the members of the board, thus promoting best practices in 
the company. Thus, we presume that female directors may improve the monitoring 
activities of the BD and as a result, it is more likely that they can narrow the gender gap 
in pay. Hence, based on the arguments and evidence presented above, we hypothesize 
that a higher percentage of women directors on boards will decrease the gender wage 
gap: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a greater percentage of female directors on their 
boards will be more likely to have a smaller gender pay gap among directors of the 
Board. 
 
On the other hand, the pay of directors on the board can be a bone of contention 
between managers and shareholders. The Spanish Unified Code of Good Governance 
(CUBG, 2006) recommended the inclusion of women on a board and its committees, 
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assigning responsibility for selection processes to the Nomination Committee, which 
should seek to recruit candidates with the required professional profile while avoiding 
gender discrimination at all times. Meanwhile, responsibility for proposing directors’ 
and executives’ pay lies with the Compensation Committee.  
 
According to Klein (2003), Compensation Committees should not confine 
themselves to moderating directors’ pay, but should also take responsibility for the 
design of remuneration structures capable of incentivising behaviour in line with 
shareholders’ interests and rewarding enhanced business performance. Among others, 
Arrondo et al. (2008), Conyon (1997), Klein (1998) and Kose and Lemma (1998) found 
that the presence of a Nomination and Compensation Committee did in fact rein in 
directors’ pay. Shin (2012) shows that the gender gap in executive pay is smaller when 
a greater percentage of women sit on the Compensation Committee of the board, which 
is the group responsible for setting executive compensation.  
 
As shown above, the previous evidence about the relationship between the presence 
of women directors on the Compensation Committee and the gender wage gap is scarce. 
However, we predict that the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation 
Committee will increase the gender pay gap among board members for two reasons. 
The first reason is because women are less likely to sit on Compensation Committees 
than men (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and this means that women directors have less 
involvement in setting boards members pay and not as much influence over the design 
of board director’s compensation as their male counterparts, and consequently, they 
cannot put pressure on their male counterparts in order to get equal salaries for all board 
members. Secondly, according to Kulich et al. (2010), members of the Compensation 
Committee, mainly men, may feel the need to offer male directors higher compensation 
compared to that offered to female directors, in order to attract and retain male directors 
on the board, since male directors on Compensation Committees perceive female 
leaders to be less instrumental in achieving particular corporate outcomes.  In light of 
the above, we propose the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 2: Firms with the presence of women on the Nomination and 
Compensation Committee will be more likely to have a greater gender pay gap among 
directors of the Board. 
 
Educational level of female independent directors 
 
As women have joined the labour market in increasing numbers in recent decades, 
they have become progressively better qualified, allowing them to rise above their 
historical situation, which confined them largely to basic education and domestic 
concerns. Education, a human capital variable that is positively related to the ability of 
the manager, has a clear effect on pay (Coelho et al., 2010). Education can potentially 
increase earning power, and women are specifically encouraged to use education where 
possible to increase their earning potential (Lips, 2008). If educational qualifications are 
important determinants of performance in a company, and if females have higher levels 
of qualifications (Blau and Kahn, 2007), then women will earn higher wages 
(Arulampalam et al., 2007). As a consequence, the gender wage gap can be reduced.  
 
In this sense, Mukhopadhayay (2001) observed that rising female education in 
Singapore caused a reduction in the gender pay gap. Similarly, the education received 
by Canadian women in the period 1986-1991 was the determining factor in narrowing 
the gap between male and female compensation (Christie and Shannon, 2001). Gardín 
and Del Río (2009), Gonzalo and Pons (2005) and Ullibarri (2003) reported that 
between graduate men and women, there was no gender gap in pay, but it was seen for 
women with elementary education. Aláez and Ullibarri (1999) analysed the gender gap 
in pay in the different regions of Spain, finding the largest gender pay gaps were in 
those regions where both men and women were least educated and the education of 
women was similar to that of men (Murcia and Castile-La Mancha). Along the same 
lines, the Spanish Economic and Social Council (CES, 2011), Del Río et al. (2011) and 
Simón et al. (2008), among others, found that the gender-based salary gap narrows with 
the level of education. Coelho et al. (2010) also reported that the gender wage gap is 
narrower when women have more advanced degrees. Similar evidence was reported by 
other authors (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Chevalier, 2007; Izquierdo and Lacuesta, 2007), 
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who showed that improvements in the level of women’s qualifications explain a 
substantial portion of the narrowing of the gender pay gap. 
 
Contrary to this evidence, Böheim et al. (2007), De la Rica et al. (2005), García et al. 
(2001), Jurajda (2003), Mirta (2003), Ortega (2007), Palacio and Simón (2002), 
Plantenga and Remedy (2006) and Simón et al. (2005) reported that the gender pay gap 
is greater among better qualified workers, while Simón (2006) found that the gap in pay 
between the best educated male and female workers was greater in Spain than in any 
other European country, except Ireland, although the gap was smaller among less well-
qualified workers. Palacio and Simón (2002) and Cho (2007) reported that male-female 
pay inequality was greater in both Spain and Korea not only when the women 
concerned lacked educational qualifications, but also among female graduates. De la 
Rica (2007), Hernández (1995) and Lauer (2000) showed that men earned higher pay 
than women even when they were educated to the same level.  
 
Our aim was to investigate the qualifications of all women holding board level office 
in listed Spanish firms. However, published Corporate Governance reports only include 
information on the qualifications of independent directors, and we shall therefore 
confine ourselves to examining the qualifications of these women. Human capital 
theory argues that one of the explanations for the gender wage gap is the difference in 
human capital among individuals, such as education (Crossley et al., 1994; Lazear and 
Rosen, 1990; Mincer and Polachek, 1994). Tharenou et al. (1994) argue that females, 
compared to males, have traditionally made fewer investments in education and work 
experience and this is reflected in lower pay and promotion. Thus, based on this 
argument and previous evidence, we posit that the presence of qualified women 
directors on the BD will diminish the gender gap in pay, as qualified female directors 
may receive top salaries and positions as often as their male counterparts. Consequently, 
well-qualified female independent directors will help narrow the gender pay gap. 
Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a presence of well-qualified female independent 
directors on boards will be more likely to have a smaller gender pay gap among 
directors of the Board. 
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Firm sector  
 
The sector in which a firm operates is an important factor, as the businesses in which 
they engage may influence gender gap in pay (Jurajda and Harmgart, 2007). Kulich et 
al. (2011) examined U.K. listed firms from 1998 to 2004 and demonstrated that there 
was a significant gender pay gap in executive positions when controlling for industry. 
Skalpe (2007) analysed 1.866 private firms from the tourism and manufacturing 
industries from 1999 to 2001 and showed that female CEOs were wage-discriminated in 
both sectors. Nonetheless, the gender gap in pay was greater in tourism companies 
because the female CEOs in this industry were employed in smaller firms than is the 
case in manufacturing. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) also found a considerable gender 
wage gap in top management, and most of the gender pay differential was explained by 
industry or occupational levels, among other reasons. Meanwhile, Renner et al. (2002) 
demonstrated that variations in annual compensation between female and male 
executive directors can be explained by the industrial sector. 
 
Contrary to this evidence, Vieito and Khan (2012) reported that there was no gender 
wage gap between male and female executive directors of BD of technology firms. 
Similar evidence was reported by Smith et al. (2011) and Holst and Busch (2009), who 
after controlling for industry and other characteristics, showed that a gender wage gap 
among directors did not exist.  
 
The existing evidence is not conclusive and therefore, it is not evident how the sector 
in which the company operates can explain the gender gap in pay that may exist 
between male and female directors of the BD. Consequently, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The sector in which the company operates can increase or narrow 
the gender wage gap among directors of the Board. 
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Geographical region  
 
The compensation of male and female board members may vary depending on the 
geographical region of the company (Lago, 2002), mainly due to differences in the cost 
of living and non-monetary conditions of employment. Towns and cities are often more 
expensive than rural areas (Skalpe, 2007). Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987) proposed that 
geographical location might affect the executives’ compensation level. 
 
In this vein, Holst (2006) examined 80.000 German firms and demonstrated that 
women and men directors on the board both earned significantly less in East Germany 
(former GDR) than in West Germany, but the regional difference was larger for men. 
This result suggests that firm location influences the gender wage gap. In contrast with 
this finding, Skalpe (2007) examined Norwegian tourism and manufacturing companies 
and showed that the urban location of the company did not appear to influence the 
gender wage gap among executive directors.  
 
Aláez and Ullibarri (1999) examined male-female compensation discrimination in 
the Spanish regions, finding the widest gender pay gaps in Catalonia and Murcia and the 
smallest in the Balearic Islands and La Rioja. Meanwhile, Palacio and Simón (2002) 
found a significant gender pay gap in large firms located in Catalonia and Madrid. 
Finally, the report of the Spanish National Statistics Institute entitled INE: Women and 
Men of Spain (2012) lists the Autonomous Communities with the smallest gender pay 
gaps as the Canary Islands (13.6%), Extremadura (15.8%), the Balearic Islands (20.2%) 
and Castile-La Mancha (21.9%). The gap was widest in Asturias (29.8%) and Aragon 
(31.1%). 
 
Internationally, Chu Ng (2004) studied data obtained from the Chinese Office of 
Statistics for the period 1988-1992, arguing that the gender pay gap was widest in 
western China, away from the coast, where economic progress has been slower. In 
contrast, they showed that rapid growth along China’s eastern seaboard and in the centre 
of the country reduced the pay gap. Leaker (2008) reported that women’s compensation 
was lower throughout the United Kingdom, and that the gender pay gap was widest in 
the South-West and South-East of the country.  
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Like the firm sector variable, it is not easy to predict a priori whether a firm’s 
geographical region will increase or decrease male-female compensation differences 
between directors, because the gender pay gap depends on the specific location of each 
firm, as the existing literature shows. In this light, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The geographical region in which the company is situated can 
increase or narrow the gender wage gap among directors of the Board. 
 
2.5. Methodology and sample  
 
2.5.1 Methodology 
 
We shall use the following model to empirically test the hypotheses proposed above:  
 
REMUit= β0 + β1PERCWBD it + β2 PWNCCit + β3ELIWBD (1)it + β4ELIWBD (2)it 
+ β5 FSEC (1) it + β6 FSEC (2) it + β7 FSEC (3) it + β8 FSEC (4) it +β9 FSEC (5) it 
+β10 GREG (1)it + β11 GREG (2)it + β12 GREG (3)it + β13 GREG (4)it +β14 GREG 
(5)it +β15 SEN(1) it + β16 SEN(2)it +β17 SEN(3) it+β18 FIRMSIZEit  +β19 PRODit 
+β20 ROAit + β21 BDSIZEit   +∑j αj FIRMj + μit 
 
Where the dependent variable, REMUit, is calculated as the logarithm of the 
difference between the compensation of male and female directors in firms listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange3. The calculation of this variable is based on annual rather than 
hourly pay, because that is how the data is presented in the Annual Corporate 
Governance Reports published by the firms analysed. The remuneration considered 
comprises fixed and variable pay, as well as allowances. The variables used in the 
model and the expected signs of each are shown in Table 13.  
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TABLE 13 
 
Variables Description 
 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PERCWBD Total number of women on the BD’s/Total number of members on the BD’s - 
PWNCC Dummy Value (1=Presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee; 0= Otherwise) + 
ELIWBD (1) Dummy Value (1= Independent women graduate; 0 = Otherwise) - 
ELIWBD (2) Dummy Value (1= Independent women PhD; 0 = Otherwise) - 
FSEC (1) Dummy Value (1= Oil and energy; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
FSEC (2) Dummy Value (1= Commodities, industry and construction; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
FSEC (3) Dummy Value (1= Consumer goods; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
FSEC (4) Dummy Value (1= Consumer Services; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
FSEC (5) Dummy Value (1= Finance and property service; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
GREG (1) Dummy Value ( 1 = Northwest; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
GREG (2) Dummy Value( 1 = Northeast; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
GREG (3) Dummy Value ( 1 = Madrid; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
GREG (4) Dummy Value ( 1 = Centre; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
GREG (5) Dummy Value ( 1 = East; 0 = Otherwise) +/- 
 CONTROL VARIABLES 
SEN (1) Dummy Value (1= one year of seniority; 0= Otherwise) - 
SEN (2) Dummy Value (1= From two to four years of seniority; 0= Otherwise) - 
SEN (3) Dummy Value (1=  From five to eight years of seniority; 0= Otherwise) - 
FIRMSIZE Log of total assets (in thousands of Euros) + 
PROD Log (Turnover/ Number of employees) + 
ROA Ordinary result/Average of total assets + 
BDSIZE Total number of directors on the BD’s + 
 
 
2.5.2 Independent and control variables 
 
2.5.2.1 Independent variables  
 
Percentage of female directors on the board 
This variable is denoted by “PERCWBD” and it is calculated as the ratio between the 
total number of female directors on the board and the total number of directors on the 
board. It is expected to be negative, as we predict that the gender pay gap between 
directors will narrow given an increase in the percentage of female board members.  
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Presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee 
Female membership of the Nomination and Compensation Committee is 
approximated by the variable “PWNCC”, defined as a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the members of the committee include any women and 0, otherwise. This 
variable is expected to be positive, as we predict that the presence of women on the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee will increase the gender pay gap between 
directors. 
 
Educational level of female independent directors in the Board of Directors 
“ELIWBD” represents the educational level of female independent directors on the 
board. As explained above, we have only considered the qualifications of female 
independent directors because this is the only data regarding the education of board 
members contained in Corporate Governance Reports. “ELIWBD” is calculated as a 
categorical variable, and we have therefore created C-1 dichotomous variables. Having 
created the dichotomous variables, the next step is to establish the reference category we 
wish to compare with the other categories. We have classified educational level as 
follows: ELIWBD (0) = no details of female independent director qualifications in the 
Corporate Governance Report; ELIWBD (1) = BA/BSc. degree; and ELIWBD (2) = 
Phd. The reference category is ELIWBD (0). The variable is expected to be negative, as 
the gender pay gap between directors will be narrower, the better qualified the female 
independents serving on a firm’s board. 
 
Firm Sector 
The business sector variable was defined on the basis of the Madrid Stock Exchange 
classification: FSEC (1) = Oil and energy; FSEC (2) = Commodities, industry and 
construction; FSEC (3) = Consumer goods; FSEC (4) = Consumer services; FSEC (5) = 
Financial services and property (excluding banks, which do not form part of the 
sample); and FSEC (6) = Technology and telecommunications. The value of the dummy 
variables is 1 if the company belongs to the sector in question and 0 otherwise. The 
reference category is FSEC (6). We expect this variable to be both positive and 
negative, as the salary gap may increase or decrease depending on the sector to which 
the firm belongs. The sector classification is shown in Table 14.  
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TABLE 14 
 
Classification of the sector 
 
SECTOR 1 Oil and Energy 
1. Oil 
2. Energy and gas 
3. Renewable energy 
SECTOR 2 Commodities, industry and construction 
1. Minerals, metals and transportation 
2. Production equipment godos 
3. Construction 
4. Materials of construction 
5. Chemical industry 
6. Engineering and others 
7. Aerospatiale 
SECTOR 3 Consumer godos 
1. Foods and drinks 
2. Textile, dress and shoes 
3. Paper and graph arts 
4. Pharmaceutical products and 
5. Others consumers godos 
SECTOR 4 Consumer services 
1. Leisure, tourism and hotel industry 
2. Retailer trade 
3. Media and advertising 
4. Transport and distribution 
5. Motorway and car park 
6. Other services 
SECTOR 5 Financial and property services 
1. Bank and savings bank 
2. Insurance 
3. Portfolio and holding 
4. SICAV 
5. Real estate and others 
6. Investment services 
SECTOR 6 Technology and telecommunications 1. Telecommunications and others 
2. Electronic and software 
 
 
Geographical region 
This variable is denoted by “GREG” and is based on the Autonomous Community 
(political region) in which the firm is located. Following Pagán (2007) and Arrazola and 
Hevia (2009), we have grouped the Autonomous Communities into seven macro-
regions: Northwest, Northeast, Madrid, Central Spain, East, South and Canary Islands. 
Although we initially intended to follow this classification, we found that none of the 
firms in the sample is in fact registered in the Canary Islands. As a result, we included 
the Canaries in the South, leaving only 6 regions. The classification of the six regions is 
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therefore as follows: GREG (1) = Northwest; GREG (2) = Northeast; GREG (3) = 
Madrid; GREG (4) = Centre; GREG (5) = East and GREG (6) = South and Canary 
Islands. Table 15 details the six regions and the Autonomous Communities that form 
each. Like educational level and sector, region is a categorical variable. The reference 
category is GREG (6). This variable is again expected to be both positive and negative, 
as the salary gap may widen or narrow depending on the firm’s geographical region.  
 
TABLE 15 
 
Classification of the Regions 
 
Label Area Region 
GREG (1) NORTHWEST Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria 
GREG (2) NORTHEAST País Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja y Aragón 
GREG (3) MADRID Madrid 
GREG (4) CENTRE Castilla y León, Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura 
GREG (5) EAST Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, Baleares 
GREG (6) SOUTH AND THE CANARY ISLANDS Andalucía, Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla y Canarias 
 
 
2.5.2.2 Control variables  
 
To test the model, we have included five control variables which could influence 
male-female differences in compensation. 
 
Seniority of women on the board 
The first control variable considered is seniority, which is a key factor in the 
promotion of both men and women. It is therefore to be expected that a longer period of 
service in a firm will open the way to positions of responsibility and will also reduce the 
gender pay gap. Aláez and Ullibarri (1999) claim that the gender pay gap is greater in 
those regions where women’s job seniority is shorter than men’s. Barceinas et al. 
(2000), Lauer (2000), Mirta (2003), Simón (2006) and Simón (2009) found that women 
were likely to earn less than men where they had spent less time in their jobs. Likewise, 
De la Rica and Ugidos (1995), Miyoshi (2008), Monk and Turner (2004) and Olsen et 
al. (2009) concluded that men with longer service with their firms earned higher 
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salaries. According to CES (2011), the gender pay gap between men and women 
widened considerably as their job seniority increased. 
 
This categorical variable is denoted by “SEN”. The classification is as follows: SEN 
(0) = No period of seniority; SEN (1) = One year’s seniority; SEN (2) = Two to four 
years’ seniority and SEN (3) = Five to eight years’ seniority. These variables take a 
value of 1 if female directors have the seniority indicated in the year considered and 0, 
otherwise. The reference category taken to measure this categorical variable is SEN (0). 
We expect this variable to be negative. Hence, the longer a female director’s seniority, 
the greater the reduction in the gender pay gap should be because the inclusion of 
experienced female directors on the board will push firms to comply more strictly with 
the gender equality legislation applicable to listed companies, and to eliminate male-
female compensation differences. 
 
Firm size 
The size of the firm is also used as a control variable. Size is sometimes associated 
with a firm’s business and financial characteristics, and it may therefore affect the 
gender pay gap. In this regard, Gardín and del Río (2009), Mirta (2003), Monk and 
Turner (2004), Pagán (2007) and Palacio and Simón (2002) showed that male-female 
compensation differences were greater in large firms. Meanwhile, Gartner and Stephan 
(2004) concluded from an analysis of German companies that the gender pay gap grew 
wider, the larger the firm. Bell (2005) found that firm size and the disproportionately 
small number of female CEOs and company chairwomen were responsible for between 
50 and 60% of the gender pay gap. Heinze and Wolf (2010) also reported that the 
gender pay gap was wider in large German concerns, at the same time showing that 
male-female compensation differences were smaller in family firms. However, CES 
(2011) observed that male-female compensation differences were greater in Spanish 
SMEs with less than ten employees. Similarly, Arrondo et al. (2008), Fernández 
Méndez et al. (2011) and Pucheta and Narro (2014) showed that a firm’s size had a 
positive and significant influence on directors’ pay. The variable is denoted by 
“FIRMSIZE” and is calculated as the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. It is expected 
to be positive, as the gender pay gap among directors will be greater the larger the firm. 
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Employee productivity 
The third control variable used to study the gender pay gap is employee productivity, 
which is denoted by “PROD” and is measured as the logarithm of the ratio of turnover 
to the firm’s total number of employees, following Mateos et al. (2007). The flexibility 
and effectiveness of the labour market are essential to ensure that employees are 
assigned efficiently in the economy. Furthermore, firms need to draw on their 
employees’ skills and training, and to incentivise performance, taking into account 
compensation equality between men and women. Examining a sample of companies in 
Mexico, Blomström (1985) showed that foreign firms were 79% more efficient in their 
use of labour than their local peers due to factors such as training and the level of 
business concentration. Haltiwanger et al. (1999), Iranzo et al. (2006) and Newell and 
Relly (1996) all found that the personal characteristics of employees contributed 
significantly to explaining differences in productivity between firms. Meanwhile, 
Doménech (2008) revealed that firms whose employees were better trained were more 
productive. Guisán and Aguayo (2008) observed that productivity per employee was 
very low in Spain compared with other developed economies. Fan and Lui (2003) 
showed that the gender pay gap narrowed when the productivity of female employees in 
Hong Kong rose compared to their productivity as perceived by their male peers. 
Likewise, Monk and Turner (2004) found that male-female compensation differences 
decreased as employee productivity increased in South Korea.  
 
This variable is expected to be positive, as we understand that employee productivity 
gains will raise directors’ pay, given their responsibility for management. However, the 
gender pay gap will also widen, as the positions of greatest responsibility on company 
boards are usually occupied by men, who are therefore likely to be credited with 
successfully raising productivity. 
 
Return on assets 
Return on assets is another of the control variables considered, reflecting the firm’s 
profitability in terms of income generated for every euro invested in assets. This 
variable is denoted by “ROA” and is calculated as the ratio of ordinary income to 
average total assets, although some authors, such as Manzaque et al. (2008), calculate it 
as the ratio of the operating margin to total assets. We expect this variable to be 
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positive, because an increase in a firm’s profitability will result in higher compensation 
for directors and a proportional widening of the gender pay gap. Arrondo et al. (2008) 
and Fernández Méndez et al. (2011) show that the return on assets has a positive and 
significant effect on directors’ pay. 
 
Board size 
The last of the control variables considered is the size of the board, as the number of 
directors may affect control and management of the firm. The board is the body 
responsible for safeguarding the interests of the shareholders and controlling the 
management team (Salas, 2002). The Spanish Code of Good Governance (CUBG, 
2006) recommended that boards should have not less than five members and not more 
than fifteen. However, Burke et al. (2001) and Al-Mudhaki and Joshi (2004) argue that 
boards should have between three and six members, and Merino et al. (2009) found 
evidence to support a size of between three and twenty-two directors. Some studies (e.g. 
Eisenberg et al., 1998) have shown that the number of board members can affect 
supervisory and control functions, and the presence of too many directors may therefore 
hinder coordination and decision-making. However, other authors (e.g. Sánchez et al., 
2008) have claimed that a larger number of directors may permit more efficient control 
of the board’s functions. Sánchez et al. (2008) also showed that the size of the board 
was positively related with executive pay, while Guest (2010) found a positive 
association between board size and directors’ pay in the United Kingdom. Board size is 
denoted by “BDSIZE”. This variable is calculated as the total number of board 
members. It is expected to be positive, as a larger board is likely to have more male 
members and, therefore, women will be in a minority and will be less well able to 
ensure compensation equality between male and female directors. 
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
The firm fixed effect control variable, denoted by “FIRM”, is intended to capture 
unobservable and fixed characteristics of firms that may potentially be correlated with 
the dependent variable. Specifically, we include year indicator variables to control for 
yearly differences. 
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2.5.3 Sample 
 
The initial sample comprised 1.392 firms/year listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange 
between 2004 and 2011, inclusive. The information was obtained from the public 
registries kept by the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), from 
the SABI data base and from corporate websites. Table 16 contains a description of the 
sample. 
 
TABLE 16 
 
Sample Description 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 
Initial sample of companies 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 1392 
Companies excluded (109) (106) (115) (105) (104) (111) (110) (117) (877) 
Industrial companies 93 90 99 89 88 95 94 101 749 
Financial companies 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 128 
Final sample of companies 65 68 59 69 70 63 64 57 515 
 
 
As may be observed in Table 4, the initial sample of 1.392 firms/year did not include 
financial institutions because they are under special scrutiny by financial authorities that 
constrain the role of their board of directors and because of their special accounting 
practices. A further 749 industrial firms were excluded because not all the data 
necessary to test the model could be obtained, and the final sample thus comprised 515 
observations. Most of the industrial firms were discarded because their Corporate 
Governance or Annual Reports did not contain details of directors’ pay. 
 
2.6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS  
 
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 17 shows the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous and continuous 
variables.  
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TABLE 17 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard deviation    
Panel A: Dummy variables 
PWNCC 0.107 0.309    
ELIWBD (0) 0.860 0.307    
ELIWBD (1) 0.082 0.274    
ELIWBD (2) 0.058 0.234    
FSEC (1) 0.097 0.296    
FSEC (2) 0.301 0.459    
FSEC (3) 0.295 0.457    
FSEC (4) 0.091 0.288    
FSEC (5) 0.155 0.363    
FSEC (6) 0.060 0.238    
GREG (1) 0.047 0.211    
GREG (2) 0.157 0.364    
GREG (3) 0.520 0.500    
GREG (4) 0.025 0.157    
GREG (5) 0.175 0.380    
GREG (6) 0.076 0.265    
SEN (0) 0.660 0.448    
SEN (1) 0.097 0.296    
SEN (2) 0.169 0.375    
SEN (3) 0.074 0.262    
Variable Mean  Standard deviation 
Percentile  
25 
Percentile  
50 
Percentile  
75 
Panel B: Continuous variables 
REMU 6.914 1.281 6.270 7.009 7.723 
PERCWBD 0.030 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FIRMSIZE 13.132 1.851 11.718 12.851 14.416 
PROD 5.727 1.690 4.951 5.672 6.714 
ROA 0.060 0.448 -0.006 0.021 0.071 
BDSIZE 10.383 3.506 8.000 10.000 12.000 
Mean, standard deviation and quartiles of the main variables. PWNCC: Variable presence of women on 
the Nomination and Compensation Committee, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if there is presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee and 0, otherwise; 
ELIWBD (0): Variable educational level of independent women on the Board of Directors, which is 
calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent female directors do not provide 
information about their educational level in the Corporate Governance Report and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD 
(1): Variable educational level of independent women on the Board of Directors, which is calculated as a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if  independent female directors have a degree and 0, otherwise; 
ELIWBD (2): Variable educational level of independent women on the Board of Directors, which is 
calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent female directors have a doctorate and 
0, otherwise; FSEC(1): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
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company operates in the oil and energy sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(2): Variable firm sector, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the basic materials, industry and 
construction sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): Variable 
firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer 
service sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(5): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the company operates in the finance and real estate sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(6): Variable 
firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the technology 
and telecommunication sector and 0, otherwise; GREG (1): Variable geographical region, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the North-Western region and 0, 
otherwise; GREG (2): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the company is located in the North-Eastern region and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): Variable geographical 
region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Madrid region 
and 0, otherwise; GREG (4): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the company is located in the Centre region and 0, otherwise; GREG (5): Variable geographical 
region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the East region and 
0, otherwise; GREG (6): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the company is located in the South and the Canary Islands region and 0, otherwise; SEN (0): Variable 
seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the Board of Directors 
do not have seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (1): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if women directors on the Board of Directors have one year of seniority and 0, otherwise; 
SEN (2): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the 
Board of Directors have from two to four years of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (3): Variable seniority, 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the Board of Directors have from 
five to eight years of seniority and 0, otherwise; REMU: Variable gap in pay between male and female 
directors on the Board of Directors and is calculated as the log of the difference between male and female 
director’s compensation in the Board of Directors; PERCWBD: Variable percentage of women directors 
on the Board of Directors and is calculated as the ratio between the total number of female directors on 
the Board of Directors and the total number of directors on the Board of Directors; FIRMSIZE: Variable 
firm size and is calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: Variable employee 
productivity and is calculated as the log of (Turnover/Number of employees); ROA: Variable Return on 
Assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total assets; BDSIZE: 
Variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors on the Board of Directors. 
 
 
 
Panel A of Table 17 shows that 11%, on average, of the Nomination and 
Compensation Committees have a female presence. In terms of educational level, an 
average 86% of female independent directors did not disclose their qualifications in the 
Corporate Governance Report, 8% were graduates and 6% held doctoral degrees. 
Meanwhile, 10% of the firms in the sample belonged to FSEC (1) (Oil and energy), 
30% each to FSEC (2) (Commodities, industry and construction) and FSEC (3) 
(Consumer goods), 9% to FSEC (4) (Consumer services), 16% to FSEC (5) (Financial 
and property services), and 5% to FSEC (6) (Technology and telecommunications). 
52% of the firms are located in the Madrid region (GREG (3)), 17% in the East of Spain 
(GREG (5)), 16% in the Northeast (GREG (2)), 8% in the South and Canary Islands 
(GREG (6)), 5% in the Northwest (GREG (1)) and 3% in the Centre (GREG (4)). 10% 
of female directors had one year’s seniority, 17% had between two and four years’ and 
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7% between five and eight years’ seniority, while 66% had no previous experience as a 
board member.  
 
As may be observed in Panel B of Table 17, the mean logarithm of compensation 
differences between male and female directors is 6’914, which is to say that the pay 
received by men is on average 6’914 times higher than the women’s pay. Also, the 
average percentage of women by board is 3%, and the average company size is 13’130 
(Ln of total assets), the productivity per employee is 5’730, the return on assets is 6% 
and boards have 10’38 members on average. 
 
2.6.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 18 shows the mean values of the independent and control variables for the 
firms in the sample, as well as the results of the parametric t test for the continuous 
variables, and Pearson’s Chi-squared for the dichotomous variables to test for the 
presence of differences in means. The median (7.01) of the difference in the logarithm 
of male and female directors’ pay was used to create the two groups. 
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TABLE 18 
 
Mean Difference for Independent and Control Variables 
 
Variable 
Median of the gender 
gap in pay in the Board 
of Directors >=7,01 
(N = 259) 
Median of the gender 
gap in pay in the Board 
of Directors <7,01  
(N = 256) 
Mean 
difference 
Univariate 
Test 
(Sig.) 
PERCWBD 0.032 0.028 0.004 0.819 (0.413) 
PWNCC 0.127 0.086 0.041 1.524 (0.128) 
ELIWBD (1) 0.093 0.070 0.023 0.926 (0.355) 
ELIWBD (2) 0.097 0.020 0.077 3.774*** (0.000) 
FSEC (1) 0.178 0.016 0.162 6.441*** (0.000) 
FSEC (2) 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.009 (0.993) 
FSEC (3) 0.208 0.383 -0.175 -4.409*** (0.000) 
FSEC (4) 0.120 0.063 0.057 2.260** (0.024) 
FSEC (5) 0.127 0.184 -0.057 -1.762* (0.079) 
GREG (1) 0.046 0.047 -0.001 -0.029  (0.977) 
GREG (2) 0.127 0.188 -0.061 -1.875* (0.061) 
GREG (3) 0.672 0.367 0.305 7.250*** (0.000) 
GREG (4) 0.004 0.047 -0.043 -3.135*** (0.002) 
GREG (5) 0.116 0.234 -0.118 -3.579*** (0.000) 
SEN (1) 0.104 0.090 0.014 0.551 (0.582) 
SEN (2) 0.178 0.160 0.018 0.528 (0.598) 
SEN (3) 0.097 0.051 0.046 1.989** (0.047) 
FIRMSIZE 14.131 12.122 2.009 14.661*** (0.000) 
PROD 6.003 5.448 0.555 3.776*** (0.000) 
ROA 0.100 0.021 0.079 2.015** (0.044) 
BDSIZE 12.008 8.738 3.270 11.950*** (0.000) 
Means Comparison Test. PERCWBD: Variable percentage of women directors on the BD’s and is 
calculated as the ratio between the total number of female directors on the BD’s and the total number of 
directors on the BD’s; PWNCC: Variable presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation 
Committee, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is presence of women 
on the Nomination and Compensation Committee and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (1): Variable educational 
level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if  independent female directors have a degree and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (2): Variable educational level 
of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
independent female directors have a doctorate and 0, otherwise; FSEC(1): Variable firm sector, which is a 
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dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the oil and energy sector and 0, 
otherwise; FSEC(2): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company operates in the basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): 
Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the 
consumer goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer service sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(5): 
Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the 
finance and real estate sector and 0, otherwise; GREG (1): Variable geographical region, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the North-Western region and 0, 
otherwise; GREG (2): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the company is located in the North-Eastern region and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): Variable geographical 
region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Madrid region 
and 0, otherwise; GREG (4): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the company is located in the Centre region and 0, otherwise; GREG (5): Variable geographical 
region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the East region and 
0, otherwise; SEN (1): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women 
directors on the BD’s have one year of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (2): Variable seniority, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have from two to four years of 
seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (3): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if women directors on the BD’s have from five to eight years of seniority and 0, otherwise; FIRMSIZE: 
Variable firm size and is calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: Variable 
employee productivity and is calculated as the log of (Turnover/Number of employees); ROA: Variable 
Return on Assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total assets; 
BDSIZE: Variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors on the BD’s. 
Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
As shown in table 18, the difference in the means of the variable denoting the 
percentage of women on the board is positive, but not statistically significant, and the 
first hypothesis tested cannot therefore be accepted, since the gender pay gap between 
male and female directors is not affected by the percentage of women on the board. 
Thus, we cannot conclude that a greater percentage of female directors on the board will 
be more likely to result in a smaller gender pay gap among directors. Along the same 
lines, the variable denoting the presence of women on the Nomination and 
Compensation Committee reflects a positive difference in the means as predicted. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant, and the second hypothesis 
therefore cannot be accepted. The two variables ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD (2), 
representing the educational level gained by female independent directors, displays a 
positive difference in the means, although this is only statistically significant at the 1% 
level in the case of ELIWBD (2). Consequently, it is likely that at least one woman will 
hold a doctoral degree in those firms where the gender pay gap between male and 
female directors is widest. This finding is in line with the evidence reported by Palacio 
and Simón (2002) and Simón (2006). Meanwhile, it may be observed that the sector 
variables FSEC (1), FSEC (2) and FSEC (4) display a positive difference in the mean, 
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although it is only statistically significant at the level of 1% in the case of FSEC (1) and 
5% in FSEC (4). Thus, the male-female compensation difference between directors is 
greater on the boards of firms belonging to the oil and energy sector and the consumer 
services sector. The difference in means is negative in FSEC (3) and FSEC (5) and is 
statistically significant at the level of 1% and 10%, respectively. Therefore, we may 
conclude that the gender pay gap is smaller in the consumer goods sector and in 
financial services and property. Finally, we may observe that the geographical region 
variable GREG (3) presents a positive and statistically significant difference at 1%. 
Consequently, the gap between the pay of male and female directors is greater in firms 
located in Madrid. Meanwhile, GREG (1), GREG (2), GREG (4) and GREG (5) show 
negative differences, which are statistically significant at 1% and 10% in all cases, 
except GREG (1). Hence, the gender pay gap among directors is lowest in firms located 
in the North-East, Centre and East of Spain.  
 
We may also observe that the difference in means of all of the control variables is 
positive and statistically significant, except in the case of SEN (1) and SEN (2). We 
may therefore conclude that the compensation difference between male and female 
directors will be greater in those firms larger where the board has more members and 
includes women with between five and eight years’ seniority, and in firms displaying 
the highest return on assets and with the highest employee productivity. 
 
2.6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
The multivariate analysis looks at the results of the linear regression and the 
multicollinearity test.  
 
 
 101 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
TABLE 19 
 
Results of the Lineal Regression 
Variable Expected 
sign 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical Test  
(Sig.) 
Param. 
Estimated 
Statistical 
Test  
(Sig.) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PERCWBD - -0.857 -0.870 (0.385) -0.659 
-0.640 
(0.522)       -0.730 -0.743 (0.458) -0.813 
-0.790 
(0.430) 
PWNCC + 0.413 2.365** (0.018) 0.567 
3.141*** 
(0.002)       0.409 2.362** (0.019) 0.582 
3.207*** 
(0.001) 
ELIWBD 
(1) - -0.559 
-2.798*** 
(0.007) -0.519 
-2.582** 
(0.010)       -0.562 
-2.806*** 
(0.005) -0.534 
-2.587** 
(0.010) 
ELIWBD 
(2) - -0.102 
-0.421 
(0.674) -0.022 
-0.095 
(0.925)       -0.068 -0.290 (0.772) -0.018 
-0.075 
(0.941) 
FSEC (1) +/- -0.008 -0.035 (0.972)   0.029 
0.136 
(0.892)   0.101 
0.473 
(0.636) -0.102 -0.461 (0.645)   
FSEC (2) +/- -0.138 -0.708 (0.479)   -0.043 
-0.234 
(0.815)   -0.027 
-0.144 
(0.885) -0.173 -0.909 (0.364)   
FSEC (3) +/- -0.119 -0.598 (0.550)   -0.023 
-0.122 
(0.903)   0.000 
-0.002 
(0.999) -0.145 -0.739 (0.460)   
FSEC (4) +/- 0.080 0.363 (0.717)   0.151 
0.701 
(0.484)   0.184 
0.858 
(0.391) 0.041 0.183 (0.855)   
FSEC (5) +/- -0.968 -4.629*** (0.000)   -0.930 
-4.641*** 
(0.000)   -0.887 
-4.387*** 
(0.000) -1.025 
-4.921*** 
(0.000)   
GREG (1) +/- 0.316 1.309 (0.191)     0.403 
1.611 
(0.108) 0.302 
1.246 
(0.213)   0.417 
1.672 
(0.102) 
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GREG (2) +/- -0.072 -0.390 (0.696)     0.153 
0.817 
(0.414) -0.089 
-0.479 
(0.632)   0.158 
0.846 
(0.398) 
GREG (3) +/- 0.058 0.359 (0.720)     0.216 
1.259 
(0.209) 0.061 
0.370 
(0.711)   0.201 
1.185 
(0.237) 
GREG (4) +/- 0.110 0.338 (0.735)     0.522 
1.643 
(0.101) 0.372 
1.190 
(0.235)   0.254 
0.766 
(0.444) 
GREG (5) +/- -0.237 -1.338 (0.181)     -0.142 
-0.767 
(0.433) -0.204 
-1.147 
(0.252)   -0.187 
-1.013 
(0.312) 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
SEN (1) - -0.099 -0.633 (0.527) -0.139 
-0.849 
(0.396) -0.204 
-1.472 
(0.142) -0.177 
-1.216 
(0.224) -0.208 
-1.509 
(0.132) -0.109 
-0.704 
(0.482) -0.116 
-0.709 
(0.479) 
SEN (2) - -0.319 -2.022** (0.044) -0.303 
-1.932* 
(0.054) -0.427 
-3.723*** 
(0.000) -0.382 
-3.095*** 
(0.002) -0.465 
-3.928*** 
(0.000) -0.323 
-2.155** 
(0.032) -0.303 
-1.837** 
(0.067) 
SEN (3) - -0.212 -0.952 (0.342) -0.239 
-1.037 
(0.300) -0.238 
-1.393 
(0.164) -0.234 
-1.303 
(0.193) -0.285 
-1.653* 
(0.099) -0.201 
-0.916 
(0.360) -0.276 
-1.818 
(0.238) 
FIRMSIZE + 0.341 10.795*** (0.000) 0.341 
11.314*** 
(0.000) 0.343 
11.572*** 
(0.000) 0.323 
10.298*** 
(0.000) 0.336 
10.620*** 
(0.000) 0.353 11.830***(0.000) 0.328 
10407*** 
(0.000) 
PROD + 0.037 1.414 (0.158) -0.008 
-0.299 
(0.765) 0.044 
1.669* 
(0.096) -0.011 
-0.413 
(0.680) 0.039 
1.496 
(0.135) 0.042 
1.609 
(0.108) -0.012 
-0.443 
(0.658) 
ROA + 0.354 3.784*** (0.000) 0.382 
3.912*** 
(0.000) 0.340 
3.603*** 
(0.000) 0.390 
3.977*** 
(0.000) 0.345 
3.658*** 
(0.000) 0.351 
3.749*** 
(0.000) 0.396 
4.079*** 
(0.000) 
BDSIZE + 0.079 5.309*** (0.000) 0.096 
6.316*** 
(0.000) 0.081 
5.421*** 
(0.000) 0.096 
6.344*** 
(0.000) 0.081 
5.433*** 
(0.000) 0.079 
5.299*** 
(0.000) 0.095 
6.264*** 
(0.000) 
Fixed effect   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
    F = 19.906 (0.000)*** F =23.836(0.000)*** F = 27.341 (0.000)*** F = 22.475 (0.000)*** F = 22.345 (0.000)*** F = 23.525 (0.000)*** F = 19609 (0.000)*** 
    Pseudo R2 = 50.70% Pseudo R2 =44.40% Pseudo R2  = 49.30% Pseudo R2 = 44.30% Pseudo R2  = 49.90% Pseudo R2  = 50.20% Pseudo R2  = 45.40% 
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Results of the Lineal Regression. PERCWBD: Variable percentage of women directors on the BD’s and is calculated as the ratio between the total number of female 
directors on the BD’s and the total number of directors on the BD’s; PWNCC: Variable presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee, which is 
calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (1): 
Variable educational level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if  independent female directors have a 
degree and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (2): Variable educational level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
independent female directors have a doctorate and 0, otherwise; FSEC(1): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company 
operates in the oil and energy sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(2): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the 
basic materials, industry and construction sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company 
operates in the consumer goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the 
consumer service sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(5): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the finance and 
real estate sector and 0, otherwise; GREG (1): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the North-
Western region and 0, otherwise; GREG (2): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the North-
Eastern region and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Madrid 
region and 0, otherwise; GREG (4): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Centre region and 
0, otherwise; GREG (5): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the East region and 0, otherwise; 
SEN (1): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have one year of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (2): 
Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have from two to four years of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN 
(3): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have from five to eight years of seniority and 0, otherwise; 
FIRMSIZE: Variable firm size and is calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: Variable employee productivity and is calculated as the log of 
(Turnover/Number of employees); ROA: Variable Return on Assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total assets; BDSIZE: 
Variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors on BD’s. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 
percent. 
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Table 19 presents the results of the linear regression for the model proposed and for 
the six variants, where the dependent variable represents the logarithm of the gender pay 
gap among BD.  
 
Model 1 includes all the independent variables included in the study, comprising the 
characteristics of the board (PERCWBD, PWNCC, ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD (2)), the 
sector (FSEC (i)) and the region (GREG (i)), while Models 2, 3 and 4 examine the 
impact of each of the independent variables in isolation. Specifically, Model 2 analyses 
board characteristics, Model 3 the sector and Model 4 the geographical region. Model 5 
includes both the sector and the geographical region where the firm is located, 
excluding the variables referring to the characteristics of the board. Meanwhile, Model 6 
analyses the variables referring to the board’s characteristics and the sector, excluding 
the geographical region, and Model 7 includes the board’s characteristics and the 
geographical region, excluding the sector variable. 
 
The results for Model 1 show goodness of fit of 50’70%, and the model is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The variable denoting the percentage of female 
board members (PERCWBD) is negative, contrary to our expectations, but it is not 
statistically significant, and the hypothesis tested therefore cannot be accepted. 
Consequently, an increase in the percentage of women on the board has no effect on the 
gender pay gap between directors. According to this result, it cannot be confirmed that a 
higher percentage of women directors on the board will be more likely to result in a 
smaller gender wage gap among directors. Meanwhile, the variable denoting the 
presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee (PWNCC) 
displays the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
Hence, we can accept the second hypothesis proposed, concluding that the presence of 
women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee will increase the gender pay 
gap among board members. According to this result, we can confirm that the presence 
of female directors in the Nomination and Compensation Committee influences the 
gender wage gap, widening it. Both of the qualifications variables are negative, as 
expected, but only ELIWBD (1) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
third hypothesis can be accepted and we can conclude that the presence of well-
qualified female independent directors on company boards will reduce the gender gap in 
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pay among directors. In this light, we concur with Gardín and del Río (2009) and with 
Mukhopadhayay (2001) in confirming that the presence of female independent directors 
holding degree level qualifications reduces the gender pay gap between the men and 
women serving on a firm’s board.  
 
The sector variable is negative for all sectors, except consumer services SEC (4), 
which is positive. However, only financial services and property (FSEC 5) is 
statistically significant at 1%. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is partially accepted, since 
only one of the five sectors analysed has an effect on gender wage pay, reducing it, and 
therefore, we may conclude that in financial services and the property sector the gender 
gap is lower than in the others. None of the variables denoting geographical region is 
statistically significant, and the fifth hypothesis therefore cannot be accepted. Thus, it 
cannot be confirmed that geographical region affects the gender gap in pay since none 
of the regions studied increased or narrowed the gender wage gap.  
 
All the control variables offer the expected signs, but only the variables denoting the 
presence of female directors with between two and four years’ seniority (SEN(2)), 
company size (FIRMSIZE), return on assets (ROA) and board size (BDSIZE) are 
statistically significant. We therefore concur with Aláez and Ullibarri (1999) and Lago 
(2002) that the presence of more experienced women (in terms of years of seniority) on 
company boards reduces male-female compensation difference between directors, and 
that the gender pay gap widens with company size, return on assets and board size. 
 
The results for Models 2, 3 and 4 are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
present goodness of fit of 44’50%, 49’30% and 44’30%, respectively. Model 2 analyses 
the individual influence of board characteristics (proportion of female board members, 
qualifications of independent female directors and the presence of women on the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee) on the gender pay gap between directors. 
Model 2 confirms the results obtained from the analysis of all of the independent 
variables together, allowing the conclusion that the presence of women on the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender pay gap between 
directors, while the presence of women graduates on company boards reduces male-
female compensation differences. The control variables for Model 2 take the same signs 
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at the same significance levels as in Model 1, except for the productivity variable, which 
is negative in this model, but it is once again not statistically significant, and SEN (3), 
which was not statistically significant in Model 1 but is so at the 10% level in Model 2.  
 
The results obtained from Models 3 and 4, which respectively analyse the influence 
of the sector and geographical region of the firm, are very similar to those of Model 1. 
Specifically, the only independent sector variable to change in Model 3 is FSEC (1), 
which is positive where it was negative in Model 1. Once again, only FSEC (5) is 
statistically significant. The results for the control variables are also the same, except for 
employee productivity, which is statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 3, 
although it was not so in Model 1. Thus, an increase in employee productivity entails a 
widening of the gender pay gap between directors. In this light, we may again conclude 
that compensation differences between male and female directors are reduced only in 
the financial services and property sector. The results of Model 4 are the same as in 
Model 1, except in the case of employee productivity, which was positive in the latter, 
but is negative in Model 4. However, this variable is not statistically significant in either 
model. In light of the results obtained in Model 4, we may conclude that the region 
where a firm is located has no effect on the gender pay gap between board directors.  
 
Model 5 analyses the independent variables denoting the sector and geographical 
region together, while excluding board characteristics. The results obtained are the same 
as for Model 1. Only FSEC (5) is negative, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Hence, the gender pay gap between directors is smallest in the financial services 
and property sector. As in Model 1, the geographical region is not statistically 
significant. Meanwhile, there is practically no change in the control variables with the 
exception of SEN (3), which is statistically significant at the level of 10% in Model 5.  
 
Model 6 presents a goodness of fit of 50’20% and is statistically significant at the 
level of 1%. The independent variables included in this model are the board 
characteristics (PERCWBD PWNCC, ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD (2)) and the sector to 
which the firm belongs. As shown in Table 7, the results obtained from the independent 
and control variables included in Model 6 are the same as in Model 1, when all of the 
independent variables are examined together.  
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Finally, Model 7 analyses the independent variables consisting of board 
characteristics and the geographical region. It confirms the results revealed by Model 1, 
both for the independent and for the control variables. The only exception is the sign of 
GREG (2) and employee productivity, as the first of these variables is positive and the 
second is negative, contrary to the results found in Model 1. Neither is statistically 
significant however. In Model 7 the control variable SEN (3) is also statistically 
significant. 
 
To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Spearman correlation coefficients for 
all of the variables included in the model. Table 20 shows the correlation matrix. 
Analysis of this table reports that the correlation between certain pairs of variables is 
statistically significant at the level of 5% or 10%. These results are consistent with 
earlier studies of gender gap in pay (Gardín and Del Río, 2009; Ortega 2007). However, 
none of the correlation coefficients is sufficiently high (> .80) to cause any major 
multicollinearity problems (see Archambeault and De Zoort, 2001). We have also 
calculated the vector inflation factor (VIF) to corroborate that our results are not biased 
because of the multicollinearity. 
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TABLE 20 
 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 
REMU PERCWBD PWNCC ELIWBD1 ELIWBD2 FSEC1 FSEC2 FSEC3 FSEC4 FSEC5 GREG1 GREG2 GREG3 GREG4 GREG5 SEN1 SEN2 SEN3 FIRMSIZE PROD ROA 
PERCWBD 0.024 
                    
PWNCC 0.056 0.507*** 
                   
ELIWBD1 0.000 0.562*** 0.517*** 
                  
ELIWBD2 0.172*** 0.483*** 0.424*** 0.380*** 
                 
FSEC1 0.311*** 0.162*** 0.205*** 0.142*** 0.394*** 
                
FSEC2 0.027 -0.028 -0.021 -0.072 -0.001 -0.215*** 
               
FSEC3 
-0.228*** -0.121*** -0.058 -0.115*** -0.161*** -0.212*** -0.425*** 
              
FSEC4 0.123*** 0.021 -0.044 -0.045 -0.079* -0.104** -0.208** -0.205** 
             
FSEC5 
-0.137*** -0.068 -0.148*** -0.069 -0.107** -0.141*** -0.281*** -0.278*** -0.136*** 
            
GREG1 
-0.002 0.009 -0.076* -0.066 -0.055 -0.072* -0.145*** 0.241*** -0.070 0.032 
           
GREG2 
-0.106* -0.011 -0.063 -0.031 -0.062 -0.070 0.217*** 0.071 -0.063 -0.185*** -0.096* 
          
GREG3 0.347*** 0.061 0.055 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.105** 0.003 -0.205*** 0.088** -0.007 -0.230*** -0.450*** 
         
GREG4 
-0.123*** 0.113** 0.185*** -0.048 -0.040 -0.053 0.218*** -0.077* -0.051 -0.069 -0.036 -0.070 -0.168*** 
        
GREG5 
-0.168*** -0.150*** -0.060 -0.118*** -0.114*** 0.056 -0.157*** 0.083** -0.004 0.127*** -0.102** -0.199*** -0.479*** -0.074* 
       
SEN1 0.006 0.352*** 0.226*** 0.262*** 0.254*** 0.048 0.042 -0.068 -0.013 -0.032 -0.010 -0.052 0.013 0.031 -0.013 
      
SEN2 0.001 0.629*** 0.398*** 0.415*** 0.441*** 0.115*** 0.054 -0.133*** 0.019 -0.079* -0.051 -0.010 -0.003 0.258*** -0.085 0.027 
     
SEN3 0.068 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.404*** 0.437*** 0.133*** -0.023 -0.036 -0.064 -0.060 0.008 0.021 0.003 0.144*** -0.091** 0.108** 0.230*** 
    
FIRMSIZE 0.667*** 0.185*** 0.075* 0.136*** 0.303*** 0.289*** 0.093** -0.333*** -0.007 0.027 -0.073* -0.140*** 0.400*** -0.183*** -0.153*** 0.083* 0.104** 0.112** 
   
PROD 0.287*** 0.044 0.021 0.034 0.042 0.138*** -0.146*** -0.090** -0.017 0.249*** 0.025 -0.021 0.133*** -0.077* -0.054 -0.034 0.057 0.030 0.333*** 
  
ROA 0.152*** 0.075* 0.101** 0.083* 0.123*** 0.071 -0.050 0.022 0.167*** -0.148*** 0.001 0.005 0.160*** -0.088** -0.189*** 0.012 0.100** 0.063 -0.002 0.230*** 
 
BDSIZE 0.586*** 0.115*** 0.090** 0.133*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 0.047 -0.295*** 0.143*** -0.093** -0.106** -0.029 0.252*** -0.051 -0.142*** 0.069 0.126*** 0.083* 0.604*** 0.240*** 0.069 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. REMU: Variable gap in pay between male and female directors on the BD’s and is calculated as the log of the difference between male 
and female director’s compensation in the BD’s; PERCWBD: Variable percentage of women directors on the BD’s and is calculated as the ratio between the total 
number of female directors on the BD’s and the total number of directors on the BD’s; PWNCC: Variable presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation 
Committee, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee and 0, 
otherwise; ELIWBD (0): Variable educational level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent 
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female directors do not provide information about their educational level in the Corporate Governance Report and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (1): Variable educational 
level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if  independent female directors have a degree and 0, 
otherwise; ELIWBD (2): Variable educational level of independent women on the BD’s, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent 
female directors have a doctorate and 0, otherwise; FSEC(1): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the oil 
and energy sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(2): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the basic materials, 
industry and construction sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the 
consumer goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer 
service sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(5): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the finance and real estate 
sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(6): Variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the technology and 
telecommunication sector and 0, otherwise; GREG (1): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the 
North-Western region and 0, otherwise; GREG (2): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the 
North-Eastern region and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the 
Madrid region and 0, otherwise; GREG (4): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Centre 
region and 0, otherwise; GREG (5): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the East region and 0, 
otherwise; GREG (6): Variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the South and the Canary Islands 
region and 0, otherwise; SEN (0): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s do not have seniority and 0, 
otherwise; SEN (1): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have one year of seniority and 0, otherwise; 
SEN (2): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have from two to four years of seniority and 0, 
otherwise; SEN (3): Variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the BD’s have from five to eight years of seniority and 
0, otherwise; FIRMSIZE: Variable firm size and is calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: Variable employee productivity and is 
calculated as the log of (Turnover/Number of employees); ROA: Variable Return on Assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total 
assets; BDSIZE: Variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors on the BD’s. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 
95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 110 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Cultural, political and social changes in recent decades have seen women enter many 
jobs that were once reserved for men. However, the limited participation of women in 
the labour market has resulted in a gender pay gap. Numerous studies in Spain and 
internationally have investigated why such male-female compensation differences 
should exist (Campos et al., 2010; Mateos et al. 2010; Simón, 2009). To solve this 
problem, numerous regulations have been enacted to ensure that women are employed 
under equal conditions to men and to prevent male-female compensation discrimination. 
The aim of this study was to determine whether there is a gender gap in pay among 
board directors of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, in the period 2004-2011, 
inclusive, and to throw light on the reason for any gender pay gap found.  
To achieve this aim, we examined the effect of the percentage of female directors on 
the board, the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee, the 
educational level of female independent directors, the sector in which the firm operates 
and its geographical region, on the gender wage gap. The results obtained show that the 
percentage of female board members does not influence the gender pay gap among 
directors, while the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation 
Committee actually widens the gap, as we predicted. The explanation for this may be 
that the opinion of women members on both the board and the Nomination and 
Compensation Committee is mitigated by their male colleagues. In particular, the few 
female members on Nomination and Compensation Committees are likely to come 
under considerable pressure in this regard, as these committees are small and are clearly 
dominated by men. Our results also report that the qualifications held by female 
independent directors influence board members’ pay, as the presence of women 
graduates narrows the gender pay gap, but not for women who hold a PhD. It may be 
that better corporate governance implies full disclosure of the director’s background and 
reduced gender gap, rather than a relationship between the latter and the educational 
level. The results also suggest that the male-female compensation difference between 
directors is smaller in the boards of financial services and property sector firms (FSEC 
(5)). The geographical region in which the firm is located is not a relevant factor, as it 
does not affect the gender pay gap among board members. We believe that the 
 111 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
explanation for these findings may be that the organisational culture of the firms listed 
on the Madrid Stock Exchange is influenced by the values of their directors rather than 
by the culture of a specific geographical region. This result may also be explained by 
the fact that the cost of living is similar in all the regions considered. With regard to the 
control variables used, we find that the presence of women with between two and four 
years’ seniority on company boards reduces the gender pay gap between directors, but 
the gap increases in very large firms, where the return on assets is higher and where the 
board is larger. We have constructed different variations to validate and confirm the 
model originally proposed. The results obtained from these models basically confirm 
the findings from the original model, with some exceptions regarding the control 
variables.  
The findings from this study reveal the existence of a gender gap in pay in the boards 
of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. Specifically, the study shows that female 
directors suffer pay discrimination when the Nomination and Compensation Committee 
has women members, in larger firms, in the most profitable firms (i.e. those with the 
highest return on assets) and in the firms with the largest boards. In contrast, the gender 
pay gap narrows when female independent directors are graduates, when the female 
board members have between two and four years’ seniority and in firms operating in the 
financial services and property sector. Finally, we may observe that neither an increase 
in the proportion of female board members nor the geographical region of the firm have 
any particular influence on the gender pay gap. These findings, therefore, report that 
equality is still a long way off, and they should provide an incentive for regulators and 
politicians to press for changes to prevailing legislation to improve the situation and 
progress towards the elimination of male-female compensation discrimination at all 
levels. More effective laws are clearly needed to reduce the gender pay gap found and to 
oblige firms to comply on pain of sanctions.  
The gender quota on boards, in our sample, rises from 1’04% in 2004 to 6’62% in 
2011. This data suggests that the Spanish quota is growing but not as much as is 
expected, considering that in 2015 the quota in listed firms should legally be 40% (a 
more in-depth discussion about this issue can be found in Terjesen et al., 2014). Thus, 
even though the regulations have been introduced, the time permitted for reaching 
gender equality is long (8 years) and for this reason, it may be possible that companies 
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are not in a hurry to reach the gender quota of 40%. In any case, we agree with 
Grosvold et al. (2007), who argue that a compulsory gender quota (affirmative action 
programs) may have the potential to generate growth in female representation in the 
boardroom and report that no negative effects of this initiative are likely to arise in the 
shape of the appointment of inexperienced female directors. 
This study is subject to certain limitations. In the first place, the study was carried out 
in Spain for the period from 2004 to 2011, and the results obtained should therefore not 
be extrapolated to other countries or periods. Secondly, the literature refers to the 
analysis of individual attributes (gender, educational level, seniority and experience), 
job attributes (type of contract, working hours and occupation) and attributes of the 
workplace (sector, collective bargaining agreements, region, firm size and 
compensation). Not all of this data (e.g. job attributes) could be obtained in this study; 
however, the database used contains information drawn from Corporate Governance 
Reports and Annual Reports, and from corporate websites. Thirdly, in this study we 
show association, not causation, between the presence of women on the Nomination and 
Compensation Committee, the educational level of independent women in the Board 
and the sector of the firm, and the difference between the compensation of male and 
female directors. Finally, it is likely that gender quotas law for Spanish boards has little 
effect because sanctions are weak in comparison to case from Norway, where the 
sanction if the company does not comply with the gender quota is extremely serve: the 
dissolution of the company. The only gender quota law similar to the Norwegian one in 
terms of effectiveness is the Italian one, introduced only in 2011. 
This study may give rise to future lines of research. In the first place, an analysis of 
directors’ pay, distinguishing between fixed and variable compensation, would be 
valuable in throwing light on the potential of incentives to narrow the gender pay gap. 
Second, it would be interesting to establish whether male-female compensation 
differences exist at all levels of an organisation or merely on the board, assessing the 
equality plans applied by firms in their recruitment and selection processes. Third, it 
would be relevant to examine employee pay taking into account the wages of immigrant 
workers to establish whether firms discriminate in this area. Finally, it would also be 
interesting to study the pay earned by both male and female directors in international 
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firms and to establish whether any gender-based compensation differences that may 
come to light are due to political, cultural or social factors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND THE 
APPOINTMENT OF SUB-COMMITTEES: THE 
EFFECT OF GENDER DIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The scale of the occurrence of financial fraud in recent years has led to the loss of 
credibility of the economic-financial information published by firms. To this must be 
added the agency problems in organizations resulting from the separation of ownership 
and control, because of the difficulty for the owner to assess the behaviour of managers. 
Therefore, firms have increased the demand for internal and external controls in order to 
reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. 
 
Over time, regulatory bodies have developed a set of standards for the purpose of 
restoring transparency and confidence to the markets, firms and investors. Among these 
measures, which were developed in the late 20th Century, the Codes of Good 
Governance (hereinafter, CGG) were created and aimed at improving the business 
process governance, developing recommendations and principles of functioning of 
organisations. 
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Spain is familiar with CGG and published the first in 1998, known as the Olivencia 
Report or Code, whose recommendations focused on the performance of firms and the 
publication of public information. The Olivencia Report was followed in 2002 by the 
Law on Measures to Reform the Financial System (LMRFS) and in 2003 by the Law on 
Transparency of Listed Firms (LTLT). In 2003 the Aldama Report was also published 
and replaced the Olivencia, while in 2006 the Unified Code of Good Governance 
(CUBG) report was published, which unifies the Olivencia and Aldama Codes. The 
objective of the CUBG was implementing tools to improve business management. Over 
time, regulatory bodies have made adaptations to existing codes in order that the CGG’s 
bring transparency, trust and shareholder value (Alonso, 2008). 
 
One of the principal recommendations of the CGG highlights competencies of the 
BD, which is responsible for conducting the business of the firm in the interests of those 
who provide resources and support business risk. The BD is a management body 
composed of internal (executives) and external (mostly independent and representatives 
of large shareholders) members that is configured as a system of internal control of the 
firm (Jensen, 1993) in order to oversee and approve the most important corporate 
decisions (Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Bainbridge, 1993 and 
Johnson et al., 1996). Authors such as Baysinger and Butler (1985), Miller (1993), 
Johnson et al. (1996) and Chatterjee and Harrison (2001) note that the BD aims at, 
among other things, guiding the affairs of the organisation and ensuring the interests of 
shareholders through the control of senior management, acting as an intermediate body 
between shareholders and management teams (Salas, 2002). As the main internal 
mechanism for resolving agency conflicts within the firm (Jensen, 1993), this body 
focuses its work in monitoring management team behaviour (Baysinger and Bulter, 
1985 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). Among its main functions it can highlighted 
the approval of the firm's strategy and organisation; appointment, remuneration and 
dismissal of any of the senior members of the company, if and where appropriate; 
determining the information and communication policies with stakeholders; 
identification of the principal risks of the firm, and implementation and monitoring of 
internal control policies, among others (Olivencia Code, 1998). 
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The Spanish CGG recommended the establishment of support commissions to 
perform complementary tasks of the BD. However, it is noteworthy that the LMRSF of 
2002 obliged listed firms to establish AC’s, with the objective of reviewing the financial 
statements of the firms before forwarding them to the BD and, therefore, ceased to be a 
recommendation for listed firms and became an obligation. The Aldama Report (2003) 
recommended the creation of an Executive Committee, a Nomination and 
Compensation Committee and a Strategy and Investment Committee, also emphasising 
the creation of the AC, which is mandatory for listed firms. However, the CUBG (2006) 
omitted the Strategy and Investment Committee that drove the Aldama Report (2003), 
as the skills developed by this committee were typical of the BD. It recognised the 
usefulness that the Corporate Governance Committee has for some firms, but generally, 
did not consider the need to recommend its creation. 
 
The formation of Board Sub-Committees can differ, both domestically and 
internationally, depending on the time of the issuance of the CGG. Adams and Ferreira 
(2003) analysed a sample of Fortune 500 firms, and showed that they had, on average, 
4.4 commissions. They also concluded that the Audit and Remuneration Committees 
were the most recommended commissions by the CGG to listed firms, while 92% of 
firms in the sample had more than two Oversight Committees. Carson (2002) analysed 
361 Top 500 Australian firms, documenting that 84% of them set up AC’s, 57% set up 
Compensation Committees and 17% set up Nomination Committees. Groff and 
Valentincic (2011) analysed non-financial firms in Slovenia, showing that only 17% 
had voluntarily created an AC. In Spain, Garcia-Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2004) 
revealed that 45% of the BD’s had an Executive Committee. They also noted that 74% 
of firms in the sample had an AC, 68% had a Nomination Committee and 67% had both 
of these committees. Banegas et al. (2006) analysed the IBEX 35 firms and concluded 
that only 14 firms had a Nomination and Compensation Committee, acting the two 
committees as one, and only five firms included independently a Nomination 
Committee and a Compensation Committee. Furthermore, only two firms created a 
Strategy and Investment Committee. 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the sustained socio-economic changes in Spain in 
recent years have increased gender diversity in BD’s. This increase was enhanced by the 
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implementation of Conthe Code (CUBG, 2006), and that its proposals are intended to 
support the female presence. But it was with the implementation of Act 3/2007 of 22 
March, for Effective Equality between Women and Men (LOIMH4), Article 75, which 
frames the regulation of the appointment of men and women on BD’s in an equitable 
form. The paper of Gómez (2005) documented that the presence of women in Spanish 
BD’s was in lower positions compared to other European Union countries. 
 
In terms of the benefits of incorporating women into the governing bodies of firms, 
Robinson and Dechant (1997), Zahra and Garvis (2000) and Del Brío and Del Brío 
(2009) observed that the presence of women on BD’s contributed to an innovative firm. 
Erhardt et al. (2003) concluded that the presence of women on BD’s provided greater 
creativity, increased the quality of proposals, better prospects and more information 
search for firms. Carter et al. (2003) noted that the presence of women on BD’s 
favoured obtaining corporate value for the firm.  
 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to study whether gender diversity in BD’s of the 
firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange influences the voluntary formation of Board 
Sub-Committees. Spain is a good context in which to examine the effect of Board’s 
gender diversity in the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees (also known as 
Board Committees) due to being one of the European countries where gender diversity 
in the Boards is increasing more slowly, in spite of publishing a law that forces BD’s to 
have a minimum percentage of women. Differences in the corporate governance 
systems of Spanish firms highlight the futility of extrapolating from studies of the 
Anglo-Saxon markets to include Spain (Fernández and Arrondo, 2007). Unlike the 
Anglo-Saxon capital markets, the ownership concentration and the lack of liquid capital 
markets in Spain have resulted in BD’s being the prevalent mechanism of control. 
Indeed, ownership concentration is one of the features that makes Spanish corporate 
governance different from countries such as the US, UK, Germany and Japan, as well as 
the low level of legal protection for investors and pyramidal groups and underdeveloped 
capital markets that focus largely on financial institutions and banks. According to De 
Miguel et al. (2005), the last two characteristics explain why the ownership structure is 
so concentrated in Spain in comparison to common law countries and even to some 
French-origin civil law countries such as Germany. Consequently, this high ownership 
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concentration acts as a legal control influencing Spanish corporate governance (Grant 
and Kierchmaier, 2004).  
 
The institutional, legal and corporate governance peculiarities that make Spain so 
different from the circumstances of the Anglo-Saxon countries and the USA, to which 
most of the existing Board Sub-committee literature refers, may affect Board’s gender 
diversity and its impact on the voluntary creation of Board Sub-committees. 
Consequently, this research may offer new insights into the relationship between 
corporate governance, and Board Sub-committees in particular, and Board’s gender 
diversity in the Spanish context, which explains the interest of analysing this 
association. 
 
Most of the previous evidence is based on the analysis of the voluntary creation of 
AC’s (Collier and Zaman, 2005), paying less attention to the examination of the 
formation of the remainder Board Sub-committees. In addition, little research has been 
performed combining Board’s gender diversity and Board-Subcommittees. Therefore, 
we contribute to the literature of Corporate Governance by demonstrating that the 
demand of internal control mechanisms such as Board Sub-committees can vary 
depending on the structure of Board’s gender diversity. Further, we find evidence of 
substitutive effects between Executive Committee and the percentage of women 
executive directors on BD’s and between Board Sub-committees and the percentage of 
female representatives of large shareholders directors on BD’s, which suggests that 
Board Sub-committees in general, and Executive Committee in particular, should not be 
considered in isolation. In sum, these results suggest that a one-size fits all solution for 
the creation of Board Sub-committees might not be optimal as different firms face 
different incentives in composing their BD’s. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After this introduction, we review the 
existing literature and posit the hypotheses to be tested. The third section describes the 
methodology, variables and the sample used in this study. The fourth section discusses 
the results and finally, the fifth and final section presents the findings and limitations 
inherent in this study, in addition to describing potential future research. 
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3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.2.1. Literature Review 
 
According to agency theory, the separation between ownership (principal) and 
control of the firm (agent) generates information asymmetries between the parties 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007). This gives rise to a 
conflict of interest between the principal and the agent and, thus, becomes an agency 
problem. A firm can mitigate the agency problem by setting up control mechanisms 
such as Board Sub-committees. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
considers such committees as important tools for monitoring corporate activities. 
Previous evidence supports that the existence of independent Board Sub-committees is 
positively related to effective decision-making (Vafeas 1999, Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
 
Among the Board Sub-committees is included the formation of an AC and the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee (Pincus et al., 1989, Menon and Williams, 
1994, Beasley and Salteiro, 2001, DeZoort et al., 2002), among others. Several previous 
studies have examined the voluntary formation of AC (Chau and Leung, 2006; Piot, 
2004 and Pucheta-Martínez and de Fuentes, 2007), of Nomination Committees (Carson, 
2002; Vafeas, 1999; Ruigrok et al., 2006) and of Remuneration Committees (Liao and 
Hsu, 2013). Bich and Hutchinson (2012) reported that the use of the Audit and Control 
Committee and Nomination and Compensation Committees reduced informational 
asymmetries, as when the directors were the same on both committees they were able to 
monitor the risk exposure of the firm. Firms also may have other control mechanisms 
such as the external and internal auditors, the BD and institutional investors. In this 
respect, Fama and Jensen (1983) showed the need for control mechanisms in decisions 
where managers do not directly bear the economic cost for those decisions. 
 
Hence, in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetries, firms demand 
control mechanisms other than the BD, such as the Board Sub-committees, as well as 
helping it to carry out its activities efficiently and independently (Harrison, 1987). In 
this vein, authors such as Kesner (1988), Andrews (1997) and Sherman et al. (1998), 
among others, found that major decisions being taken by BD’s came from Board Sub-
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committees. The firm director of Roebuck and Firm noted in 1999 that firms are run 
primarily by their committees. Harrison (1987) demonstrated that the control 
commissions were important management mechanisms for BD’s to independently 
perform oversight functions. Boone and Mulherin (2012) analysed the Delegated 
Committees of 845 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock 
Exchange, the Nasdaq and Small Market Prices, showing that the creation of Board 
Sub-committees increased oversight functions, thus, reducing agency problems. 
Wolnizer (1995) demonstrated that the principal operations performed by Board Sub-
committees were the controlling and monitoring of the development and subsequent 
disclosure of accounting information. In a similar manner, Vance (1983) and Ruigrok et 
al. (2006) showed that the delegation of functions by the BD to Sub-Committees 
increased the quality of the activities of the BD. Laux and Laux (2009) revealed that the 
Delegate Committees, at times, were working independently in order to achieve the 
objectives set by the CGG. However, sometimes a single committee performed the 
combined functions of various committees. 
 
Previous evidence shows that the formation of Board Sub-committees implies an 
increase in the delegation of functions by the BD (Vafeas, 1999) and increased 
monitoring and control (Vafeas, 1999, Klein, 2002 and Walker, 2009), impacting 
positively on the firm value or reducing earnings management, among other issues. In 
this sense, Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) documented a positive relationship between the 
number of Board Sub-committees and firm performance. Bich and Hutchinson (2012) 
also demonstrated a positive relationship between the risk and firm performance, mainly 
due to the creation of Supervision and Control Committees. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1991) concluded that those firms having AC’s had not overstated annual earnings, thus 
reducing the manipulation of accounting information. Conyon (1997) noted that the 
presence of Compensation Committees in British firms caused a wage restraint in 
director compensation. In addition, Klein (1998) showed that Remuneration 
Committees were in charge of pay structure design, in order to encourage shareholders 
to generate higher business returns. Frankforet et al. (2012) analysed 166 firms from the 
Wall Street Journal and showed that the presence and structure of a Compensation 
Committee increased the effectiveness of control and monitoring functions. Garcia-
Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2007) demonstrated that the inclusion of a Nomination and 
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Remuneration Committee guaranteed that firms would achieve good business 
performance.  
 
3.2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Number of Women Directors on Boards of Directors 
  
The incorporation of women into BD’s has been slow and gradual. Although in 
recent decades women have increased their levels of training and qualifications, there 
are still jobs with high barriers to direct access to the labour market, such as BD’s and 
the decision-making and control bodies in firms (Sarrió et al. 2002). 
 
In terms of female representation in BD’s, Carnicer et al. (2007) reported that the 
presence of women in senior management and the BD was greater in those firms that 
had the highest percentage of women in the workforce. In a similar manner, Porto et al. 
(2010) concluded that Spain was the country with the lowest number of firms having 
female directors, after the UK and the US. Moreover, Ramos (2005) revealed that the 
presence of women in the BD’s of IBEX 35 firms was only 3.6% and also documented 
that 63% of firms did not have any women in their BD’s. The publication of the 
National Institute of Statistics (2012) showed that the presence of women in the BD’s of 
IBEX 35 firms was 10.3%, which is insufficient, but higher than in previous years, as in 
2005 this figure did not exceed 2%. 
 
Previous research addresses the relationship between gender diversity in BD’s and 
the creation of firm value. Adler (2001), Adams and Ferreira (2003), Carter et al. 
(2003), Jimeno and Redondo (2008) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) 
documented that the presence of women in decision-making positions with high 
responsibility increased the value of the firm. In contrast, Burke (1997), Robinson and 
Dechant (1997), and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) concluded that gender 
diversity in BD’s could become a competitive advantage and a source of value for the 
firm. Similar results from Erhardt et al. (2003), Krishnan and Park (2005), Jimeno and 
Redono (2008) and Castaño et al. (2009) demonstrated that the degree of gender 
diversity in BD composition can lead to increased firm performance. Burgess and 
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Tharenou (2002) showed that firms with heterogeneous BD’s reduced the likelihood of 
poor performance as a result of decisions taken. Similarly, Watson and Robinson (2003) 
reported that women in BD’s were more risk averse in making important decisions. 
 
Vance (1983) and Waldo (1985), among others, highlight that the Delegate 
Committees facilitate the effectiveness of BD’s and contribute to a more skilled use of 
it, which will permit greater flexibility and efficiency. Therefore, Board Sub-
committees have become an integral part of Corporate Governance mechanisms. 
Previous studies seem to support the benefits derived from Board Sub-committees, as 
they may exercise their functions more independent and efficiently (Vance, 1983; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Laux and Laux, 2009), and the firm will permit greater value 
creation and reduce the manipulation of information (Vafeas, 1999; Klein, 2002; 
Walker, 2009), among other aspects. 
 
Authors such as Carter et al. (2003) and Adler (2001), among others, show that the 
presence of women in BD’s increases business performance, and ultimately, the value 
of the firm, because women exercise better the control function, and therefore, agency 
costs arising from the separation of ownership and management can be reduced. In the 
same sense, previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009 and Schwartz-Ziv, 2011) also 
documented that women in BD’s are better able to develop monitoring activities. 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) examined Norwegian firms which had from 50 to 5.000 
employees, and showed that gender diversity in BD’s increased strategic control of 
them, providing advantages in the strategic decision making of BD’s. 
 
Therefore, and taking into account previous evidence, it is expected that as the 
number of women increases in BD’s, the greater will be the likelihood of creating 
Delegated Committees, as female directors on BD’s will demand more control 
mechanisms with which to exercise greater supervision and monitoring of both, the 
management team and other members of BD’s, making better decisions that positively 
impact shareholders. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of women directors on the Board of Directors is 
positively associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees. 
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Percentage of Female Independents Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
The presence of independent members of BD’s is essential for them to adequately 
perform the functions of control and supervision. Independent directors are those 
members of recognised prestige who bring experience and expertise to Corporate 
Governance, who are not linked with the management team and cannot be considered as 
executives or representatives of large shareholders. That is why the CGG recommend 
that the presence of independent members in BD’s is, at least, one third of all directors, 
in order to produce effective management (CUBG, 2006). 
 
A large number of previous studies (Abbott et al., 2000; Deli and Gillan, 2000; 
Carcello and Neal, 2003; Felo et al., 2003, Bradbury et al., 2006; Song and Windram, 
2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2007; Bédard 
and Gendron, 2010) analyse the impact of the independence of the Board Sub-
committees, particularly the AC, documenting that independent AC’s provided higher 
quality financial reported in the process. Similarly, Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003) 
demonstrated that the existence of an AC was associated with increased control and 
monitoring, suggesting an increase in the quality and transparency of financial 
information. Moreover, Vafeas (1999) documented that the inclusion of independent 
and representatives of large shareholders directors on the Nomination Committee aided 
in improving the quality of BD’s. Beasley (1996) showed that financial fraud in 
companies reduced by the existence of independent members on the AC. Researchers 
such as Abbott et al. (2000), García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz (2005), and Song and 
Windram (2004) reported that the presence of independent members on AC’s reduced 
accounting manipulations, since they represented the interests of shareholders. 
 
However, the functions of control and supervision of BD’s may lose effectiveness by 
information asymmetries between external and internal directors, as internal directors 
have more financial information than external directors. Chen and Jaggi (2000), and 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) documented that firms that have independent directors on 
BD’s were more likely to disclosure more detailed and complete financial information, 
thereby, reducing information asymmetries between ownership and management. 
Cormier et al. (2010) revealed that the independence of BD’s was positively associated 
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with greater disclosure of information concerning the management and ownership of the 
firm. Similarly, Kumar and Singh (2012) investigated 157 non-financial firms in India, 
showing that the presence of independent directors on BD’s increases firm performance.  
 
The independent members of BD’s will support the creation of Board Sub-
Committees, as such Commissions may reduce information asymmetries between 
directors and enhance the confidence of the owners and investors of firms. Pincus et al. 
(1989), Menon and Williams (1994), and Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2008) 
showed that the increase of independent directors of BD’s was associated with the 
voluntary formation of AC’s. Cotter and Silvester (2003) demonstrated a positive 
relationship between the presence of independent members on BD’s and Oversight 
Committees. In the same vein, Chau and Leung (2006), Firth and Rui (2006), and Chen 
and Kilgore (2007) concluded that the presence of external members on BD’s affected 
the voluntary creation of AC’s. Haung et al. (2009) demonstrated that the percentage of 
independent members on BD’s increased the formation of Board Sub-committees. 
Furthermore, Yatim (2010) analysed a sample of firms in Malaysia and showed that 
BD's more independent tended to create Risk Management Committees, in order to 
maintain their reputation. However, Subramanian et al. (2009) analysed 200 firms on 
the Stock Exchange of Australia (NSX) and documented that the presence of external 
members in BD’s did not influence the creation of Risk Management Committees. 
 
Previous evidence does not directly address the relationship between independent 
women on BD’s and voluntary formation of Board Sub-committees. Notwithstanding, 
we predict that as the percentage of independent women directors on BD’s increases, 
the greater is the likelihood of establishing Board Sub-committees, as this will allow 
them to conduct a more comprehensive control over the management of the firm. In this 
sense, Francoeur et al. (2008) also suggest that incorporating gender diversity and 
independence in BD’s will allow better exercise of supervision and control functions. 
Hence, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of independent women directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees. 
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Percentage of Female Executives Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
The executive or internal BD members are those who possess executive or 
management functions in the firm or in one of the participating firms, and can 
sometimes maintain with the firm a contractual, commercial or otherwise relationship, 
other than the position of director (CUBG, 2006). Castaño et al. (2009) noted that in 
2006 the IBEX 35 firms had 2.2% of female executive directors on BD’s.  
 
When the chairman of the BD and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) are the same 
person, the BD usually has more executive members, since the work between the 
chairman and these members is more direct, because they have common knowledge 
concerning the firm, and also the executive directors will be less willing to question 
their views. The inclusion of executive members on BD’s can provide knowledge about 
the inner workings of the firm, because of their relationships within the company. 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) proposed that the executive directors of the BD had 
more information and knowledge with which to evaluate strategic decisions. Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) examined 115 firms and demonstrated that those BD’s having a 
greater number of executive members reduced the financial disclosures and, therefore, 
did not provide the desired level of control. In the same vein, Huang et al. (2009) 
reported that the executive directors of BD’s were negatively related to the composition 
of Delegated Committees. 
 
Other studies link executive directors with financial performance. Cochran et al. 
(1985) and Vance (1983) reported that the executive members of BD’s were positively 
related to the financial performance of the firm. Fernandes (2008), after analysing a 
sample of Portuguese firms, demonstrated that the remuneration of executive directors 
is positively associated with the value of the firm, but only when the BD is comprised 
solely of executive directors. Furthermore, the study also documents that the presence 
of executive directors on the BD aligns the interests of shareholders and managers. 
However, Cho and Kim (2007) showed that the firm performance of the companies was 
reduced when the BD had executive directors, due to agency costs arising from internal 
directors and minority shareholders. Hsu and Wu (2010) analysed 101 London Stock 
Exchange firms, and demonstrated that a higher percentage of internal directors in BD’s 
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increased the likelihood of business failure. In the same vein, Ruíz-Barbadillo et al. 
(2007) examined 75 Spanish firms, which voluntarily formed an AC from 1998 to 2001, 
and demonstrated that the presence of executive directors in BD’s increased their 
capacity to influence the decision-making of the BD’s, thus, reducing the effectiveness 
of AC’s.  
 
Although previous evidence is inconclusive, we predict that the higher percentage of 
women executives on BD’s, the lower the probability of voluntary creation of Board 
Sub-Committees, as these committees involve more supervision and control on 
executive functions and, therefore, they will be reluctant to demand internal control 
mechanisms. Hence, we posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of female executives directors on the Board of 
Directors is negatively associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-
Committees. 
 
Percentage of Female institutional Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
The institutional directors are those who hold a percentage of shares greater or equal 
than to what is considered legally significant, or who have been appointed in their 
capacity of shareholders, although their shareholding does not reach that amount, and 
who represent the aforementioned shareholders (CUBG, 2006). 
 
Gómez (2005) and Mateos et al. (2010) demonstrated that the majority of women 
who were part of the BD of Spanish firms were institutional directors. Olcese et al. 
(2005) showed that only 4% of BD members were women, of whom 70% were 
nominated institutional directors. Castaño et al. (2009) concluded that in 2006, 5.15% of 
IBEX 35 firms had female institutional directors.  
 
An important range of studies have analysed the relationship between the 
institutional directors on BD’s and financial reporting quality. Garcia-Osma and Gill de 
Albornoz (2005) reported that the presence of institutional directors on BD’s decreased 
the number of fraudulent accounting practices. Wan-Hussin (2009) analysed Malaysia 
 130 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
Stock Exchange firms for 2001 and 2002, and demonstrated that the presence of 
institutional directors on BD’s increased corporate transparency. Hsu and Wu (2010) 
observed the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 1997 to 2005, and showed 
that institutional directors had greater ability to report and monitor corporate 
management than internal directors. Colpan and Yoshikawa (2012) investigated 
Japanese firms during the period from 1997 to 2007, and concluded that external 
directors of BD’s promoted the interests of the firms and banks they represented which, 
consequently, improved control-specific interests of shareholders. 
 
Board Sub-Committees are more likely to pay attention to the interests of 
shareholders, ensuring that new members of the BD are external members who possess 
skills necessary to perform their duties. Vicknair et al. (1993), after analysing 100 U.S. 
firms during the period 1980-1987, demonstrated that institutional directors on the AC’s 
mitigated the independence of the committees, as they had direct information of the firm 
that can be used with financial interest. Wright (1996) analysed 151 non-financial firms 
in the U.S., demonstrating that when there was a large number of institutional directors 
on the AC, this reduced the quality of financial information, thus, hampering 
supervisory functions of the firm. In the same context, Yammeersi and Herath (2010), 
and Kumar and Singh (2012) reported that the presence of institutional directors in 
BD’s influenced negatively the firm performance. Furthermore, Grossman Hart (1980), 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that institutional directors of BD’s reduced 
agency costs, since they have strong incentives to monitor managers. 
 
Previous evidence regarding the impact on a firm of institutional directors on BD’s is 
inconclusive. For this reason, we do not predict any direction for the percentage of 
female institutional directors on BD’s, since they may demand more control 
mechanisms for the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees, as this may exert 
more direct control over the management team, thus, reducing information asymmetries 
and, as a consequence, agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bahalba and Rao, 
1995). But the opposite may be also expected, according to prior literature. Hence, we 
posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
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Hypothesis 4: The percentage of female institutional directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively or negatively associated with the voluntary creation of Board 
Sub-Committees. 
 
Percentage of Ownership Held by Female Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
Ownership of the firm by the managers is another key factor in reducing agency 
costs. Agency theory considers that the BD should ensure the interests of the firm 
owners and also reduce agency problems arising from information asymmetries. 
Previous studies (Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Jensen, 1993; Chen and Steiner, 1999; 
Crutchley et al., 1999; Ang et al., 2000; Salas, 2002; Fleming et al., 2005; Lasfer 2006) 
showed that management ownership caused a greater alignment of interests between 
owners and managers, as reducing agency costs. Chung and Pruitt (1996) demonstrated 
that as management ownership increased, agency costs decreased, but when ownership 
reached a certain high point, then agency costs increased. In contrast, Barnes et al. 
(2005) analysed a sample of recently established, but small and fast growing U.S. firms, 
revealing that increased ownership by managers increased agency costs. Pincus et al. 
(1989) found that firms with low ownership management encouraged the voluntary 
formation of AC’s. In the same vein, Groff and Valentincic (2011) showed that the 
ownership structure of Slovenian firms negatively influenced the voluntary formation of 
AC’s. Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2008) demonstrated that there is no 
relationship between ownership by members of BD’s and the voluntary creation of an 
AC. 
 
Furthermore, there are other members in the BD structure that could influence 
agency costs, such as banks and owners with a high concentration of ownership, which 
can provide control and reduce agency costs. The presence of a large shareholder, able 
to control and fire managers, can help mitigate agency problems and influence the BD, 
either via their integration or through a representative, thus, influencing decision 
making and mitigating potential opportunistic behaviour (Craswell et al., 1997; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 1998). 
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In Spain, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries, there is a high ownership concentration. 
Hence, problems between owners and managers are minimal and highlight problems 
between large and minority shareholders, as the former try to expropriate the wealth of 
the latter. In this sense, Reyes (2002) analysed a sample of Spanish listed non-financial 
firms for the period from 1996 to 1998, with the result that, for the year 1998, 82.98% 
of firms had ownership concentration (considered to be when shareholder participation 
exceeded 10%). Consequently, in this context we predict that the lack of incentives of 
minority shareholders, as well as the control exercised by the large shareholder on BD’s 
diminishes the interest in the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees. Hence, we 
posit our hypothesis in the following manner: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of shares held by female directors on the Board of 
Directors is negatively associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-
Committees. 
 
Remuneration of Female Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
In Spain there has been a wave of financial scandals in recent decades and the world 
economic and financial situations have questioned multi-million euro remunerations and 
indemnities received by executives and directors of firms. As firms have been reluctant 
to disclosure the remuneration of directors and senior management, Spanish legislators 
have drafted regulations in order to make firms more transparent and to publish the 
remunerations of directors. Thus, the LTLT (2003) forced listed firms to publish the 
compensation of their directors in their annual reports, together with a breakdown of the 
elements that form them. Despite legislation, some Spanish firms do not disclosure 
details of the remuneration of directors and senior management, as corroborated by 
Merino et al. (2009), who reported that that 74.39% of Spanish firms did not include 
information on the remuneration of senior positions in the annual reports.  
 
Remuneration of directors is an important element in reducing problems associated 
with the separation of ownership and control. The Remuneration Committee is 
responsible for proposing the remuneration of directors and senior management, 
although ultimately BD’s are responsible for approving remunerations. 
 133 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
Notwithstanding, there may be conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
(agency theory), mainly due to the existence of information asymmetries (Arrow, 1991). 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) showed that the system of director’s compensation is an 
alignment and monitoring mechanism, which supervises the management behaviour 
about firm performance. In this context, Jeppson et al. (2009) demonstrated a positive 
relationship between the remuneration of directors and business performance. However, 
Alshimmiri (2004) reported that there was a negative relationship between the 
remuneration of senior management and firm performance. Furthermore, Brick et al. 
(2006) also concluded that excessive remuneration of senior management and the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) was associated with a lower financial performance of firms, 
while that Lippert and Rahman (1999), after analysing 1,000 firms in the Stock 
Exchange, observed that CEO’s incentive contracts for multi-national firms were not 
related to firm's financial performance.  
 
Moreover, Johnson et al. (2003) investigated 2.504 S&P firms for the period from 
1992 to 2001, pronouncing that the best measures of Good Governance of the firms 
relied on incentives received by senior management. Barontini and Bozzi (2011), after 
analysing a sample of firms from the Milan Stock Exchange for the period from 1995 to 
2002, concluded that the remuneration of BD’s was related to the characteristics of 
Corporate Governance of the firm. On the contrary, the authors documented that 
excessive compensation was not related to future business performance. Eckles et al. 
(2011) revealed that the remuneration of directors was associated with the presence of 
certain governmental structures, while the results also showed that incentives received 
were inciting managers to manipulate their earnings. 
 
Previous evidence on the effects of remuneration systems for directors in firms is 
mixed, but it is undeniable that the compensation system is not a neutral mechanism. 
Thus, we predict that the remuneration of female directors in BD’s is positively 
associated with the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees, as this will increase 
the need to exercise greater supervision and control of the performance management, 
and therefore, the greater the demand will be for control mechanisms. Hence, we posit 
our hypothesis in the following manner: 
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Hypothesis 6: The remuneration of female directors on the Board of Directors is 
positively associated with the voluntary creation of a Board Sub-Committee. 
 
3.3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
3.3.1 Methodology 
 
In order to test empirically the hypotheses, we use the following logistic regression: 
 
CDCAit= β0 + β1 NUMCAit + β2 %MICAit + β3 %MECAit + β4 %MDCAit + β5 
%ACCWOMit + β6 REMUCAit + β7 TAMCAit+ β8 REUNCAit + β9 TAMEMPRit + β10 
ANTEMPRit + β11DPC it + β12BIGFOUR it + β13 LEVit  +∑j αj FIRMj + μit 
 
Where variable CDCA will take the value 1 if the BD has constituted voluntarily all 
or some of the Committees recommended by the Codes of GCG (Executive Committee 
and Oversight and Control Committee: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
and/or Compliance Commissions or Corporate Governance) and 0, otherwise. The AC 
is not studied in this work because it is a Board Sub-Committee mandatory rather than 
voluntary. Moreover, we also study how gender diversity in BD’s can influence the 
voluntary creation of an Executive Committee, on the one hand, and some or all of the 
Committees for Oversight and Control, on the other. Thus, this paper tests three models. 
In Model 1, the dependent variable CDCA analyses all Committees recommended by 
the CGG, taking the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily created all or some of the Board 
Sub-Committees and 0, otherwise. In Model 2, the dependent variable CDCA (named 
CDCA1) takes the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily established an Executive 
Committee and 0, otherwise. Finally, in Model 3, the dependent variable CDCA (named 
CDCA2) takes the value 1 if the BD has voluntarily established a Committee for 
Oversight and Control: a Nomination and Remuneration Committees and/or the 
Compliance Committee or Corporate Governance and 0, otherwise. Table 21 provides a 
description of the variables. 
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TABLE 21 
 
Variable Description 
      
Variable   Description   
Expected 
Sign in the 
three 
models 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
NUMCA  Number of women in BD  + 
%MICA 
 
Number of independent women in BD/ Total number 
of independent members in BD + 
%MECA 
 
Number of insiders women in BD/ Total number of 
insiders members in BD 
- 
%MDCA 
 
Number of grey women in BD/ Total number of grey 
members in BD 
+/- 
%ACCWOM  Shares held by women of BD - 
REMUCA 
 Log of woman compensation of BD + 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
TAMCA   Total number of directors in BD + 
REUNCA  Number of times BD meets per year + 
TAMEMPR  Log of total assets (in thousands of Euros) + 
ANTEMPR  
Log of the difference between setting-up firm and 
observation year  
 
- 
DPC  
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the same person 
serves simultaneously as CEO and President of the 
BD 
- 
BIGFOUR  Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the big auditing firms + 
LEV   Ratio of book value of debt over total assets - 
 
 
3.3.1.1. Independent Variables 
 
Number of Women on Boards of Directors 
The variable number of women in BD’s is defined as "NUMCA", and is calculated 
as the total number of women who make up the BD. The expected sign for this variable 
is positive for all models, since the higher the number of women in BD’s, the greater the 
likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees.  
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Percentage of Independent Women on Boards of Directors 
The variable "%MICA" is calculated as the ratio between the total numbers of 
independent women and independent members who make up the BD. The expected sign 
is positive for all three models, because in increasing the percentage of independent 
women on BD’s, the greater the likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-
Committees.  
 
Percentage of Executives Women on the Board of Directors 
This variable is defined as "%MECA" and is calculated as the ratio between the total 
number of women executive directors in BD’s and the total number of executive 
directors in BD’s. For this variable, a negative sign is expected for the three models, as 
it will reduce the likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees.  
 
Percentage of Institutional Female Directors on the Board of Directors  
This variable is defined as "%MDCA" and is calculated as the ratio between the total 
number of institutional female directors in BD’s and the total number of institutional 
directors in BD’s. The expected sign is positive or negative for all three models, as it 
may increase or reduce the likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees.  
 
Percentage of Shares Held by Women Directors on Boards of Directors  
The ownership of women directors on BD’s is defined as "%ACCWOM", and it is 
calculated as the percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s. The expected 
sign is negative for all three models, since the greater the ownership of the firm held by 
women directors on BD’s, decreases the likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-
Committees.  
 
Remuneration of Women Directors on Boards of Directors 
As compensation approximation for women directors on BD's, we have defined the 
variable "REMUCA", measured as the logarithm of total compensation women 
directors on BD’s. We expect a positive sign for the three models, since the higher the 
remuneration for women directors on BD’s, the greater the likelihood of creating 
voluntarily Board Sub-Committees.  
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3.3.1.2. Control Variables 
 
To test the proposed models we include control variables that could influence the 
voluntary establishment of Board Sub-Committees.  
 
Boards Directors Size 
In Spain, the Olivencia Code (1998) as the Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK, 
recommended that the BD should be made up, on average, by three Directors. A few 
years later, the CUBG (2006) indicated that the recommended percentage of members 
for BD should be not less than five nor should it be more than fifteen. Jensen (1993) 
stated that the optimal size of the BD was from seven to eight members. Kang et al. 
(2007) analysed 100 Australian firms in 2003, demonstrating that the optimal size of the 
BD was from eight to nine members. 
 
Previous studies show a relationship between BD size and the formation of its Board 
Sub-Committees. In this context, Bradbury (1990), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Menon 
and Williams (1994), Piot (2004), Chen and Kilgore (2007), Pucheta-Martínez and De 
Fuentes (2008), and Groff and Valentincic (2011), among others, show that the number 
of directors on BD’s is positively associated with the voluntary creation of AC’s. This 
can be justified by the fact that a large number of members in the BD has more financial 
information to make highly responsible decisions (Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004), 
and at the same time, they have more skills to coordinate the functions of BD (Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1999) and to create its Board Sub-Committees. Carson (2002) 
demonstrated that Australian firms with more members on the BD’s increased the 
formation of Nomination Committees. Haung et al. (2009) analysed 1500 S & P firms 
during the period from 1996 to 2002 and concluded that a large number of members on 
the BD increased, positively, the voluntary formation of Board Sub-Committees. In the 
same context, Subramanian et al. (2009) documented that the creation of a Risk 
Management Committees was more prevalent in those firms with a larger BD. 
 
We define BD size as "TAMCA". This variable is calculated as the total number of 
members of the BD. The expected sign for this variable is positive, since the larger the 
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BD, the greater the probability of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees, as the 
need to create commissions increases in order to delegate certain functions of the BD. 
 
Board Directors Activity 
Another control variable that we consider is BD activity. It is hoped that an increased 
number of BD meetings would provide greater control over the management and, thus, 
reduce financial irregularities and increase quality control functions. Banegas et al. 
(2006) showed that the BD’s of IBEX 35 firms met, approximately, 10 times a year, 
which was about once a month. According to their study, BD activity improved 
operation and participation of the directors in the same. Moreover, the authors also 
showed that those BD’s which do not meet quite often promote absenteeism, which 
might impair the functions of supervision and control of BD’s and Board Sub-
Committees. 
 
Vafeas (1999) documented that augmenting the number meetings of the BD 
increased the demand for control mechanisms, thus streamlining the BD. Lipton and 
Lorch (1992) documented that a higher frequency of BD meetings was more likely to 
increase financial performance. Moreover, if a BD increases the frequency of meetings, 
firms are more likely to recover from bad results (Vafeas, 1999). Abbott et al. (2000) 
documented that firms with AC’s composed of independent directors and who met, at 
least, twice a year, were less likely to suffer from fraudulent financial reporting. Xie et 
al. (2003) concluded that those BD’s which met more often were less likely to suffer 
from earnings management.  
 
This variable is defined as "REUNCA" and is calculated as the total number of 
meetings of the BD. The predicted sign for this variable is positive, as the higher the BD 
activity, the greater the likelihood of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees, as this 
will increase the number of control mechanisms. Authors such as Haung et al. (2009) 
documented that BD activity was positively related to the voluntary creation of 
Government Committees. 
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Firm Size 
The firm size is another control variable used in this study. The implementation of 
control mechanisms implies that firms can incur elevated costs. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) concluded that larger firms had more agency costs; hence, they needed more 
control mechanisms. Previous studies (Pathan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009) demonstrated that 
large firms will require increased oversight functions and, therefore, require a larger 
number of control mechanisms such as Risk and the Compensation Committees. 
 
Some authors, such as Devers et al. (2008), Pathan (2009) and Sun et al. (2009) 
concluded that a larger-sized firm increased the need to incorporate control 
mechanisms; hence, it is necessary to increase Board Sub-Committees in order to 
perform control functions. Rodríguez (2005), and Chizema and Shinozawa (2012) 
documented that larger-sized firms tended to create Board Sub-Committees. Haung et 
al. (2009) concluded that larger firms were positively related to the formation of 
Government Committees. Subramanian et al. (2009) and Yatim (2010) concluded that 
larger-sized firms increased the formation of Risk Management Committees. In the 
same context, Pincus et al. (1989), Piot (2004), Firth and Rui (2006), Pucheta-Martínez 
and De Fuentes (2008), Chen et al. (2009), and Groff and Valentincic (2011) 
demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between firm size and voluntary 
formation of AC’s. 
 
The variable firm size has been defined as "TAMEMPR" and is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of total firm assets. The expected sign for this variable is positive, 
since the larger the firm, the greater the need for control mechanisms and, therefore, 
firms will demand the voluntary creation of Board Sub-Committees. 
 
Firm age 
The setting-up of the firm is a key element for the adoption of Board Sub-
Committees, as it is expected that older organisations are resistant to change, unless 
changes are required. Baum and Shiplov (2006) showed that firm age could be 
indicative of the experience, adaptability and market credibility. Chizema and 
Shinozawa (2012) reported that firms with greater professional experience adopted a 
commission system based on the creation of Audit, Nomination and Remuneration 
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Committees. However, Sherer and Lee (2002) demonstrated that older firms were 
reluctant to change and, therefore, were more resistant to the implementation of Board 
Sub-Committees. 
 
Hence, this variable is defined as "ANTEMPR" and is calculated as the logarithm of 
the difference between the year of establishment of the firm and the observation year. 
The expected sign for this variable is negative, as we predict that the older the firm, the 
lower the probability of creating voluntarily Board Sub-Committees. 
 
Duality in the Position of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Firm 
When the positions of Chairman of a BD and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) fall on 
the same person (CEO duality), this may cause both advantages and disadvantages. The 
accumulation of responsibilities influences the acquisition of internal and external 
leadership; hence, it reduces the cost of information and coordination. Moreover, CEO 
duality sometimes increases the concentration of power in one person, leading to 
opportunistic behaviour, contrary to the interests of shareholders (Jensen, 1993). 
 
Laux and Laux (2006) reported that CEOs tended to manipulate earnings, which 
explains the necessity for BD’s to demand control mechanisms. Pi and Timme (1993) 
and Dehaene et al. (2001) show that CEO duality produces a poor quality of financial 
information. Haung et al. (2009) studied a sample of 1500 S & P firms for the period 
from 1996 to 2002 and reported that the separation of the positions of Chairman of the 
BD and CEO was positively related to the formation of Board Sub-Committees. Yatim 
(2010) examined 690 firms in Malaysia in 2009 and concluded that the separation of 
Chairman of the BD and CEO positions increased the formation of Risk Management 
Committees. However, Collier (1993), and Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2008) 
demonstrated that CEO duality did not influence the voluntary formation of AC’s. 
 
Hence, another control variable that we will use is when one person simultaneously 
holds the position of chairman of the BD and CEO and defines it as "DPC". The 
variable is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if one person is holding 
both positions as chairman of the BD and CEO and 0, otherwise. For this variable, we 
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expect a negative sign for the three models, as CEO duality may hinder the work of the 
BD in performing supervision of the management team and, therefore, the demand for 
control mechanisms as Board Sub-Committees will diminish.  
 
Auditing Firm  
Auditors are external control mechanisms of organisations, although in recent 
decades their work has been questioned, due to the global financial and economic crises. 
Auditing firms influence the internal control of the organisation in order for firms to 
comply with the recommendations of the CGG. The use of big audit firms is linked to 
the quality of financial reporting (De Angelo, 1981). 
 
Previous studies (Pinkus et al., 1989; Bradbury, 1990, Collier, 1993; Menon and 
Williams, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Carson, 2002) showed a positive 
relationship between large firms and the voluntary formation of AC’s. Moreover, small 
audit firms promote, to a lesser extent, the establishment of AC’s (Pincus et al. 1989; 
Collier, 1993). However, authors such as Piot (2004), Willekens et al. (2004), Firth and 
Rui (2006), Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2007), and Groff and Valentincic (2011) 
demonstrated that the use of a large auditing firm did not influence the voluntary 
adoption of AC’s. Yatim (2010) examined firms from Malaysia in 2009 and 
documented that those firms which were audited by one of the four audit firms 
increased the incorporation of Risk Management Committees. In contrast, Subramanian 
et al. (2009) showed that the use of a big auditing firm did not influence the formation 
of a Risk Management Committee. 
 
We define the variable auditing firm as "BIGFOUR" and calculate it as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a major accounting firm (Ernst & 
Young, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Deloitte and KPMG) and 0, otherwise. A positive 
sign is expected for this variable, because if the company is audited by one of the big 
auditing firm it is more likely to create voluntarily Board Sub-Committees, since a large 
auditing firm can promote an increase of control mechanisms within the firms. 
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Leverage 
The level of financial leverage measures the proportion of debt that the firm supports 
relative to its total assets. With increase in financial leverage, a priori, agency costs 
increase; hence, loss of trust increases between owners and managers. When financial 
debt levels are high, control mechanisms are increased in order to reduce agency costs 
(Agrawal and Knober, 1996). Previous studies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pincus et 
al., 1989; Piot, 2004) demonstrate that high financial leverage increases the formation of 
control mechanisms, which would increase the creation of Board Sub-Committees 
(Bradbury, 1990; Deli and Gillan, 2000). 
 
Ang et al. (2000) demonstrated that there is an inverse relationship between leverage 
and agency costs. Carson (2002) analysed Australian firms and demonstrated that debt 
level was positively associated with the formation of the Nomination Committee. Cotter 
and Silvester (2003), Chen and Kilgore (2007) and Chen et al. (2009) showed that 
increased debt-level incentives for organisations in the voluntary creation of AC’s. 
Conversely, Groff and Valentincic (2011), and Bich and Hutchinson (2012) reported 
that firms with higher debt levels were less likely to voluntarily create AC’s. 
 
The level of debt or leverage is defined as "LEV" and measured as the ratio of total 
debt and total assets firm. The expected sign for this variable is positive, since the 
higher the debt, the greater the demand for control mechanisms and, therefore, the more 
likelihood of formation of Board Sub-Committees. 
 
Firm Fixed Effect 
The firm fixed effect control variable, denoted by “FIRM”, is intended to capture 
unobservable and fixed characteristics of firms that may potentially be correlated with 
the dependent variable. Specifically, we include year indicator variables to control for 
yearly differences.  
 
3.3.2. Sample 
 
The initial sample of this study consists of all non-financial firms listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange during 2004-2011. We exclude financial companies both 
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because they are under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of 
their BD’s and because of their special accounting practices. The information used for 
this analysis was obtained from the public records of the Spanish Securities Market 
Commission (CNMV), the SABI database and the official websites of firms, while 
corporate governance information is collected from the annual corporate governance 
reports that all the listed companies have had to publish since 2003. 
 
We build an unbalanced panel of 910 firm-year observations from 175 firms. The 
panel is unbalanced because during this time period some firms became public, and 
other firms delisted as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless, the 
estimations based on unbalanced panels are as reliable as those based on balanced 
panels (Arellano, 2003).  
 
3.4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Firms 
 
Table 22 presents mean value, median, standard error, and quartiles 25 and 75 of the 
main variables. 
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TABLE 22 
 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 
A) CONTINUOUS VARIABLES     
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Q25 Q75 
NUMCA 910 0.723 0.000 0.973 0.000 1.000 
%MICA 910 0.067 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.000 
%MECA 910 0.019 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000 
%MDCA 910 0.084 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.111 
%ACCWOM 910 2.268 0.000 8.927 0.000 0.006 
REMUCA 910 0.611 0.000 1.596 0.000 0.000 
TAMCA 910 10.349 10.00 3.814 8.000 12.000 
REUNCA 910 9.546 9.000 5.067 7.000 12.000 
TAMEMPR 910 13.007 12.812 1.880 11.697 14.342 
ANTEMPR 910 3.554 3.689 0.953 2.944 4.174 
LEV 910 0.539 0.511 0.953 2.944 0.693 
B) DUMMY VARIABLES         
  
    0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
CDCA     144  16% 766 84% 
CDCA1   586 64% 324 36% 
CDCA2   154 17% 756 83% 
DPC   682 75% 228 25% 
BIGFOUR      127 14% 783 86% 
Mean, median, standard deviation and quartiles of the main variables. NUMCA: Number of women in 
BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female independent directors on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female 
executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: Percentage of female representatives of large shareholders 
directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: 
Log of the compensation of women directors on BD’s; TAMCA: BD size measured as the total number of 
directors in BD’s; REUNCA: BD activity measured as the number of times that the BD meets per year; 
TAMEMPR: Firm size measured as the log of the total assets of the firm (in thousands of Euros); 
ANTEMPR: Firm age measured as the log of the difference between setting-up of the firm and 
observation year; LEV: Leverage measured as book value of debt over total assets; CDCA: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the BD has established all or some of the Committees recommended by the Good 
Governance Code (CGG); CDCA1: dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established an Executive 
Committee; CDCA2: dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established a Supervision and Control 
Committee: a Nomination and Compensation Committee and/or a Compliance or Corporate Governance 
Committee; DPC: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and 
Chairman on BD’s; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big 
auditing firms. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
As shown in Table 22, the average number of women on BD’s is .72. Moreover, it is 
observed that of all women who make up the BD, 6.700% are independent directors, 
1.900% are executive directors and 8.400% are institutional directors. The ownership of 
the firm held by women directors on BD’s is 2.268%, while the logarithm of the 
remuneration of women on the BD’s is .61. Also, it can be seen that the BD, on average, 
is formed of 10.349 members and meets 9.546 times a year. The average size of firms in 
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the sample is 13.007 (logarithm of total assets), the average age of firms is 3.554 years 
and finally, the level of leverage is 53.900%. Moreover, the statistics reveal that 84% of 
companies have voluntarily constituted all or some of the Board Sub-Committees, 36% 
created an Executive Committee and 83% voluntarily formed a Commission for 
Supervision and Control. Furthermore, in 25% of the firms of the sample the chairman 
of the BD is also the CEO and 86% of firms are audited by one of the big auditing 
firms.  
 
3.4.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
Tables 23, 24 and 25 give the mean of the independent variables of firms in the 
sample for the three models, respectively, and the results of the parametric t-test for 
continuous variables and the Pearson Chi-squared test for dichotomous variables, in 
order to analyse differences in the means. 
 
TABLE 23 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 1. 
 
Variables 
CDCA (=1) 
(N=766)  
Mean 
CDCA (=0) 
(N=144)  
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
test 
(p.value.) 
NUMCA 0.803 0.299 0.504 5.809*** (0.000) 
%MICA 0.078 0.010 0.068 4.941*** (0.000) 
%MECA 0.020 0.009 0.011 1.552  (0.121) 
%MDCA 0.082 0.096 -0.014 -0.776  (0.438) 
%ACCWOM 2.431 1.406 1.025 1.264  (0.207) 
REMUCA 0.702 0.130 0.572 3.981*** (0.000) 
Means Comparison Test. CDCA: dummy variable equals to 1 if the BD has established all or some of the 
committees recommended by the Code of Good Governance (CGG); NUMCA: Number of women in 
BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female independent directors on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female 
executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: Percentage of female representatives of large shareholders 
directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: 
Log of the compensation of women directors on BD’s. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, 
** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
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Table 23 presents the mean differences of the independent variables of Model 1, 
where the dependent variable represents the voluntary creation of all or some of the 
Board Sub-Committees. The results in Table 23 show that the mean difference of the 
variables number of women on BD’s, percentage of female independents directors on 
BD’s and remuneration of women directors on BD’s are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, we can accept the hypotheses one, 
two and six. Thus, with increases in the number of women, the percentage of 
independent women and the remuneration of women directors on BD’s, the greater the 
likelihood of voluntarily forming all or some of the Board Sub-Committees. With 
respect to the remainder of independent variables, the mean difference is not statistically 
significant. 
 
TABLE 24 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 2. 
 
Variables 
CDCA1 (=1) 
(N=324) 
Mean 
CDCA1 (=0) 
(N=586) 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
test 
(p.value.) 
NUMCA 1.037 0.549 0.488 7.453*** (0.000) 
%MICA 0.089 0.055 0.034 3.309*** (0.000) 
%MECA 0.012 0.022 -0.010 -1.885*  (0.060) 
%MDCA 0.099 0.075 0.024 1.739*  (0.082) 
%ACCWOM 3.640 1.510 2.130 3.467*** (0.001) 
REMUCA 0.977 0.409 0.568 5.208*** (0.000) 
Means Comparison Test. CDCA1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if BD has established an executive 
committee; NUMCA: Number of women in BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female independent directors 
on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: Percentage of female 
representatives of large shareholders directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by 
women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: Log of the compensation of women directors on BD’s. Significant 
at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
In Table 24 we provide the mean difference for the independent variables of Model 
2, where the dependent variable represents the voluntary formation of an Executive 
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Committee by the BD. This analysis reveals that all differences are statistically 
significant at 1% or 10% and positive, except for the variable percentage of female 
executive’s directors on BD’s, which casts a negative difference. Therefore, we can 
accept all hypotheses, except the fifth. Thus, according to these results, we conclude 
that BD’s of large size, with independent women and female institutional directors are 
more likely to voluntarily create an Executive Committee, as well as those firms whose 
women directors receive higher compensation and have shareholdings in the firm. 
Moreover, the results also show that the percentage of female executive directors on 
BD’s are less likely to voluntarily establish an Executive Committee, as predicted. 
 
TABLE 25 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 3. 
 
Variables 
CDCA2 (=1) 
(N=756) 
Mean 
CDCA2 (=0) 
(N=154) 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
test 
(p.value.) 
NUMCA 0.812 0.286 0.562 6.248*** (0.000) 
%MICA 0.078 0.010 0.068 5.145*** (0.000) 
%MECA 0.021 0.008 0.013 1.708*  (0.088) 
%MDCA 0.083 0.089 -0.006 -0.306 (0.760) 
%ACCWOM 2.463 1.315 1.148 1.455 (0.146) 
REMUCA 0.711 0.121 0.590 4.221*** (0.000) 
Means Comparison Test. CDCA2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if BD has established a supervision and 
control committee: a nomination and compensation committee and/or a compliance or corporate 
governance committee; NUMCA: Number of women in BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female 
independent directors on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: 
Percentage of female representatives of large shareholders directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage 
of shares held by women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: Log of the compensation of women directors on 
BD’s. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
In Table 25 is presented the mean difference for the independent variables of Model 
3, where the dependent variable represents the voluntary formation by the BD of a 
Commission for Supervision and Control. The results show that the mean difference of 
the variables number of women directors on BD’s, the percentage of independent 
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women directors on BD’s and the compensation of the women directors on BD’s are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, as in Models 1 and 2. Hence, we 
can accept the hypotheses one, two and six. Thus, there is a high likelihood of creating a 
voluntary Supervision and Control Commission as the BD size, the percentage of 
independent and compensation of women directors on BD’s increase. With respect to 
the mean difference of the variable percentage of female executive directors on BD’s is 
positive, contrary to our predictions, and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Therefore, an increase in the percentage of female executive directors on BD’s will 
increase the probability of establishing voluntary Committees for Supervision and 
Control by the BD. The other independent variables are not statistically significant. 
 
3.4.3. Regression Results 
 
In Table 26 we show the results of the logistic regression. As can be observed, we 
have built three models. In Model 1, we examined whether the BD has voluntarily 
formed all or some of Board Sub-Committees. In Model 2, we examine whether the BD 
has voluntarily established an Executive Committee, and in Model 3 we observed 
whether the BD has voluntarily created a Committee for Supervision and Control, that 
is, if they have formed Appointments and Remuneration and/or Compliance or 
Corporate Governance Committees. The Chi-square test shows that all three models are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 26 
 
Results of Logistic Regression for Board of Directors 
 
  Exp. 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
Parameters 
estim. 
Wald test 
(p.value.) 
Parameters 
estim. 
Wald test 
(p.value) 
Parameters 
estim. 
Wald test 
(p.value.) 
NUMCA + 0.384 
1.439  
(0.230) 0.372 
5.594** 
(0.018) 0.424 
1.743 
(0.187) 
%MICA + 4.393 
4.994** 
(0.025) -0.422 
0.370 
(0.543) 4.051 
4.378** 
(0.036) 
%MECA - 1.794 
0.978 
(0.323) -3.039 
5.192** 
(0.023) 1.802 
0.975 
(0.323) 
%MDCA +/- -1.335 
3.082* 
(0.079) -0.289 
0.243 
(0.622) -1.215 
2.490 
(0.115) 
%ACCWOM - 0.014 
0.627 
(0.428) 0.031 
5.752** 
(0.016) 0.016 
0.733 
(0.392) 
REMUCA + 0.025 
0.023 
(0.881) 0.007 
0.013 
(0.910) 0.030 
0.031 
(0.861) 
TAMCA + 0.190 
12.695*** 
(0.000) 0.098 
12.521*** 
(0.000) 0.197 
14.373*** 
(0.000) 
REUNCA + 0.180 
22.435*** 
(0.000) 0.013 
0.685 
(0.408) 0.129 
13.210*** 
(0.000) 
TAMEMPR + 0.347 
12.267*** 
(0.000) 0.493 
62.090*** 
(0.000) 0.409 
17.285*** 
(0.000) 
ANTEMPR - -0.113 
0.654 
(0.419) -0.218 
6.895*** 
(0.009) -0.186 
1.898 
(0.168) 
DPC - 0.814 
5.823** 
(0.016) -0.390 
3.646* 
(0.056) 0.767 
5.637** 
(0.018) 
BIGFOUR + 0.846 
8.871*** 
(0.003) 0.111 
0.156 
(0.693) 0.699 
6.012*** 
(0.014) 
LEV - -0.202 
1.710 
(0.191) -0.311 
2.171 
(0.141) -0.212 
2.173 
(0.140) 
Firm Fix Effects   Included   Included   Included 
Observations    910  910   910 
Classification   88.132%  74.286%  87.692% 
χ
2
     303.771***   261.284***   317.996*** 
Estimated coefficients through logistic regression. In Model 1, dependent variable is CDCA, which is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established all or some of the Committees recommended by the 
Code of Good Governance (CGG); in Model 2, dependent variable is CDCA1, which is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the BD has established an Executive Committee; in Model 3, dependent variable is 
CDCA2, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established a Supervision and Control 
Committee: a Nomination and Compensation Committee and/or a Compliance or Corporate Governance 
Committee; NUMCA: Number of women in BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female independent directors 
on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: Percentage of female 
representatives of large shareholders directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by 
women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: Log of the compensation of women directors on BD’s; TAMCA: 
BD size measured as the total number of directors in BD’s; REUNCA: BD activity measured as the 
number of times that the BD meets per year; TAMEMPR: Firm size measured as the log of the total 
assets of the firm (in thousands of Euros); ANTEMPR: Firm age measured as the log of the difference 
between setting-up of the firm and observation year; DPC: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person 
serves simultaneously as CEO and Chairman on BD’s; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is audited by one of the big auditing firms; LEV: Leverage measured as book value of debt over 
total assets. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
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The results in Table 26 show that, for Model 1, the variable number of women 
directors on the BD (NUMCA) has a positive sign, as expected, but is not statistically 
significant; hence, we cannot accept the first hypothesis. Thus, we conclude that the 
number of women directors in BD’s has no impact on the formation of all or some of 
the Board Sub-Committees. This result could be explained by the fact that the number 
of female directors in BD’s is not an essential feature for the firms listed in the Madrid 
Stock Exchange, as evidenced by Merino et al. (2009), so that the number of female 
directors in BD’s is not a relevant factor in the establishment of all or some of the Board 
Sub-Committees. With respect to the independent variable the percentage of women 
independent directors in BD’s (%MICA), it has a positive sign, as predicted, and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, we can accept the second hypothesis. 
This permits us to conclude that the presence of independent women directors on BD’s 
increases the probability of forming voluntarily all or some of the Board Sub-
Committees. Furthermore, the variable percentage of women executive directors on 
BD’s (%MECA) is not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot accept the third 
hypothesis. As for the variable percentage of female institutional directors on the BD 
(%MDCA), it shows a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Therefore, we can accept the fourth hypothesis. These results are in line with those 
reported by Wan-Hussin (2009), and Hsu and Wu (2010), who show that the presence 
of female institutional directors on BD’s brings transparency and a greater ability to 
report and monitor the management team and, therefore, it is not necessary the creation 
of Board Sub-Committees. These findings suggest that there is a substitution effect 
between the percentage of female institutional directors on BD’s and the voluntary 
creation of Board Sub-Committees. With respect to the variables percentage of shares 
held by women directors (%ACCWOM) and remuneration of women on BD’s 
(REMUCA) are not statistically significant. Thus, the fifth and sixth hypotheses cannot 
be accepted.  
 
Regarding the control variables, we note that the variables BD size (TAMCA), BD 
activity (REUNCA), firm size (TAMEMPR) and audit firm (BIGFOUR) have a positive 
sign, as predicted, and are statistically significant. Hence, we can confirm, as did many 
authors such as Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes (2008), Haung et al. (2009) and Sun 
et al. (2009), that the probability of voluntarily forming Board Sub-Committees in BD’s 
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will increase when the size and activity of BD’s increase and the company is audited by 
one of the big four auditing firms. In addition, the variable duality of Chairman and 
CEO has a positive sign, contrary to the expected, and is statistically significant. In the 
same context, Collier and Gregory (1999) demonstrated that the CEO duality 
encouraged the need for stricter control mechanisms, such as Board Sub-Committees, to 
control the functions of the BD. 
 
The results of Model 2 demonstrate that the variables number of women on BD’s and 
the percentage of women executive directors on BD’s present a positive and negative 
sign, respectively, as expected, and are statistically significant. Hence, we accept the 
first and third hypotheses. Therefore, we can conclude that as the number of women in 
BD’s increases, the greater the probability of creating an Executive Committee on the 
BD, while a higher percentage of female executive directors on the BD reduces that 
likelihood. Moreover, the variable ownership held by women directors on BD’s is 
positive, contrary to our predictions, and statistically significant at a 5% level, which 
does not allow us to accept the fifth hypothesis. Thus, this result suggests that the 
percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s is positively associated with the 
voluntary creation of an Executive Committee. Carson (2002) obtained similar results, 
demonstrating the positive relationship between the shareholdings of directors and the 
formation of a Remuneration Committee. Jensen (1993) and Monks and Minow (2004) 
argue that high equity ownership by directors is an important factor in increasing the 
willingness of directors to monitor. The remainder of independent variables are not 
statistically significant. 
 
With respect to the control variables, BD size, firm size, firm age, and CEO duality 
show the expected signs and are statistically significant. Thus, we can conclude that the 
probability of creating an Executive Committee on the BD will increase in larger and 
older firms, whose BD’s are numerous, while this probability is reduced with CEO 
duality. The other control variables are not significant. 
 
Model 3 shows that the only statistically significant independent variable is the 
percentage of independent women directors on BD’s, offering the expected sign. Hence, 
we can accept the second hypothesis. Therefore, according to these results, we can 
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assume that the percentage of independent women directors on BD’s increases 
voluntary establishment of a Committee for Supervision and Control. With respect to 
the control variables, we obtained similar results as in Model 1. BD size and activity, 
firm size and auditing firms are statistically significant and show a positive sign, as 
predicted. Thus, we can conclude that there is a greater likelihood of creating a 
voluntary Supervision and Control Committee as it increases BD size and activity, firm 
size and when a firm is audited by one of the big audit firm. Moreover, the variable 
CEO duality has a positive sign, contrary to our expectations, but is statistically 
significant. Accordingly, this result suggests that CEO duality encourages the voluntary 
creation of Commissions for Supervision and Control. In the same vein, Chau and 
Leung (2006) also documented that CEO duality increases the likelihood of creating a 
Commission for Supervision and Control. The other control variables are not 
statistically significant. 
 
To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Spearman correlation coefficients for 
all of the variables included in the model. Table 27 presents the results for the 
correlation matrix. Analysis of this table shows that the correlation between some pairs 
of variables is statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% levels. These results are 
consistent with previous studies concerning the voluntary formation of Board Sub-
Committees (Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes, 2008). However, none of the 
correlation coefficients are high enough (> 80) to cause significant problems of 
multicollinearity (see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). According to these results, we 
can conclude that these models do not have significant multicollinearity problems. 
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TABLE 27 
 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
  
  CDCA CDCA1 CDCA2 NUMCA PMICA PMECA PMDCA PACCWOM REMUCA TAMCA REUNCA TAMEMPR ANTEMPR DPC BIGFOUR 
CDCA1 0.322***               
CDCA2 0.961*** 0.281***              
NUMCA 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.222***             
PMICA 0.191*** 0.164*** 0.195*** 0.560***            
PMECA 0.050 -0.075** 0.056* 0.243*** -0.099**           
PMDCA 0.023 0.076** 0.040 0.626*** -0.044 0.088*          
PACCWOM 0.066** 0.047 0.078** 0.652*** 0.194*** 0.324*** 0.556***         
REMUCA 0.136*** 0.151*** 0.144*** 0.434*** 0.376*** 0.022 0.154*** 0.224***        
TAMCA 0.336*** 0.381*** 0.346*** 0.206*** 0.176*** -0.127*** 0.085** 0.024 0.094**       
REUNCA 0.301*** 0.187*** 0.269*** 0.045 0.116*** -0.110*** -0.065* -0.015 0.112*** 0.322***      
TAMEMPR 0.385*** 0.433*** 0.401*** 0.188*** 0.174*** -0.055* 0.070** -0.009 0.229*** 0.609*** 0.296***     
ANTEMPR -0.024 -0.043 -0.036 -0.131*** -0.158*** -0.161*** 0.062* 0.000 -0.003 0.079** 0.026 0.119***    
DPC 0.135*** -0.050 0.134*** 0.031 -0.055* 0.079** -0.009 0.032 -0.025 -0.039 0.054 0.022 0.007   
BIGFOUR 0.345*** 0.161*** 0.324*** 0.118*** 0.069** 0.070** 0.037 0.143*** 0.130*** 0.285*** 0.248*** 0.343*** 0.021 0.168***  
LEV 0.078** 0.054 0.080** 0.046 -0.093** 0.013 0.120*** 0.073** -0.003 0.195*** 0.176*** 0.357*** 0.216*** 0.035 0.050 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. CDCA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established all or some of the Committees recommended by the Code of Good 
Governance (CGG); CDCA1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has established an Executive Committee; CDCA2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the BD has 
established a Supervision and Control Committee: a Nomination and Compensation Committee and/or a Compliance or Corporate Governance Committee; NUMCA: 
Number of women in BD’s; %MICA: Percentage of female independent directors on BD’s; %MECA: Percentage of female executive directors on BD’s; %MDCA: 
Percentage of female representatives of large shareholders directors on BD’s; %ACCWOM: Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s; REMUCA: Log 
of the compensation of women directors on BD’s; TAMCA: BD size measured as the total number of directors in BD’s; REUNCA: BD activity measured as the 
number of times that the BD meets per year; TAMEMPR: Firm size measured as the log of the total assets of the firm (in thousands of Euros); ANTEMPR: Firm age 
measured as the log of the difference between setting-up of the firm and observation year; DPC: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves simultaneously 
as CEO and Chairman on BD’s; BIGFOUR: dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the big auditing firms; LEV: Leverage measured as book 
value of debt over total assets. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
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3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The succession of financial scandals in recent years and the global financial and 
economic crises have led to a distrust of the capital markets. To avoid this situation, 
regulatory bodies published the CGG’s in order to improve transparency of information 
and firm governance. On the other hand, companies are affected by agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control, thus, demanding internal and 
external mechanisms in order to increase monitoring and control functions. 
 
The aim of this study is to determine whether gender diversity in BD’s of firms listed 
on the Madrid Stock Exchange influences the voluntary formation of Board Sub- 
Committees. To achieve our goal, we propose three models in which we study the 
number of women on BD’s, the percentage of female independent, executive and 
institutional directors on BD’s, the percentage of shares held by women directors on 
BD’s and the remuneration of women directors on BD’s. The results demonstrate that 
the number of women on BD’s only encourages the voluntary creation of an Executive 
Committee, which depends on the BD, while the percentage of independent women on 
BD’s increases the voluntary creation of all or some of the Board Sub-Committees and 
Committees for Supervision and Control, as evidenced by Cotter and Silvester (1993). 
The percentage of female executive directors on BD’s reduces the likelihood of creating 
an Executive Committee. This result suggests that a high percentage of women 
executive directors on BD’s could be seen as a substitute for an Executive Committee, 
and to avoid duplication of functions, they would be more reluctant to create this 
Commission. Furthermore, the percentage of female institutional directors on BD’s is 
more likely to reduce the formation of all or some of the Board Sub-Committees. 
Similar evidence was obtained by Wan-Hussin (2009) and Hsu and Wu (2010), who 
concluded that BD’s dominated by institutional directors reduced the demand for 
control mechanisms, as these directors provided transparency and greater oversight 
capacity in business management. The ownership held by women directors on BD’s has 
a positive effect, contrary to our predictions, in the voluntary formation of an Executive 
Committee. Finally, the results reveal that the remuneration of female directors on BD’s 
does not contribute to the voluntary creation of all or some of the Boards Sub-
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Committees, nor the formation of an Executive, and Supervision and Control 
Committees.  
 
With respect to the control variables, we can conclude that BD size and firm size 
increase the likelihood of forming voluntarily all or some of the Board Sub-Committees, 
an Executive Committee and a Committee on Oversight and Control. BD activity and 
auditing firm also encourage the formation of all or some of the Board of Sub-
Committees and a Commission for Supervision and Control, but do not influence the 
creation of an Executive Committee. Finally, we can affirm that firm age and CEO 
duality discourage the voluntary creation of an Executive Committee, while the 
probability of creating all or some of the Board of Sub-Committees and Supervisory 
Control Commission increases when the chairman of the BD and CEO are the same 
person. 
 
The results show that the voluntary creation of Boards Sub-Committees depends on 
the female independent directors on BD’s, the number of women directors and the 
ownership held by women directors. These findings suggest that the presence of women 
in decision-making bodies of firms has increased BD delegation of functions to Board 
Sub-Committees. Hence, given that gender diversity in BD’s of listed firms increases 
internal control mechanisms, such as Boards of Sub-Committees, legislation should 
encourage more participation of women in governance bodies of firms as well as the 
presence of independent and shareholders women directors on BD’s, because although 
in recent years the role of women in BD’s has increased, this has not yet advanced 
enough. Our evidence supports the legislative initiative to establish quotas for women in 
corporate governance bodies of firms (e.g., as set by the European Union Justice 
Commissioner and the Financial Reporting Council at the end of 2010), based on the 
premise that gender diversity in BD’s encourages voluntary creation of Board Sub-
Committees. This point of view is supported by Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2012) and Scapin 
et al. (2013).  
 
This chapter may promote future line of research. Firstly, it would add extra value to 
analyse the impact of gender diversity in BD’s in the voluntary formation of Board Sub-
Committees by comparing companies of the Madrid Stock Exchange and a country of 
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traditional culture, such as the oriental, where the role of women in firm decision-
making is reduced. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to analyse whether gender 
diversity in BD’s can influence the demand for external control mechanisms or 
diversification of the firm's business. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND DIVIDEND 
POLICY: THE EFFECT OF GENDER DIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between gender diversity on BD’s 
and dividend policy. In this sense, Knyazeva et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
heterogeneous boards were associated with lower cash holdings, higher dividends and 
higher leverage. Wellalage et al. (2012) documented that the presence of female 
directors and CEO duality could pay higher dividends to shareholders. Byoun et al. 
(2013) documented that gender diversity on BD’s increased the payment of dividends 
when firms have greater agency problems regarding free cash flow, suggesting that 
females on BD’s helped mitigate the free cash flow problem. In addition, Van Pelt 
(2013) reported that the percentage of women on BD’s increased payout dividends. 
However, Francis et al. (2009) demonstrated that female CFOs (Chief Financial Officer) 
were more likely to reduce dividend payouts due to an increase in accounting 
conservatism. Thus, the aim of this study is to analyse whether gender diversity on 
Spanish firms’ BD’s has an effect on the dividend policy of the companies. 
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Spain is a good context in which to examine the effect of gender diversity on BD’s 
on dividend policies, since most of the studies about dividend policy refer to non-
European countries (Bathala and Rao, 1985; Zhou and Ruland, 2006; Rakotomavo, 
2010; Gupta and Parua, 2012; Said, 2013). On the other hand, the business context in 
which Spanish listed firms operate is characterized by a less developed capital market 
and significant ownership concentration, among others. Most of the previous evidence 
analyses the influence on dividend payout of ownership concentration (Chen et al., 
2005; Erol and Tirtiroglu, 2011), outside directors (Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; 
Setia-Atmaja, 2010), taxes on dividends (Amihud and Murgia, 1997), future earnings 
(Flint et al., 2010; Lee, 2010; Vermeulen, 2011) and investor protection (La Porta et al., 
2000). However, little research has been performed combining gender diversity on BD’s 
and dividend payouts (Wellalage et al., 2012; Byoun et al., 2013).   
 
This study contributes to the literature by showing that gender diversity on BD’s 
influences the dividend policy of firms, concretely the percentage of women directors, 
the percentage of institutional women directors and the percentage of shares held by 
women directors. Our evidence supports the Spanish Law (Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for 
Effective Equality between Women and Men), which is based on the premise that 
corporate boards’ female quote should be 40%. The Spanish legislator allows listing 
companies to achieve this gender quota by 2015, so the current legislation should 
encourage more participation by women in governing bodies. However, the progress 
made is still too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target, and for this reason we 
recommend that stronger government sanctions, combined with more effective equality 
plans within companies, are required for the quota to be met. Secondly, our study 
provides evidence that gender diversity on BD’s can alleviate the agency problem of 
free cash flow by monitoring and resolving the manager–shareholder conflict in an 
effective way; this is particularly true in the Spanish context, where two important 
agency problems are currently weak, namely shareholder rights and low management 
ownership. Finally, our findings suggest that a diverse board yields benefits to 
shareholders through its effect on dividend policy, and further contributes to the 
literature on the factors that influence dividend payout policy. This may be useful for 
current and potential shareholders of listing firms to know more deeply the dividends 
policies of the companies in which they invest.  
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The structure of this paper is as follows. After this introduction, the second section 
focuses on the theoretical background. The third section describes the institutional 
background, while in the fourth section we review the previous literature and develop 
the hypotheses. The fifth section describes the sample, methodology and variables used 
in the study; the sixth section shows the obtained results. In the final section, we discuss 
our conclusions, explain the limitations inherent to this study and the future lines of 
research. 
 
4.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
According to agency theory, the separation between the ownership and control of the 
firm generates information asymmetries between the parties, because the owners of a 
firm have delegated to managers to act on their behalf. This informational disadvantage 
between both parties includes information about the firm's prospects, earnings and risk 
aversion, among others. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders might lead to agency costs. This gives 
rise to a conflict of interest between ownership (principal) and the control of the firm 
(agent), and therefore becomes an agency problem. Managers take daily decisions about 
the firm’s earnings, although they do not always adopt dividend policies which benefit 
the shareholders’ interests. From time to time, they may choose a dividend policy that 
maximizes their own private benefits. Grossman and Hart (1980) documented how 
dividend payout mitigated agency conflicts by reducing the amount of free cash flow 
available to managers. In the same vein, Jensen (1986) showed that the distribution 
dividend reduces free cash flow at managers’ disposal, prevents unprofitable projects 
and alleviates agency costs. Hwang et al. (2013) demonstrated that dividend payments 
reduced the amount of free cash flow, thus reducing minority shareholder rights. 
 
Given that it has an effect on both of their interests, dividend policy is the most 
important economic and financial policy for managers and investors. Furthermore, it 
affects the value and financial and economic capacity of the firm. Dividend payouts 
reduce the total amount of retained profit and reduce financing with private capital. For 
this reason, dividend policy depends on companies’ profit distribution priorities and 
investment financing decisions.  
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The payment of dividends, managerial equity ownership and debt financing are 
considered effective mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts of interest within the 
firm (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Díez and Esteban, 2001). Rozeff (1982) analysed 1000 
firms on the Value Line Investment Survey, and evidenced that dividend payments 
could be part of a corporate monitoring tool. In a similar manner, Easterbrook (1984) 
argued that dividends help alleviate agency conflicts by exposing firms to more frequent 
monitoring by primary capital markets, as paying dividends increased the probability 
that new common stock had to be issued. De Angelo et al. (2004) showed that firms 
with high cash and low debt capital structures paid dividends to mitigate agency costs. 
Sedzro (2010) examined repurchases and regular and special dividends, and concluded 
that firms with agency problems increased their regular dividends. However, Chay and 
Suh (2009) analysed 5000 firms from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
UK and the US, and found weak association between payout policy and agency 
conflicts.  
 
4.3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
The context in which this study is framed is crucial, and for this reason a brief 
overview of some important issues concerning Spanish dividend policy is provided. In 
this sense, we deal with the financial situation, corporate governance system and gender 
diversity. 
 
The recent worldwide financial crisis has led to the international financial system 
losing its credibility. In addition, firms have problems in getting funding because banks 
do not provide financing to them. Many Spanish firms have difficulty in getting 
financing. Firstly, Spanish banks have cut their financing to clients and firms. On the 
other hand, firms cannot use internal financing because they cannot attend to their debts. 
Companies are going bankrupt because they cannot pay their debt, consequently leading 
to increasing unemployment. 
 
The Spanish corporate governance system is characterized by the presence of few 
large shareholders or independence on their boards, under-developed capital markets, no 
active market control, high ownership concentration and a one-tier board system (all 
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directors, executives and non-executives form one board). In this sense, De Miguel et al. 
(2004) showed that ownership concentration is higher in Spain than in countries such as 
the US, the UK, Japan and Germany. In these countries, important institutions, such as 
the government and large banks, have become controlling shareholders. As in other 
continental European corporate governance systems (Faccio and Lang, 2002), most of 
these institutions attain an important position on boards as they represent the interests of 
large shareholders and institutional investors (Kirchmaier and Grant, 2005). Most of 
these institutional investors are banks, investment funds and insurance companies. 
Institutional investors directly influence the management’s activities through their 
ownership, and indirectly by trading their shares. In this vein, Delgado-García et al. 
(2010) documented that ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder 
erodes the corporate reputation of Spanish firms. Continental European countries’ 
financial systems contrast with Anglo-American ones because the latter do not consider 
institutional investors as significant members of the board.  
 
Spain has undergone significant legal and institutional changes in order to increase 
the transparency of the stock markets and to protect minority shareholders. One of the 
consequences has been the issue of several codes of Corporate Governance: Olivencia 
in 1998, Aldama in 2003, and finally, the Conthe Code in 2006 which are characterized 
by a “comply or explain” principle in the enforcement of corporate governance 
regulations.  
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the continuous socio-economic changes in Spain in 
recent years have increased gender diversity on BD’s. This increase was enhanced by 
the implementation of Conthe Code (CUBG, 2006), whose proposals are intended to 
support female presence in decisions bodies; while the implementation of Act 3/2007 of 
22 March, for Effective Equality between Women and Men (LOIMH), Article 75, 
frames the regulation of the appointment of men and women in BD’s in an equitable 
way. Furthermore, the presence of women on BD’s should increase over a period of 
eight years since the issue of the law.  
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4.4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.4.1. Hypothesis 
 
Percentage of female directors on Boards of Directors 
 
Gender diversity on BD’s can help to mitigate agency problems by monitoring and 
resolving conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Jurkus et al., 2011). 
Authors such as Page (2008), Anderson et al. (2011) and Byoun et al. (2013), among 
others, argue that gender diversity on BD’s could decrease the conflicts between the 
principal and the agent.  
 
Previous evidence focuses on the analysis between women on BD’s and dividend 
payout. In this sense, Knyazeva et al. (2009) examined the Compustat database, CDA 
Spectrum and Corporate Library’s Board Analyst data for the period 2001–2006, and 
found that board heterogeneity is associated with higher dividends. Wellalage et al. 
(2012) observed the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2001 to 2005, and 
documented how the presence of female directors could mean higher dividends paid to 
shareholders. Byoun et al. (2013) consider 2,234 firms of Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) database, and showed that firms with more gender diverse 
BD’s are more likely to pay larger dividends than firms without diversity on their BD 
when firms perform large free cash flows and cause agency problems. In particular, 
firms with gender diversity on their BD are associated with a roughly 15% higher 
probability of paying dividends than firms without gender diversity. Van Pelt (2013) 
analysed a total number of 1,350 firm-year observations, and considered that gender 
diversity on BD’s increased payout dividends. Nevertheless, Lückerath-Rovers (2013) 
examined 116 Dutch companies listed on the Amsterdam Euronext Stock Exchange, 
and found that firms with female directors paid lower dividends than companies without 
female directors. Similar evidence was provided by Jurkus et al. (2011). 
 
In sum, the previous literature seems to support the hypothesis that women's 
presence on BD’s has positive impacts on dividend payout. Therefore, we predict that 
the percentage of female on BD’s may have a positive effect on dividend payout. Ye et 
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al. (2010) provide evidence that companies with a higher proportion of women directors 
perform better than those without gender diversity, and this could increase the dividend 
payout. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The percentage of female directors on the Board of Directors is 
positively associated with the dividend policy. 
 
Percentage of female independent directors on Boards of Directors 
 
The presence of independent members on BD’s is essential to perform the functions 
of monitoring and supervision. Independent directors can constrain the management's 
opportunistic dividend policies, which often benefit them and other stakeholders at the 
expense of shareholders. In recent years, the proportion of independent directors on 
BD’s has increased because of the need to protect shareholders from managerial abuse 
and to maximize firm value (Linck et al., 2009). Independent directors have strong 
incentives to issue independent and free judgment relating to management influence 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Linck et al., 2009). 
 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between the presence of 
independent directors on BD’s and dividend payout. In this sense, Belden et al. (2005) 
examined 524 companies listed in the Forbes 500 list of the largest American 
companies, and showed that firms with more outside directors paid higher dividends. 
Setia-Atmaja (2010) concluded that the presence of independent members on the BD’s 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange increased the dividend payout ratio. Sharma 
(2011) examined 944 firms of S&P 1500, and evidenced that greater independent 
director representation on the BD has a positive and significant influence on the 
propensity to pay dividends. In the same vein, Al Shabibi and Ramesh (2011) studied 
the Forecasting Analysis and Modelling Environment (FAME) database in 2007, and 
reported that the increment of independent directors on the BD positively influenced the 
dividends paid to shareholders. Furthermore, Wellalage et al. (2012) documented a 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the payment 
of high dividends; while Byoun et al. (2013) reported that the existence of more 
independent board members tends to pay higher dividends. O'Connor (2013) analysed 
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220 companies from 21 countries, and demonstrated that dividend payout increased in 
firms where board independence was higher. Contrary to this evidence, other studies 
(e.g. Bathala and Rao, 1995; Borokhovich, et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2008; Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey, 2009; Tseng et al., 2012) showed that there was a negative relationship 
between independent directors and dividend payout. 
 
Previous evidence does not directly address the relationship between independent 
women on BD’s and dividend policy. Notwithstanding, we predict a positive association 
between the proportion of independent female directors and dividend payout, as this 
will allow them to possess more comprehensive control over members of the board 
(Erhardt et al., 2003), which could also reduce conflicts of interests between directors 
and shareholders (Jurkus et al., 2011). Hence, we posit our second hypothesis in the 
following manner: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of female independent directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively associated with the dividend policy. 
 
Percentage of female institutional directors on Boards of Directors 
 
Institutional directors are those who hold a percentage of shares greater than or equal 
to what is considered legally significant, or who have been appointed in their capacity 
as shareholders despite their shareholding not reaching that amount and who thus 
represent the aforementioned shareholders (CUBG, 2006). For this reason, institutional 
investors have been the most important controlling shareholders in cases where the 
principal agency conflict has been based on the expropriation of minority shareholders’ 
wealth by controlling shareholders. Therefore, institutional owners can monitor the 
company and influence the amount of dividends paid. In this sense, Chen et al. (2005) 
suggested that dividend payout has been used by controlling shareholders in smaller 
Hong Kong companies as a way of extracting resources from the firms they control.  
 
Previous works have examined the relationship between institutional investors and 
dividend payout. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) analysed the monitoring role of pension 
funds in 289 firms in 1996, and found that firms with high levels of pension fund 
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ownership were less likely to be efficient or to pay higher dividends than their industry 
counterparts. Gugler (2003) investigated Austrian firms over the 1991–1999 period, and 
documented that state-controlled firms exhibit a higher dividend payout than family-
controlled firms. Khan (2006) examined the UK Stock Exchange, and showed a positive 
relationship between the level of insurance company shareholding and dividends 
payout, while a negative relationship was found for shareholding by individual 
investors. Al-Kuwari (2012) observed 37 non-financial firms listed on the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange in an emerging market between 1999 and 2003, and found that the 
government ownership increased the probability of paying dividends, consequently 
resulting in reduced agency problems. Similar evidence was reported by He et al. 
(2012). 
 
A large number of previous studies provide evidence that institutional ownership 
contributes to increased dividend payout (e.g. Han et al., 1999; Short et al., 2002; 
Farinha, 2003; Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Hovakimian and Li, 2010; Van Pelt, 2013). 
Nevertheless, Kania and Bacon (2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), Azzam (2010) and 
Ferreira et al. (2010), among others, found that institutional ownership was negatively 
associated with dividend payout  
 
These studies do not directly examine the relationship between female institutional 
directors and dividend payout. In addition, previous evidence regarding the relationship 
between institutional directors and dividend payout is inconclusive. For this reason, we 
predict that the percentage of female institutional directors can either positively or 
negatively affect the dividend payout. Hence, we pose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage of female institutional directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively and negatively associated with the dividend policy. 
 
Percentage of female Executive Directors on Boards of Directors 
 
The presence of executive directors on BD’s reduces firm performance due to agency 
costs arising between internal directors and minority shareholders (Cho and Kim, 2007). 
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Dividend payout has been used by companies to reduce agency problems between 
owners and managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
According to Jensen (1986), CEO duality on BD’s increased the concentration of 
power in one person, leading to opportunistic behaviour that was contrary to the 
interests of shareholders. Maury and Pajuste (2002) examined the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange from 1999 to 2000, and showed firms paid lower dividends when the CEO 
was a large shareholder. Zhang (2008) compared the cash dividend policy of Chinese 
firms listed in Hong Kong and those on the Mainland, and showed that Mainland-listed 
firms with combined CEO and chairman titles on their BD tended to pay lower cash 
dividends; however, there was no such evidence about Hong Kong-listed firms. Francis 
et al. (2009) studied the ExecuComp database, and documented that female CFOs 
reduced dividend payouts. Deshmukh et al. (2010) used panel data from large US 
companies over the period 1980–1994, and documented that firms managed by 
overconfident CEOs had lower levels of dividend payout. In this sense, Banerjee et al. 
(2013) studied 3,492 observations from the Compustat database, and evidenced that 
overconfident CEOs tended to prefer not to pay dividends, preferring instead to 
substitute dividends for stock. Wellalage et al. (2012) analysed the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, and showed that CEO duality on boards resulted in higher dividends. 
Meanwhile, Van Pelt (2013) found a negative association between the percentage of 
inside directors on BD’s and dividend payout. However, Mansourinia et al. (2013) 
examined a sample of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 
2006–2010, and found that there was not a significant relationship between CEO duality 
and dividend policy. 
 
Other studies concluded that CEO duality was positively associated with dividend 
payout (Cheung et al., 2005; John and Knyazeva, 2006; Feng et al., 2007; Obradovich 
and Gill, 2013; Wellalage et al., 2012). Abor and Fiador (2013) observed a sample of 
listed firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange and the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1997–2006, 
and showed that Nigerian firms which separated the roles of CEO and chairman on the 
corporate board had higher dividend payouts.  
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Previous literature focuses on the impact that executive directors on BD’s have on 
dividend payout; however, the effect that female executives on BD’s have on dividend 
policy has not been previously analysed. Despite this, we predict that the presence of 
female executive directors on BD’s is negatively associated with dividend payout, since 
a lower payout of dividends will allow firms to reduce agency costs. Thus, we posit the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of female executive directors on the Board of 
Directors is negatively associated with the dividend policy. 
 
Percentage of shares held by female directors on Boards of Directors 
 
Agency theory argues that when shareholders have greater rights (voting power), 
they can use this power to influence dividend policy. A strong legal system helps to 
protect minority shareholders from majority shareholders’ opportunistic behaviour, such 
as wealth expropriation and excessive compensation. La Porta et al. (2000) and 
Wellalage et al. (2012) evidenced that countries with weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders paid lower dividends.  
 
Most of previous studies analyse the relationship between shareholders’ rights – by 
means of voting – and dividend payout. Nielsen (2005) studied the Compustat Industrial 
Annual Database from 1987–2003, and demonstrated that companies with weaker 
shareholders were more likely to pay dividends. Jiraporn and Ning (2006) examined 
3,732 firm-year observations, and evidenced that firms where shareholder rights were 
weak paid out higher dividends. However, Kowalewski et al. (2007) observed 110 non-
financial listed companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and showed that companies 
with strong shareholder rights paid more dividends than firms with low corporate 
governance standards. Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) observed 714 firm-year 
observations, and evidenced that when shareholder rights were strong, the dividend 
payout increased, as shareholders could use their powers to pressure managers to pay 
higher dividends. Hwang et al. (2013) studied a sample of Korean companies during the 
period 2003–2010, and evidenced that firms with weaker shareholder rights paid lower 
dividends. 
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Other studies (Pérez-González, 2003; Troung and Heaney, 2007; Ramli, 2011) 
evidenced that the largest shareholder often increased dividend payout. Nevertheless, 
authors such as Maury and Pajuste (2002), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Mancinelli 
and Ozkan (2006), among others, found that the largest shareholders reduced dividend 
payout levels. Moreover, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) studied 287 firms in the Value 
Line Investment Survey, and concluded that there was no significant difference among 
dividend payouts with or without large shareholders. 
 
Previous evidence about the impact of shares held by directors (shareholders vote 
rights) on dividend policy does not deal with the relationship between shares held by 
female directors and dividend policy. Regardless, we predict that the shares held by 
female directors on BD’s may have a positive effect on dividend payout, since 
shareholders could use their power by means of their voting rights to pressure managers 
to pay higher dividends (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010), and therefore female directors 
could increase their personal benefits. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of shares held by female directors on the Board of 
Directors is positively associated with the dividend policy. 
 
4.5. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
4.5.1. Sample 
 
The sample is drawn from the population of Spanish non-financial firms listed on the 
Spanish Stock Exchange during 2004-2012. We exclude financial companies both 
because they are under special scrutiny by financial authorities that constrain the role of 
their BD’s, and due to their special accounting practices. Spanish data is obtained from 
the “Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” (SABI) database, from the annual 
corporate governance reports that all listed companies have been required to publish 
since 2003 and from the companies’ Web pages.  
 
We build an unbalanced panel of 910 firm-year observations from 175 firms. Our 
sample roughly accounts for more than 95% of the capitalization of Spanish non-
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financial firms. The panel is unbalanced because some firms became public during this 
time period, while other firms delisted as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions. 
Nevertheless, the estimations based on unbalanced panels are as reliable as those based 
on balanced panels (Arellano, 2003).  
 
4.5.2. Variables  
 
The dependent variable (DPY) is calculated in three ways: (1) as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise (Al-Malkawi, 
2008; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; Byoun et al., 2013); (2) as cash dividends on 
common stock divided by the market value of common stock of firms listed on the 
Madrid Stock Exchange (Fenn and Liang, 2001); (3) as the logarithm of the total 
amount of dividend paid per share in the accounting year (Kumar, 2006). 
 
As independent variables, we define the percentage of female directors on the BD as 
PERWDBD; it is calculated as the ratio between the total number of women on the BD 
and the total members of the BD. The PERIWDBD variable represents the percentage 
of independent women directors on the BD; this is calculated as the ratio between the 
total number of independent female directors on the BD and the total number of 
directors on the BD. The PERINSWDBD defines the percentage of institutional female 
directors; it is calculated as the ratio between the total number of institutional women 
directors on the BD and the total number of directors on the BD. The percentage of 
executive female directors on the BD is defined as PEREWDBD; it is calculated as the 
ratio between the total executive women directors on the BD and the total number of 
directors on the BD. Finally, the variable OWNWOMBD represents the percentage of 
shares held by female directors on the BD; it is calculated as the proportion of shares 
held by women directors.  
 
We control for a number of factors supported by previous evidence (see Rozeff, 
1982) that can potentially affect dividend payout. OWNCON measures ownership 
concentration and is calculated as the percentage of shares held by shareholders holding 
at least 10% of the firm’s stock (Sedzro, 2010). Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. (1992), 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Kumar (2006), among others, showed a negative 
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relationship between the ownership concentration and dividend payout. Another control 
variable used is investment opportunities; in line with Ruiz et al. (2008), and we define 
it as IO, which is calculated as the rate of assets growth. Authors such as Rozeff (1982), 
Díez and Esteban (2001), Fama and French (2001), Mitton (2004), Denis and Osobov 
(2008), Ruiz et al. (2008), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009), Setia-Atmaja (2010), 
Sharma (2011) and O’Connor (2013) demonstrated a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and dividend payout. The ownership of managers is also 
considered as control variable; it is defined as OWNMANG and calculated as the 
percentage of stocks owned by directors. Previous studies (Rozeff, 1982; Fama and 
French, 2001; Short et al., 2002; Hu and Kumar, 2004; Azzam, 2010) reported a 
negative relationship between the percentage of shares held by managers and dividend 
policy.  
 
LEV is calculated as the ratio of book value of debt over total assets, and represents 
the leverage level of the firm. Previous literature (e.g. Díez and Esteban, 2001; Fama 
and French, 2001; Fenn and Liang, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Ruiz et al., 2008; 
Setia-Atmaja, 2010; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011, Byoun et al., 2013) has shown 
that high financial leverage was negatively related to dividend payout. We also control 
for profitability, which is defined as ROA, and calculated as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxation (EBIT) over book assets (O’Connor, 2013). Díez and Esteban 
(2001), Fama and French (2001), Kania and Bacon (2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), 
Denis and Osobov (2008), Abdelsalam et al. (2008), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009), 
Jiraporn et al. (2011), Al Shabibi and Ramesh (2011) and O’Connor (2013) 
demonstrated that firms with a high return on assets ratio had a greater potential to pay 
dividends. ROE represents the profitability of stockholders' investments and, in line 
with Diez and Esteban (2001), is calculated as the net income divided by stockholders’ 
equity. Previous evidence documented that there was a negative relationship between 
returns on equity and the dividend payout (e.g. Díez and Esteban, 2001; Azofra and 
López-de-Fornoda, 2007; Ali Shah et al., 2011; Metha, 2012).  
 
Previous literature shows a positive association between firm size and the dividend 
payout (e.g. Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2008; 
Ruiz et al., 2008; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Setia-
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Atmaja, 2010; Al Shabibi and Ramesh, 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Byoun et al., 2013; 
O’Connor, 2013). Thus, we define firm size as FIRMSIZE; it is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the firm. Finally, various studies (e.g. Mansourinia et al., 
2013; Obradovich and Gill, 2013) reported that board size had a positive impact on pay 
dividends. We therefore define board size as BDSIZE and calculate it as the total 
number of directors serving on the board (Obradovich and Gill, 2013). The variables 
used in the model and the expected signs of each are shown in table 28.  
 
 
TABLE 28 
 
Variable Description 
 
Variables Description Expected Sign 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PERWDBD Total number of women in BD/Total members of BD + 
PERIWDBD Total number of independent women in BD/Total number of members of BD + 
PERINSWDBD Total number of institutional women in BD/Total number of members of BD +/- 
PEREWDBD Total number of insider women in BD/Total number of members of BD - 
OWNWOMBD Percentage of shares held by women directors on BD + 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
OWNCON Percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 10% of the firm’s 
stock - 
IO  Rate of assets growth - 
OWNMANG Percentage of stocks owned by directors - 
LEV Ratio of book value of debt over total assets - 
ROA Ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT)/Total book assets + 
ROE  Ratio of net income/stockholder's equity - 
FIRMSIZE Total assets (log) + 
BDSIZE Total number of directors serving on board     + 
 
 
4.6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
4.6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 29 presents the mean value, the standard error and the 25th, 50th and 75th 
percentiles of all the variables. As can be seen, 56% of the Spanish firms decide to pay 
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dividends. In addition, the average ratio between cash dividends on common stock and 
the market value of common stock of firms is 38’579, with firms paying 5’777€ on 
average (logarithm of total amount of dividends paid per share in the accounting year). 
Furthermore, the statistics reveal that 7’8% of BD’s members are women, being 2’9% 
female independent directors, 3’8% female institutional directors and 0’8% are female 
executive directors.  
 
The ownership of the firms held by women on BD’s is 2’40%, the ownership 
concentration of the companies is 54’20%, the investment opportunities are 20’90% and 
the management ownership is 26’81%. Also, it can be seen that the level of leverage is 
60’20%; the return on assets is, on average, -2’20%, while the return on equity is -
9’20%. Finally, the firm size is 13’30 (log of the total assets), while the board size, on 
average, is 10’78 members. 
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TABLE 29 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
a) Continuos Variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Perc. 25 Perc. 50 Perc. 75 
DPY2 910 38.579 221.611 0.000 7.139 26.328 
DPY3 910 5.777 5.408 0.000 7.653 10.831 
PERWDBD 910 7.800 0.093 0.000 0.059 0.125 
PERIWDBD 910 2.900 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PERINSWDBD 910 3.800 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.071 
PEREWDBD 910 0.800 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OWNWOMBD 910 2.400 9.339 0.000 0.000 0.007 
OWNCON 910 54.200 40.751 20.689 51.104 79.063 
IO  910 20.900 1.293 -0.040 0.034 0.155 
OWNMANG 910 26.800 26.664 1.384 18.535 49.932 
LEV 910 60.200 1.209 0.349 0.562 0.713 
ROA 910 -2.200 2.112 -0.009 0.032 0.084 
ROE  910 -9.200 2.454 -0.001 0.084 0.185 
FIRMSIZE 910 13.295 1.839 11.953 13.162 14.497 
BDSIZE 910 10.778 3.755 8.000 10.000 13.000 
b) Dummies Variables 
   
0 % (0) 1 % (1) 
DPY1 397 44% 513 56% 
Mean, standard deviation and percentiles of the main variables. DPY2 is cash dividends on common stock 
divided by the market value of common stock of firms; DPY3 is the logarithm of the total amount of 
dividends paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of female directors on the 
BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the 
percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; 
OWNWOMBD is the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD; OWNCON is the 
percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 10% of the firm’s stock; IO is the rate of assets 
growth; OWNMANG is the percentage of stocks owned by directors; LEV is the ratio of book value of 
debt over total book assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) over total 
book assets; ROE is the net income divided by stockholder’s equity; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets; BDSIZE is calculated as the total number of directors on the board; DPY1 is equal to 1 if 
the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Table 30 presents the mean differences of the independent variables of Model 1, 
where the dependent variable DPY1 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise. Two groups have been made up in order to 
analyse mean differences among independent variables in relation to whether the 
company pays dividends or not. The results in Table 30 show that the mean difference 
of the variable percentage of independent female directors on BD’s is positive and 
statistically significant at a level of 1%. Therefore, we can accept the second hypothesis. 
 176 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
Thus, these findings show that there is a positive association between the percentage of 
independent women directors and the dividend payout. Concerning the remainder of 
independent variables, each present the expected sign, but none are statistically 
significant. Thus, the first, third, fourth and fifth hypotheses cannot be accepted.  
 
TABLE 30 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 1 
 
Variables 
DPY1 (=1) 
(N=513)  
Mean 
DPY1 (=0)  
(N=397) 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
Test 
(p. value) 
PERWDBD 0.078 0.077 0.001 0.246 
 (0.806) 
PERIWDBD 0.034 0.022 0.012 3.119*** (0.002) 
PERINSWDBD 0.037 0.040 -0.003 -0.682 
 (0.495) 
PEREWDBD 0.006 0.009 -0.003 -1.435  (0.152) 
OWNWOMBD 2.760 2.047 0.713 1.143  (0.253) 
Means Comparison Test. DPY1 is equal to 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; 
PERWDBD is the percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of 
independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional directors; 
PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the percentage of 
shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 
percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
In Table 31 we provide the mean differences for the independent variables of Model 
2, where the dependent variable DPY2 represents the dividend payment in relation to 
the capitalization. Two groups have been created according to the median of the 
dependent variables (which is 7’14). This analysis reveals that, as in Model 1, the 
percentage of independent women directors on BD’s is positive and statistically 
significant at a 1% level. Hence, we can accept the second hypothesis. Therefore, the 
percentage of independent female directors is positively associated with the ratio 
between cash dividends paid per share and firm capitalization. The remainder of 
independent variables offers the predicted sign, but they are not statistically significant.  
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TABLE 31 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 2 
 
Variables 
DPY2 (>=7,14) 
(N=455)  
Mean 
DPY2(<7,14) 
 (N=455) 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
Test  
(p. value) 
PERWDBD 0.080 0.075 0.005 0.915 
 (0.360) 
PERIWDBD 0.035 0.022 0.013 0.3562*** (0.000) 
PERINSWDBD 0.037 0.039 -0.002 -0.503  (0615) 
PEREWDBD 0.007 0.009 -0.002 -9.975 
 (0.330) 
OWNWOMBD 2.956 1.942 1.014 1.639  (0.102) 
Means Comparison Test. DPY2 is cash dividends on common stock divided by the market value of 
common stock of firms; PERWDBD is the percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the 
percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional 
directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence 
level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
Table 32 shows the mean difference for the independent variables of Model 3, where 
the dependent variable DPY3 represents the dividend payment per share in the 
accounting year.  The median of the dependent variable to create the two groups is 7’65. 
The analysis of the results reveals that the percentage of independent women directors 
and the percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s present the expected sign 
and are statistically significant at a level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Hence, we can 
accept the second and third hypotheses. Thus, according to these results, we can 
conclude that a higher percentage of independent female directors on BD’s makes them 
more likely to pay dividends, while the percentage of institutional female directors on 
BD’s means they are less likely to pay dividends. The rest of independent variables are 
not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 178 
 
Gender diversity on Boards and Audit Committees of Spanish listed firms 
TABLE 32 
 
Means Comparison Test. Model 3 
 
Variables 
DPY3 (>=7,65) 
(N=455)  
Mean 
DPY3 (<7,65) 
(N=455)  
Mean 
Mean 
Difference 
Univariate 
Test 
(p. value) 
PERWDBD 0.077 0.079 -0.002 -0.290 
 (0.772) 
PERIWDBD 0.036 0.021 0.015 4.014***  (0,000) 
PERINSWDBD 0.033 0.044 -0.011 -2.379** (0.018) 
PEREWDBD 0.006 0.009 -0.003 -1.385 (0.166) 
OWNWOMBD 2.668 2.230 0.438 0.709  (0.479) 
Means Comparison Test. DPY3 is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends paid per share in the 
accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the 
percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional 
directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence 
level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
4.6.2. Regression Results 
 
In Table 33 we present the results for the Spearman correlation matrix in order to test 
for multicollinearity. The correlation between most of the pairs is not significant and is 
low (generally below 0’5). Further, none of the correlation coefficients are high enough 
(>0.80) to cause multicollinearity problems (see Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). 
According to these results, we can conclude that these models do not have significant 
multicollinearity problems. In any case, we also calculate the vector inflation factor 
(VIF) to corroborate that our results are not biased because of the multicollinearity. 
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TABLE 33 
 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
  DPY1 DPY2 DPY3 PERWDBD PERIWDBD PERINSWDBD PEREWDBD OWNWOMBD OWNCON IO OWNMANG LEV ROA ROE FIRMSIZE 
DPY2 0.794*** 
              
DPY3 0.782*** 0.709*** 
             
PERWDBD -0.001 0.034 0.021 
            
PERIWDBD 0.091*** 0.140*** 0.173*** 0.442*** 
           
PERINSWDBD -0.002 -0.010 -0.031 0.563*** -0.060* 
          
PEREWDBD -0.033 -0.036 -0.093*** 0.286*** -0.117*** 0.058* 
         
OWNWOMBD 0.062* 0.061* 0.032 0.644*** 0.113*** 0.525*** 0.289*** 
        
OWNCON -0.064* -0.036 -0.023 0.069** -0.095*** 0.104*** 0.170*** -0.019 
       
IO 0.218*** 0.155*** 0.176*** -0.061* 0.005 0.003 -0.049 0.002 0.003 
      
OWNMANG -0.168*** -0.192*** -0.269*** 0.170*** -0.209*** 0.248*** 0.211*** 0.307*** 0.270*** -0.005 
     
LEV -0.103*** -0.041 -0.002 -0.008 -0.087*** 0.075** 0.003 0.052 0.165*** -0.015 0.157*** 
    
ROA 0.568*** 0.566*** 0.523*** -0.052 0.109*** -0.066** -0.041 -0.002 -0.067** 0.261*** -0.167*** -0.236*** 
   
ROE 0.551*** 0.566*** 0.531*** -0.025 0.089*** -0.027 0.003 0.042 0.005 0.235*** -0.084** 0.059* 0.759*** 
  
FIRMSIZE 0.329*** 0.403*** 0.528*** 0.033 0.186*** 0.013 -0.081** -0.037 0.109*** 0.151*** -0.258*** 0.296*** 0.092*** 0.229*** 
 
BDSIZE 0.298*** 0.341*** 0.402*** -0.037 0.119*** 0.046 -0.160*** -0.011 -0.078** 0.126*** -0.178*** 0.082** 0.108*** 0.169*** 0.614*** 
Spearman’s correlation matrix. DPY1 is equal to 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; DPY2 is cash dividends on common stock divided by the market 
value of common stock of firms; DPY3 is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of female 
directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the percentage of institutional directors; 
PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD; OWNCON is the 
percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 10% of the firm’s stock; IO is the rate of assets growth; OWNMANG is the percentage of stocks owned by 
directors; LEV is the ratio of book value of debt over total book assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) over total book assets; ROE is 
the net income divided by stockholder’s equity; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; BDSIZE is calculated as the total number of directors on the board. 
Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, ** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent  
 
 In Table 34 we show the results of the regression for women directors on BD’s. As can be 
observed, we have built three models. In Model 1 we examined whether firms pay or do not 
pay dividends; in Model 2 we examine the dividend payment in relation to capitalization; 
while in Model 3 we analyse the of the total amount of dividend payout per share in the 
accounting year. The statistic tests show that the three models are statistically significant at 
1%. 
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TABLE 34 
 
Results of the Regression for Women Directors on Board of Directors 
 
Variables Expected Sign 
Model 1 
DPY1 
  Model 2 
DPY2 
  Model 3 
DPY3   
  Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
Estimated 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
 
      
PERWDBD + 4.809***  6.788*** (0.008)  
0.017** 
(0.023)  (0.004) 
   
PERIWDBD + 0.642 
 (0.748)  
190.990 
(0.282)  
0.040 
 (0.303)  
   
PERINSWDBD +/- -1.224** (0.048)  
-7.589* 
(0.090)  
-0.102** 
(0.022)  
   
PEREWDBD - -1.324 (0.644)  
-25.609 
(0.923)  
-0.034 
(0.310)  
   
OWNWOMBD + 0.009  (0.392)  
0.051** 
(0.020)  
0.061* 
 
  
(0.083) 
 
OWNCON - -0.003 (0.198)  
0.360* 
(0.073)  
0.001  
(0.982)  
   
IO  - -0.289** (0.017)  
-2.247 
(0.696)  
-0.109*** 
(0.000)  
   
OWNMANG - -0.003 (0.400)  
-0.330 
(0.298)  
-0.118*** 
(0.000)  
   
LEV - -1.901*** (0.000)  
1.907 
(0.811)  
0.072* 
(0.053)  
   
ROA + 0.894 
 (0.198)  
2.126 
(0.640)  
0.066* 
 
  
(0.074) 
 
ROE  - 1.219*** (0.000)  
1.175 
(0.240)  
0.092*** 
(0.001)  
   
FIRMSIZE + 0.495*** (0.000)  
-8.680 
(0.100)  
0.379*** 
(0.000)  
   
BDSIZE + 0.073** (0.017)  
13.911*** 
(0.000)  
0.099*** 
(0.007)  
   
Firm Fix Effects Included   Included   Included   
Test Statistic   313.625***   2.296***   19.354***   
Pseudo R2   39’10%   2,91%   29,80%   
Estimated coefficients. In Model 1, the dependent variable is DPY1, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
pays dividends and 0, otherwise; in Model 2, the dependent variable is DPY2, which is calculated as the ratio between cash 
dividends on common stock ant the market value of common stock of firms; in Model 3, the dependent variable is DPY3, 
which is the logarithm of the total amount of dividend paid per share in the accounting year; PERWDBD is the percentage of 
female directors on the BD; PERIWDBD is the percentage of independent female directors on the BD; PERINSWDBD is the 
percentage of institutional directors; PEREWDBD is the percentage of executive directors on the BD; OWNWOMBD is the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on the BD; OWNCON is the percentage of shares held by shareholders holding 
at least 10% of the firm’s stock; IO is the rate of assets growth; OWNMANG is the percentage of stocks owned by directors; 
LEV is the ratio of book value of debt over total book assets; ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) 
over total book assets; ROE is the net income divided by stockholder’s equity; FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; BDSIZE is calculated as the total number of directors on the board. Significant at *** for 99 percent confidence level, 
** for 95 percent and * for 90 percent. 
 
 
According to our predictions – and as can be appreciated in Model 1, where the dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise – the percentage of 
female directors on BD’s (PERWDBD) presents the expected sign and is statistically 
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significant at 1%. Thus, we can accept the first hypothesis: the percentage of women directors 
on BD’s increases the probability of dividend payout. Authors such as Knyazeva et al. (2009), 
Byoun et al. (2013) and Van Pelt (2013) also provide evidence of the positive relationship 
between the percentage of women on BD’s and dividend payout. As predicted, the variable 
percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s (PERINSWDBD) offers a negative sign 
and is statistically significant at 5%. Thus, the third hypothesis can also be accepted. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the percentage of institutional women directors on BD’s 
negatively influence decisions regarding paying dividends. Similar evidence was reported by 
Kania and Bacon (2005), Amidu and Abor (2006), Azzam (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2010), 
among others. The remainder of independent variables, the percentage of independent female 
directors (PERIWDBD), the percentage of executive women directors (PEREWDBD) and the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s (OWNWOMBD) offers the expected 
sign, but they are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot accept the second, fourth and 
fifth hypotheses, and therefore we cannot provide evidence that the percentage of independent 
and executive women directors and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s 
have an impact on dividend payout. In this sense, Cotter and Sylvester (2003), Chen et al. 
(2005), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Mansourinia et al. (2013), among others, documented 
that no significant association was found between independent directors and dividend payout. 
Concerning the non-relationship between executive directors and the decision of paying 
dividends, Abor and Fiador (2013) and Mansourinia et al. (2013) provide similar findings, 
while Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and Al-Kuwari (2012) also evidenced that large 
shareholders did not affect dividend payout decisions, which is in line with our findings.  
 
Regarding the control variables, it can be observed that the variables investment 
opportunities (IO), leverage (LEV), firm size (FIRMSIZE) and board size (BDSIZE) present 
the expected sign and are statistically significant. In addition, the return on equity (ROE) 
offers a positive sign – contrary to that expected – and is statistically significant. In the same 
vein, Aivazan et al. (2003), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and Malik et al. (2013) documented that 
there was a positive relationship between returns on equity and dividend payout. Thus, these 
findings report that high investment opportunities and levels of leverage are negatively 
associated with decisions relating to paying dividends, whereas a company is more likely to 
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pay dividends when returns on equity (ROE), firm size and board size increase. The rest of 
control variables provide the expected sign, but they are not statistically significant.  
 
In Model 2, where the dependent variable is the ratio between cash dividends on common 
stock and the market value of firms’ common stock, the independent variables for the 
percentage of female directors (PERWDBD) and the percentage of shares held by female 
directors on BD’s (OWNWOMBD) present a positive sign and are statistically significant at 
1% and 5%, respectively. Thus, the first and fifth hypotheses can be accepted, and we can 
conclude that the percentage of women directors and the percentage of shares held by women 
on BD’s increase the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization. On the other hand, the 
variable percentage of institutional directors on BD’s (PERINSWDBD) presents a negative 
sign and is statistically significant as expected. As a result, we can accept the third hypothesis. 
Therefore, this result implies that as the percentage of institutional female directors increases, 
it is more likely that the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization will decrease.  
 
In addition, the percentage of independent female directors on BD’s (PERIWDBD) and the 
percentage of female executive directors (PEREWDBD) provide the predicted sign; however, 
they are not statistically significant. Hence, we cannot accept the second and fourth 
hypotheses. As a result, we conclude that, as reported in Model 1, the percentage of female 
independent and executive directors on BD’s has no impact on the ratio of dividend policy.  
 
Contrary to our predictions with respect to the control variables, the ownership 
concentration (OWNCON) shows a positive sign and is statistically significant at a level of 
1%. In the same vein, Ahmed and Javid (2008) and Chen et al. (2009) documented that listed 
companies in Pakistan and China paid more dividends, respectively, as ownership became 
more concentrated. In addition, the board size (BDSIZE) presents the expected sign and is 
significant at 1%. According to these findings, we can conclude that companies whose 
ownership is concentrated and whose BD’s are large are more likely to pay dividends. The 
rest of the control variables are not statistically significant. 
 
In Model 3, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of dividends 
paid per share in the accounting year, the results reveal that the percentage of female directors 
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(PERWDBD) and the percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s 
(OWNWOMBD) present the expected sign and are statistically significant at 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Thus, we can accept the first and fifth hypothesis, and can therefore reach the 
conclusion that the dividend payment will increase when the percentage of women directors 
and the percentage of shares held by women directors on BD’s also increases. As predicted, 
the variable percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s (PERINSWDBD) offers a 
negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level, which allows us to accept the 
third hypothesis. Thus, these findings show that the percentage of female institutional 
directors on BD’s will reduce the probability of paying dividends. In same vein, Kania and 
Bacon (2005) and Amidu and Abor (2006) found that institutional ownership was negatively 
associated with dividend payout. Moreover, as can be seen in Models 1 and 2, the other 
independent variables (PERIWDBD and PEREWDBD) present the expected sign, but they 
are not statistically significant.  
 
With regards to the control variables, we can observe that investment opportunities (IO), 
manager ownership (OWNMANG), return on assets (ROA), firm size (FIRMSIZE) and board 
size (BDSIZE) present the expected signs and are statistically significant. Therefore, these 
results provide evidence that investment opportunities and management ownership are 
negatively associated with dividend payout, while those relating to a high return on assets, 
firm size and board size will increase the likelihood of paying dividends. Contrary to our 
expectations, the variables leverage (LEV) and return on equity (ROE) present a positive sign  
and are statistically significant at 1% and 10%, respectively. In line with these findings, 
Chang and Rhee (1990), Maury and Pajuste (2002), Kania and Bacon (2005) and Kahn (2006) 
reported that there was a positive relationship between leverage and dividend payout. In 
relation to the positive relationship between return on equity (ROE) and the payment of 
dividends, Al -Kuwari (2012) and Ehsan et al. (2013) showed similar conclusions. Thus, we 
can conclude that there is a greater likelihood to pay dividends when the leverage and ROE 
increases. Finally, the variable ownership concentration is not statistically significant.  
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4.7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous studies have examined the effect of gender diversity on BD’s on dividend policy. 
Thus, this study provides insight into the relationship between gender diversity on BD’s and 
dividend policies of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. Dividend policy is measured 
in three ways. In Model 1, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 
1 if the company pays dividends, and 0 otherwise; in Model 2, the dependent variable is the 
ratio between cash dividends on common stock and the market value of common stock of 
firms; and in Model 3, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of dividend 
payout per share in the accounting year. We hypothesized that the percentage of female 
directors on BD’s, the percentage of independent, institutional and executive directors on 
BD’s, and the shares held by female directors on BD’s would affect dividend policy. 
 
Our results demonstrate that the percentage of female directors on BD’s positively 
influences dividend policy, as the percentage of women directors increases the probability of 
affecting the decision of paying dividends, the ratio between cash dividends and 
capitalization, and the payment of dividends per share in the accounting year. This finding is 
supported by Ye et al. (2010), who showed that the percentage of women directors on BD’s 
increases dividend payout. The fact that the percentage of female directors on BD’s increases 
the dividend payout can be due to that women are more risk averse than men and 
consequently, female directors prefer to distribute the earnings instead of invest the cash in 
future inversions. The percentage of independent female directors on BD’s has no impact on 
the dividend policy analysed in the three models. The percentage of institutional female 
directors on BD’s negatively impacts on dividend policy, since there is a negative association 
between institutional female directors and the decision of paying dividends, as well as the 
ratio between cash dividends and capitalization and the payment of dividends per share in the 
accounting year. This result suggests that institutional female directors on BD’s prefer to pay 
lower dividends, thereby retaining and investing more of their earnings, resulting in agency 
costs being lower. These results support the relevant role of institutional directors on boards 
and the lack of influence of independent directors in European countries, as suggested in the 
literature (e.g. Vafeas, 2000; García-Osma and Gill de Albornoz, 2007; Lorca et al., 2011; 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2013). The lack of significance of independent female 
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directors on BD’s may be related to the measure of independence, particularly in 
communitarian studies, where there are many concerns that board members are not 
independent of those who nominate them. Other explanations could be the substitution effect 
between independent female and institutional female directors, or as Abdelasam et al. (2008) 
and Mansourinia et al. (2013) reported, because the presence of independent female directors 
on BD’s cannot influence the dividend policy decisions of executive directors and managers. 
 
The percentage of executive female directors on boards has no effect on the dividend 
payout. This result suggests that executive women directors have more firm-specific 
information, and that rather than paying dividends, prefer instead to have higher control of 
cash to invest in their firm’s projects, leading to higher returns. This argument is supported by 
Jensen (1986) and Crifo and Forget (2013), who argue that managers in firms with excess 
cash flows have an incentive to waste organizational resources on personal ends, rather than 
pay out the excess cash to shareholders through dividends. The percentage of shares held by 
female directors on BD’s has no effect on the decision of paying dividends or not, but it raises 
the ratio between cash dividends and capitalization and the amount of dividends paid by share 
in the accounting year. The results suggest that shareholders whose rights are stronger can use 
their power to pressure managers to pay higher dividends (La Porta, et al., 2000; Brockman 
and Unlu, 2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010).  
 
The limitations of this study are as follows. Firstly, it is possible that there are unknown 
factors that could impact our dependent variables. While we have controlled for as many 
factors as possible based on theory and prior research, empirical and theoretical limitations 
prevent us from knowing whether all of the important influences have been controlled for and 
addressed. Finally, the study is based on the Madrid Stock Exchange for the period 2004–
2012, so the results obtained should not to be extrapolated to other countries or periods.  
 
This study could give rise to future lines of research. Firstly, it would add value to analyse 
the impact of gender diversity on BD’s on the shares repurchased. Secondly, it would be 
interesting to examine the relationship between gender diversity on BD’s and dividends tax 
advantages.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to analyse the repercussions of gender diversity for the 
decision-making bodies of Spanish listed companies. In this section, we describe the findings 
reported in the four chapters. 
 
The aim of the first chapter was to analyse whether AC diversity has an effect on financial 
reporting quality, measured by means of the type of opinion issued by external auditors in 
their audit reports. The results evidenced that after controlling for other audit report 
qualifications-related factors, no negative association was found between AC diversity and 
the probability of receiving qualifications with errors, non-compliance and the omission of 
information, but we did find a significant and positive relationship between the number of 
AC’s chaired by women and the likelihood of disclosing qualifications with uncertainties, 
suggesting that having chairwomen on AC’s would enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
 
In our opinion, these results could be caused by various factors. Firstly, the low number of 
qualifications with errors, non-compliance and the omission of information can justify the 
lack of significant results for these types of qualifications. Secondly, the vestiges of the 
Franco dictatorship, a traditionally male-dominated society, can also support these findings. 
Spanish society needs to remove any remainder of this era over time. To this effect, the 
presence of women on corporate governance bodies is a new phenomenon, which might play 
a role in restricting their influence. It is possible that female AC members are more ethical 
than male AC members but are unable to influence the remainder of the AC. Therefore, their 
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role in relation to financial reporting issues would be either limited or unattended to in most 
cases. Thirdly, it is possible that women are not uniform in their ability to influence other AC 
members. Individual differences in this ability may mask a gender difference in financial 
reporting quality beliefs and lead to the null results. Unfortunately, we cannot control for this 
effect in the study. Finally, the culture of corporate governance may not yet be fully 
developed in Spain, in particular with respect to AC’s, as these mechanisms of corporate 
governance were imported from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
The goal of the second chapter of this thesis was to examine whether a gender wage gap 
exists among the BD’s of Spanish listed companies. The remuneration of male–female 
directors was calculated as the logarithm of the difference between male and female directors’ 
compensation of firms. The results showed that the percentage of female directors and the 
geographical region have no effect on the gender wage gap, while women’s presence on the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender gap in pay, which is reduced 
when there are independent female directors who had gained degree on the BD and the 
company operates in the finance and real estate services sector.  
 
In our opinion, the results reported may be due to the following reasons. Firstly, the lack of 
significance of the geographical region for the gender wage gap on BD’s can be justified 
because the organizational culture of the firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange is 
influenced by the values of their directors. Secondly, the facts that the percentage of females 
on the board has no effect on the gender pay gap and the presence of women on the 
Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender gap in pay can be explained 
because there are few women on BD’s and Nomination and Compensation Committees and 
they cannot influence the opinion of the men who make up the BD and the Nomination and 
Compensation Committee. Thirdly, our results also reported that the presence of graduate 
independent female directors narrows the gender pay gap, which could be due to the fact that 
female directors with high educational qualifications obtain similar compensation to male 
directors.  
 
The objective of the third chapter was to examine whether gender diversity on BD’s 
influences the voluntary formation of their board sub-committees. The results showed that the 
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voluntary creation of board sub-committees depends on the female independent directors on 
BD’s, the number of female directors on BD’s and the ownership held by female directors. In 
addition, the percentage of executive and institutional directors on BD’s reduces the 
probability of creating an Executive Committee and all or some of the board sub-committees, 
respectively. Nevertheless, the remuneration of female directors on BD’s has no impact on the 
voluntary formation of board sub-committees. 
 
In our opinion, these findings may be due to the following reasons. Firstly, a high 
percentage of executive female directors on BD’s could be seen as a substitute for an 
Executive Committee, which can explain the reduction of all or some of the board sub-
committees and the Committee for Supervision in order to avoid duplicating functions. 
Secondly, the percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s reduces the formation of all 
or some of the board sub-committees. This implies that those BD’s dominated by institutional 
directors provide transparency and greater oversight capacity in business management; 
therefore, the demand for control mechanisms is reduced. Thirdly, the remuneration of female 
directors on BD’s does not contribute to the voluntary creation of board sub-committees. This 
finding could be due to the fact that there are some Spanish firms that do not include 
information on the remuneration of senior positions in their annual reports, although this has 
been obligatory since the publication of the Spanish Listed Companies Transparency Act 
(Law 26/2003). 
 
The main idea of the last chapter was to study the impact of board diversity on the 
dividend policy. To achieve this objective, we calculated the dependent variable in three 
ways: (1) as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company pays dividends and 0 
otherwise; (2) as cash dividends on common stock divided by the market value of common 
stock of listed firms; (3) as the logarithm of the total amount of dividends paid per share in the 
accounting year. Our results showed that the percentage of female directors and the 
percentage of shares held by female directors on BD’s are positively associated with the 
dividend payout, while the percentage of institutional female directors on BD’s has a negative 
impact on the dividend payment. The percentage of independent and executive female 
directors on BD’s has no effect on the dividend payout. 
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These findings can be explained in the following points. Firstly, the fact that the percentage 
of female directors on BD’s increases the dividend payout could be due to women being more 
risk-averse than men; consequently, female directors prefer to distribute the earnings instead 
of investing the cash in future investments. Secondly, the female shareholders whose rights 
are stronger can use their power to pressure managers to pay higher dividends. Thirdly, 
institutional female directors prefer to pay lower dividends, thereby retaining and investing 
more of their earnings, resulting in the agency costs being lower. Fourthly, the lack of 
significance of independent female directors on BD’s for the dividend policy may be because 
in communitarian studies there are many concerns that board members are not independent 
from those who nominate them. Other explications may be that the presence of independent 
female directors on BD’s cannot influence the dividend policy decisions of executive 
directors and managers. Finally, executive female directors have more firm-specific 
information, so rather than paying dividends, they prefer to have a higher level of control over 
cash to invest in their firm’s projects, leading to higher returns. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
The cultural, political, social and economic changes in recent years in Spain have increased 
the gender diversity on companies’ decision-making bodies. This increase has been enhanced 
by the implementation of the Unified Code of Corporate Governance (2006), the proposals of 
which are intended to support the female presence on decision bodies. However, the 
implementation of Act 3/2007 of 22 March, for Effective Equality between Women and Men 
(LOIMH), Article 75, framed the regulation of the appointment of men and women on BD’s 
in an equitable way. This law establishes that listed companies have to achieve a quota of 
40% of women on decision-making bodies by 2015. Thus, the Spanish law allowed 8 years to 
reach this percentage.  
 
The results have shown that gender diversity plays an important role in positions of 
responsibility in Spanish companies. Our evidence supports Act 3/2007 of 22 March based on 
the premises that the number of AC’s chaired by women increases the likelihood of disclosing 
qualifications with uncertainties, gender diversity on BD’s has an impact on the gender gap in 
pay, gender diversity increases the board sub-committees and gender diversity has an impact 
on the dividend policy. However, we can observe in our results that the percentage of females 
on decision-making bodies is too low to achieve the objective by 2015. In our opinion, the 
legislation should encourage greater participation of women in governing bodies. However, it 
is necessary to introduce some changes into the Spanish laws in order to increase women’s 
presence on the decision-making bodies of firms.  
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For this reason, we would like to recommend some actions regarding gender diversity in 
decision-making bodies, which should be taken to improve the presence of women on these 
bodies. Firstly, we recommend that the legislative bodies should establish stronger 
government sanctions for non-compliance with the law (Law 3/2007) since the results have 
shown that the progress made is still too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target. 
Secondly, it would also be advisable to introduce a wide range of laws and tools to address 
the underrepresentation of women in senior leadership positions in medium-sized and small 
firms, considering that in these firms there can be few women on the board. Finally, it would 
be interesting to establish some methods for monitoring the equality plans followed by firms 
in their recruitment and selection processes in order to assess whether firms discriminate 
between workers.  
 
The results have significant implications for Spanish supervisors and regulators. In the first 
place, the findings suggest that the composition of gender diversity on AC’s has an effect on 
the audit opinion. Specifically, this evidence could help regulators and legislative bodies to 
improve some aspects of the structure of the board of directors and its sub-committees. In the 
second place, this study reveals the existence of a gender gap in pay on BD’s, so these results 
should stimulate regulators and politicians to improve the present situation and eliminate 
male–female salary discrimination at all levels of companies. In the third place, the results 
confirm that gender diversity on BD’s has a significant influence on the voluntary creation of 
board sub-committees and the dividend payout, so the existing legislation should encourage 
greater participation of women in governing bodies. This thesis provides evidence of the 
positive impact of female directors on BD’s and AC’s; therefore, all companies, especially 
listed companies, should be motivated to achieve the gender quota of 40% of women on their 
decision-making bodies by 2015. In addition, legislators should establish stronger sanctions in 
the case of failure to follow the law, combined with more effective equality plans. 
 
We propose the following future research lines related to this thesis: 
• Examining the impact of women in corporate governance, especially in the 
international context, as a comparison of our results with other legal, cultural, 
professional and regulatory environments would enrich the debate about gender 
diversity in corporate governance. 
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• Analysing the gender wage gap between female and male directors, 
distinguishing between fixed and variable compensations, would be valuable to shed 
light on the potential of incentives to narrow the gender gap in pay. 
• To investigate whether male–female compensation differences exist at all 
levels of an organization or merely on the board, assessing the equality plans applied 
by firms in their recruitment and selection processes.  
• To examine employees’ pay taking into account the wages of immigrant 
workers to establish whether firms discriminate in this area. 
• To study the pay earned by both male and female directors in international 
firms and establish whether any gender-based compensation differences that may 
come to light are due to political, cultural or social factors. 
• To describe the impact of gender diversity on BD’s in the voluntary formation 
of board sub-committees by comparing companies of the Madrid Stock Exchange with 
companies from a country of a traditional culture, such as an oriental country, where 
the role of women in firm decision-making bodies is reduced. 
• To study whether gender diversity on BBD’s can influence the demand for 
external control mechanisms or diversification of the firm’s business. 
• To explore the impact of gender diversity on BD’s on the shares’ repurchase. 
• To identify the relationship between gender diversity on BD’s and dividends’ 
tax advantages. 
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CONCLUSIÓN 
 
 
 
 
 
Los cambios culturales, políticos, sociales y económicos ocurridos en los últimos años en 
España han incrementado la diversidad de género en los órganos de decisión de las 
compañías. Este incremento se vio reforzado por la aplicación del Código Unificado de Buen 
Gobierno (2006), cuyas recomendaciones apoyaban la presencia femenina en los órganos de 
decisión de las empresas. Pero fue con la aplicación de la Ley 3/2007, de 22 de Marzo, para la 
igualdad efectiva entre mujeres y hombres (LOIMH), el artículo 75, la que establece la 
regulación de forma equitativa de hombres y mujeres en los BD’s. Esta ley establece que las 
empresas cotizadas tienen que alcanzar una cuota del 40% de mujeres en los órganos de toma 
de decisiones de las empresas hasta 2015. Por lo tanto, la ley española tiene ocho años para 
llegar a este porcentaje. 
 
Los resultados han demostrado que la diversidad de género tiene un importante papel en 
las posiciones de responsabilidad de las compañías españolas. Nuestra evidencia apoya a la 
Ley 3/2007 del 22 de Marzo basada en la premisa que el número de mujeres presidentas en el 
AC incrementa la probabilidad de divulgar salvedades con incertidumbres, la diversidad de 
género en los BD’s tiene un importante impacto en la brecha salarial por razón de género, la 
diversidad de género incrementa la constitución de Comisiones Delegadas del consejo y la 
diversidad de género tiene un impacto en la política de dividendos. Pero observamos en 
nuestros resultados que el porcentaje de mujeres en los órganos de decisión es demasiado 
lento para conseguir el objetivo en 2015. En nuestra opinión la legislación debería fomentar 
una mayor participación de mujeres en los órganos de gobierno. Sin embargo, es necesario 
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introducir algunos cambios en las leyes españolas con el fin de aumentar la presencia de 
mujeres en los órganos de decisión de las empresas. 
 
Por esta razón, nos gustaría recomendar algunas acciones relativas a la diversidad de 
género en los órganos de decisión y control, que deben adoptarse para mejorar la presencia de 
mujeres en estos órganos. En primer lugar, recomendamos que los órganos legislativos 
deberían establecer fuertes sanciones gubernamentales al incumplimiento de la ley (Ley 
3/2007) ya que los resultados han demostrado que los avances son todavía demasiado lentos 
para alcanzar el objetivo de gobierno en 2015. En segundo lugar, sería conveniente introducir 
una amplia gama de leyes y herramientas desarrolladas para hacer frente a la escasa 
representación de las mujeres en altos cargos directivos en las pequeñas y medianas empresas 
teniendo en cuenta que en estas empresas pueden haber pocas mujeres en los consejos. 
Finalmente, sería interesante establecer algunos métodos para controlar los planes de igualdad 
aplicados por las empresas en sus procesos de reclutamiento y selección de empleados con la 
finalidad de conocer si las empresas discriminan a los trabajadores. 
 
Los resultados tienen implicaciones importantes para los supervisores y reguladores 
españoles. En primer lugar, los hallazgos sugieren que la inclusión de la diversidad de género 
en los AC’s tiene efectos sobre la opinión del auditor. Específicamente, esta evidencia puede 
ayudar a los órganos reguladores y legisladores a mejorar algunos aspectos de la estructura de 
los BD’s y de las Comisiones Delegadas. En segundo lugar, este estudio revela la existencia 
de una brecha salarial por razón de género en los BD’s, por eso estos resultados deberían 
estimular a los reguladores y políticos a mejorar la situación actual y eliminar la 
discriminación salarial entre hombres y mujeres en todos los niveles de las compañías. En 
tercer lugar, los resultados confirman que la diversidad de género en los BD’s tiene una 
influencia significativa en la creación voluntaria de Comisiones Delegadas y en la política de 
dividendos, por eso la legislación actual debe fomentar la participación de mujeres en los 
órganos de gobierno. Esta tesis proporciona evidencia del impacto positivo de las mujeres en 
los BD’s y los AC’s y por lo tanto, todas las empresas, especialmente las empresas cotizadas, 
deben estar motivadas para alcanzar la cuota de género del 40% de mujeres en los órganos de 
toma de decisiones para 2015. Además, los legisladores deberían establecer sanciones más 
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severas en caso de incumplimiento de la ley, combinado con planes de igualdad más 
efectivos. 
 
A continuación, proponemos las siguientes líneas de investigación futuras relacionadas con 
esta tesis: 
• Examinar el impacto de las mujeres en el gobierno corporativo, especialmente 
en el contexto internacional, como la comparación de nuestros resultados con otros 
entornos jurídicos, culturales, profesionales y reglamentarios que enriquecerían el debate 
sobre la diversidad de género en el gobierno corporativo. 
• Analizar el salario de los directivos distinguiendo entre el salario fijo y variable 
ya que sería valioso arrojar luz sobre el potencial de los incentivos en la reducción de la 
brecha salarial por razón de género. 
• Investigar si existen diferencias salariales entre los hombres y las mujeres de 
todos los niveles de las organizaciones o simplemente en los Consejos de Administración, 
evaluando que planes de igualdad utilizan las empresas para contratar a sus trabajadores. 
• Examinar las remuneraciones de los empleados de las empresas, teniendo en 
cuenta los salarios percibidos por los inmigrantes, y analizar si las empresas realizan algún 
tipo de discriminación salarial 
• Estudiar las retribuciones de los hombres y mujeres que forman los CA de 
empresas internacionales, y observar, en el caso que se pongan de manifiesto diferencias 
salariales por razón de género, si éstas son debidas a cambios políticos, culturales y 
sociales. 
• Describir el impacto de la diversidad de género en CA en la creación voluntaria 
de Comisiones Delgadas comparando las empresas de la Bolsa de Madrid y otros países 
con una cultura más tradicional, como puede ser la oriental, donde se reduce el papel de 
las mujeres en los puestos de toma de decisiones de las empresas. 
• Estudiar si la diversidad de género puede influir en la demanda de mecanismos 
externos o en la diversificación de los negocios de la empresa. 
• Explorar el impacto de la diversidad de género en el CA y la recompra de 
acciones. 
• Buscar la relación entre la diversidad de género en los CA y las ventajas 
fiscales de los dividendos. 
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NOTES 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Financial statements are the representations of management, and individual investors use 
them to make decisions but rely on the auditor to verify their credibility (Chen et al., 2000; 
Chow and Rice, 1982; Dopuch et al., 1986; Firth, 1978). As an audit can effectively reduce 
and mitigate information asymmetry, auditing is an integral part of the modern financial 
reporting system. When we evaluate an accounting system in a capital market, we should 
adequately consider the auditor’s opinion and assurance on financial reports. An auditor may 
issue an unqualified or qualified opinion based on his/her examination. A qualified audit 
opinion is prima facie evidence of low financial reporting quality.  
 
2 Given the high correlation between MCA and %MCA in both models, a new analysis 
(logistic regression) was done by dropping the variable percentage of women in ACs 
(%MCA). The results referring to the hypotheses, not provided, were unaffected. 
 
3
 The logarithm of the difference between mean values of male and female directors’ 
compensation of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange has been also used as a 
dependent variable. The mean value of compensation is calculated as the ratio between the 
total remuneration of the director and the total number of directors of the BD. The results, not 
provided, are unaffected.  
 
4 Spanish acronym for Igualdad Efectiva entre Mujeres y Hombres. 
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